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5Abstract
A zero-knowledge proof is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that enables the
verification of statements without revealing unnecessary information. Zero-knowledge
proofs are a key component of many cryptographic protocols and, often, one of their
main efficiency bottlenecks. In recent years there have been great advances in improv-
ing the efficiency of zero-knowledge proofs, bring them closer to wide deployability.
In this thesis we make another step towards the construction of computationally-
efficient zero-knowledge proofs. Specifically, we construct efficient zero-knowledge
proofs for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits for which the computational cost of
the prover is only a constant factor more expensive than direct evaluation of the cir-
cuit. We also construct efficient zero-knowledge proofs to check the correct execution
of (Tiny)RAM programs. In this case the computational cost for the prover is a super-
constant factor larger than executing the program directly. Our proofs also support
efficient verification and small proof sizes. For security, they rely on symmetric prim-
itives and could potentially withstand attacks from quantum computers.
On a different research direction, we look at group signatures, a fundamental prim-
itive which relies on zero-knowledge proofs. A group signature enables users to sign
anonymously on behalf of a group of users. In case of dispute a Manager can iden-
tify the author of a signature and potentially banish the user from the group. In this
thesis we address the fundamental question of defining the security of fully dynamic
group signatures, for which the users can join and leave at any time. Differently from
other restricted settings, this case has been largely overlooked in the past. Our security
model is general, does not implicitly assume existing design paradigms and captures
the security of existing models for more restricted settings.

7Impact Statement
Zero-knowledge proofs are cryptographic protocols that enable the verification of
some information without compromising the privacy of the data. The potential appli-
cations of this primitive are numerous both inside and outside academia. In cryptog-
raphy, zero-knowledge proofs are used in the construction of other important primi-
tives, such as digital signature schemes and secure public key encryption schemes, and
they are used within protocols to enforce honest behaviour of the participants. Zero-
knowledge proofs are a fundamental tool for the preservation of privacy, enabling
medical applications that use healthcare data, the verification of cloud computation,
and various distributed ledger technologies.
The main obstacle to the widespread adoption of zero-knowledge proofs is related
to their efficiency. The performance is usually measured in terms of the computational
costs to generate and verify the proofs, as well as the amount of space required to store
them. Nowadays, the main bottleneck is in the cost of computing the proofs.
The results presented in this work make important steps towards the development
of computationally-optimal zero-knowledge proofs. The relevance of our results is
mainly theoretical, and more effort is required to improve the practical costs of our
solutions. On the other hand, this work opens interesting possibilities that are likely
to lead to further improvements in the future.
In this work we also investigate the security of group signatures, which is an im-
portant cryptographic application of zero-knowledge proofs. Group signatures en-
able a member in a group to sign on behalf of the group without revealing its identity.
Group signatures can be used in several applications, including anonymous credential
schemes, e-cash and for remote attestation in Intel SGX. Our work contributes to the
study of group signatures by introducing a strong security model which helps captur-
ing security in a more realistic setting than previous existing models. For example, our
model captures security in the presence of highly adversarial authorities and allows
for maximal flexibility for the group members.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The “Knowledge of London”, or simply “the Knowledge”, is an examination sys-
tem for taxi drivers in London, United Kingdom. Every aspiring taxi driver must go
through an extensive period of training to memorise all the landmarks and streets of
the British capital. As a part of the examination process, a candidate must undergo an
interview in which they are requested to situate the position of two arbitrary points of
interest of the city and to find the best route between them, without the aid of a map
or any technology. This interactive interviewing process is repeated few times over
the years to ensure the aspirant taxi driver has the necessary Knowledge to fulfil the
position.
Alice thinks she can beat the Knowledge and that she can find better routes than
Bob, the Knowledge examiner. Alice aims to prove Bob she knows better than him,
but at the same time she is concerned about revealing him the fruits of her hard work.
For his part, Bob does not believe her until she can prove it to him.
Cryptography offers solutions to overcome the above impasse. A zero-knowledge
proof is a cryptographic protocol that allows Alice to convince Bob she has the nec-
essary Knowledge, without disclosing any additional information about it. This is a
powerful primitive that can be used in many security applications, whenever it is nec-
essary to strike a balance between verifiability of information and privacy. Examples
of these include medical applications using healthcare data, cloud computation, and
distributed ledger technology.
Zero-knowledge proofs are ubiquitous in cryptography. For instance, they are
used in constructions of public-key encryption schemes, digital signatures, voting
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systems, auction systems, e-cash, secure multiparty computation, and verifiable out-
sourced computation. Unfortunately, zero-knowledge proofs are an expensive compo-
nent of all of these, and it is therefore important for them to be as efficient as possible.
In this thesis we investigate the efficiency of zero-knowledge proofs and we make
important steps towards the achievement of optimal performances. Among the nu-
merous applications of zero-knowledge proofs we consider group signatures and dis-
cuss their security formalisation. In this work we propose a new model which offers
stringent properties and it captures the security of more realistic scenarios than done
by existing models.
1.1 Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs
A zero-knowledge proof is a protocol between two parties, called prover and verifier,
which consents the prover to convince the verifier about the validity of a statement.
There are three main properties a zero-knowledge proof needs to satisfy. Completeness
states that if prover and verifier follow the protocol, the verifier accepts the validity
of a true statement. Soundness guarantees the prover cannot deceive the verifier into
accepting the validity of a false statement, even if the prover deviates from the spec-
ifications of the protocol. Zero knowledge prevents the verifier to learn anything from
the protocol apart from the validity of the statement.
The performance of zero-knowledge proofs can be measured by a number of pa-
rameters. These include the prover’s running time, the verifier’s running time, the
size of the exchanged messages and the number of rounds the prover and verifier in-
teract. Current state of the art zero-knowledge proofs achieve very good performance
on verification time, communication and round complexity, which makes the prover’s
running time the crucial bottleneck. The main research challenge we focus in this work
is to construct prover-efficient zero-knowledge proofs.
The statements we are interested in proving are about checking the correctness
of some computation performed on some, possibly private, input. The instances
of computation we use in this work are either arithmetic circuits or TinyRAM pro-
grams [BCG+13b], a RAM machine specifically designed to construct efficient proofs
of program execution. The main question that we pose in this thesis is whether it is
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possible to construct zero-knowledge proofs, for which the computational cost of the
prover is only a constant factor more expensive than directly executing the computa-
tion in the instance.
We give a positive answer to the above question and construct zero-knowledge
proofs that are highly efficient asymptotically. In the case of arithmetic circuits con-
sisting of N additions and multiplications gates over a finite field we construct proofs
with the following computational efficiency.
• Prover time is O(N) field additions and multiplications.
• Verifier time is O(N) field additions.
In the case of TinyRAM programs terminating in T steps we construct proofs with the
following computational efficiency.
• Prover time is O(αT ) TinyRAM operations.
• Verifier time is poly(λ)√T TinyRAM operations.
Where λ is the security parameter and α = ω(1) is an arbitrarily small supercon-
stant function. Our proofs for TinyRAM program execution fell short of our goal of
achieving constant computational overhead for the prover. Nonetheless, they reduce
considerably the overhead incurred with respect to the state of the art, bringing us one
step closer to the hoped result.
Our zero-knowledge proofs have perfect completeness, i.e., when the prover knows
a satisfactory witness she is always able to convince the verifier. Our constructions
are proofs of knowledge, that is, not only does the prover demonstrate the statement
is true but also that she knows a witness. The proofs have special honest-verifier
zero knowledge, which means that honest verifier strategies are simulateable without
knowing a witness. The flavour of knowledge soundness and special honest-verifier
zero-knowledge depends on the underlying commitment scheme we use. When in-
stantiated with statistically binding commitment schemes, we obtain proofs (statisti-
cally knowledge sound) with computational zero-knowledge. When we use statisti-
cally hiding commitments we obtain arguments (computationally knowledge sound)
with statistical special honest verifier zero-knowledge. The communication complex-
ity of our proofs with unconditional soundness is onlyO(N) andO(T ) field elements,
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respectively. Our arguments with computational soundness have sub-linear commu-
nication of poly(λ)
√
N and poly(λ)
√
T field elements, respectively, when the commit-
ments are compact. Round complexity is also low, when we optimize for compu-
tational efficiency for prover and verifier we only use O(log logN) and O(log log T )
rounds.
Our constructions are modular and consist of three steps. First, we construct proofs
in a communication model we call the Ideal Linear Commitment (ILC) channel. In the
ILC model, the prover can commit vectors of secret field elements to the channel. The
verifier may later query openings to linear combinations of the committed vectors,
which the channel will answer directly. We show that idealising the techniques by
Groth et al. [Gro09] gives us efficient proofs in the ideal linear commitment model.
Next, we compile proofs in the ILC model into proof and argument systems using
non-interactive commitment schemes. However, unlike previous works we do not
commit directly to the vectors. Instead, we encode the vectors as randomized code-
words using a linear error-correcting code. We now consider the codewords as rows
of a matrix and commit to the columns of that matrix.
Finally, we instantiate the scheme with concrete error-correcting codes and non-
interactive commitment schemes. To achieve the best asymptotic efficiency we use
linear-time computable error correcting codes [DI14] and linear-time computable com-
mitment schemes [IKO+09; AHI+17b].
1.2 Group Signatures
A group signature scheme [CvH91] allows a member of a group to anonymously sign
messages on behalf of the group. Group membership is administered by a designated
group manager. In the case of a dispute, the group manager or a designated opening
authority have the ability to identify the signer and attribute the signature to her.
In static group signatures, the group members are fixed once and for all during the
setup phase. Partially dynamic group signatures allow the enrolment of members in
the group at any time but members cannot leave or be removed from the group once
they have joined. In many real-life applications, on the other hand, it is desirable to let
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the users join and leave at any time. Group signatures offering this level of flexibility
are referred to as fully dynamic.
Static and partially dynamic group signatures have been rigorously studied and
their security properties are nowadays well-established [BMW03; BSZ05; KY06]. Un-
fortunately, the same cannot be said about the fully dynamic variant, despite being the
more relevant one for applications. Existing constructions of fully dynamic signatures
follow different design paradigms and the existing security models tend to implicitly
assume the different approaches. The resulting security definitions do not necessar-
ily capture the security of different approaches and in most cases are not properly
formalised.
In this work we address the question of defining a rigorous security model for fully
dynamic group signatures. We consider both the case of a single group manager, and
the case where the role of the group manager who oversees the group is separated by
the role of the opening authority who can identify a signer. Our security definitions
are general and applicable across different design paradigms. Most importantly, our
model offers stringent security requirements and considers, when possible, security
against compromised authorities with adversarially generated keys.
Alongside our general definitions for the fully dynamic case, we present relax-
ations of our model to the case of partially dynamic and static group signatures. We
show that the obtained notions cover the existing formal security models for these
two settings. Lastly, we show a generic construction which is secure with respect to
the strongest variant of our definitions.
1.3 Structure and Content
In Chapter 2 we cover the related work, identify current gaps in the literature and
position our contributions. Next, in Chapter 3 we introduce the notation, we present
the definitions of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge together with the ILC model
and recall the definitions of linear error-correcting codes and commitment schemes.
In Chapter 4 and 5 we present our proofs in the ILC model for the satisfiability of
arithmetic circuits and for the correct execution of TinyRAM programs, respectively.
In Chapter 6 we discuss how to compile proofs in the ILC model into standard proofs
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and arguments. In the same chapter we discuss the compiled version of the proofs
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 and their instantiations using error correcting codes
and commitment schemes. In Chapter 7 we diverge from the topic of the previous
ones and we present our security model for fully dynamic group signatures. Chapter
8 concludes this thesis with some future research directions left open by this work.
The research presented in Chapters 4 and 6 was joint work with Jonathan Boo-
tle, Essam Ghadafi, Jens Groth, Mohammad Hajiabadi and Sune Jakobsen, and it was
published in [BCG+17]. The author contributed to design of some of the ILC building-
block sub-proofs used in the construction and to the instantiation using error correct-
ing codes and commitments. The author did not actively contributed to the design of
the known permutation proof system and its full specifications have not been included
in this thesis. In Chapter 6 we introduce a novel primitive called Exposure-Resilient
Encoding, which has not appeared before.
The research presented in Chapter 5 was joint work with Jonathan Bootle, Jens
Groth, Sune Jakobsen and Mary Maller, and it was published in [BCG+18]. The au-
thor contributed to the arithmetization of the TinyRAM relation, its deconstruction
into small relations, the novel bit-decomposition as well as the design of some of the
proofs over the ILC. The author did not actively contributed to the design of the un-
known permutation and lookup proof systems and their full specifications have not
been included in this thesis.
The research presented in Chapter 7 significantly updates the work published in
[BCC+16a] jointly with Jonathan Bootle, Pyrros Chaidos, Essam Ghadafi and Jens
Groth. The security model introduced in Chapter 7 refines, generalises and addresses
few shortcomings of the previously published model. The author contributed sub-
stantially to the redesign of the model and its generalisation, with the collaboration of
Essam Ghadafi and Jens Groth.
All the research leading to the results included in this thesis has received funding
from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework
Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement n. 307937.
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Literature Review
Since their introduction zero-knowledge proofs have played a central role in cryptog-
raphy and have been used in a vast number of applications such as digital signatures,
secure public key encryption schemes, multiparty computation, electronic cash, and
internet voting, just to name a few. The impact of zero-knowledge proofs, however,
is well beyond their applicability as their conception represented a shift of paradigm
in the way we think and define security in general. In this literature review we ex-
amine the research done around zero-knowledge proofs, with particular focus on the
efficiency of zero-knowledge proofs for general statements.
Among the numerous applications of zero-knowledge proofs we take a look at
group signatures, another important primitive that has received considerable atten-
tion. Rather than on efficiency, the focus here is on different security models and
different design paradigms of group signatures.
2.1 Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Arguments
Zero-knowledge proofs were invented by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR89]
and since then a large amount of research has been devoted to their study. A zero-
knowledge proof is a protocol between two parties, called the prover and the verifier,
which allow the prover to convince the verifier about the validity of a statement. The
type of statements we are interested in proving are of the form u ∈ L, where L is a lan-
guage in NP. There are three main properties a zero-knowledge proof needs to satisfy:
completeness, which states that if prover and verifier follow the protocol, the veri-
fier accepts the validity of a true statement; soundness, which guarantees the prover
cannot deceive the verifier into accepting the validity of a false statement, even if the
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prover deviates from the specifications of the protocol; zero knowledge, which pre-
vents the verifier to learn anything from the protocol apart from the validity of the
statement.
Much of the early work in the area was devoted to explore the classes of languages
admitting zero-knowledge proofs and to the different flavours of their properties. Gol-
dreich, Micali and Wigderson [GMW91] showed that all languages in NP admit com-
putational zero-knowledge proofs under the assumption that uniform one-way func-
tions exist. This was then generalised by Impagliazzo and Yung [IY87] and Ben-Or et
al. [BGG+88] to all languages admitting an interactive proof system. Shamir [Sha92]
then showed that this complexity class coincides with PSPACE in the acclaimed result
IP=PSPACE.
The first zero-knowledge proofs only achieved zero-knowledge in the presence
of a computationally bounded verifier but Brassard, Chaum and Crepeau [BCC88]
showed proofs can also have statistical zero-knowledge, for which zero-knowledge
holds against an unbounded verifier. However unless the polynomial time hierar-
chy collapses, NP-complete languages cannot have proof systems that are both sound
against unbounded provers and zero-knowledge against unbounded verifiers [For89;
AH91]. Therefore, if one aims to construct proofs for all languages in NP, one must
choose between proof systems with statistical soundness and proof systems with com-
putational soundness. The latter are usually called argument systems as opposed to
proof systems, which indicate the former. For more restricted classes of languages, on
the other hand, it is possible to construct proofs with both statistical zero-knowledge
and statistical soundness [SV00]. Naor et al. [NOV+92], showed that assuming the ex-
istence of one-way permutations, all languages in NP admit perfect zero-knowledge
arguments, i.e. for which unbounded verifiers have zero probability of learning any
additional information. Later, Nguyen, Ong and Vadhan [NOV06] showed that one-
way functions suffice to construct statistical zero-knowledge arguments for all lan-
guages in NP.
Another key notion introduced by [GMR89] is the one of proof of knowledge,
which strengthen the soundness property of a proof system and requires that if the
prover convinces the verifier, then she must know a witness w certifying the validity
of the statement, i.e. for u ∈ L. The first formalisations of this property were done by
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Feige, Fiat and Shamir [FFS88], Tompa and Woll [TW87], and Feige and Shamir [FS89].
The last cited work also showed that all languages in NP admitted both perfect zero-
knowledge arguments of knowledge based on the hardness of discrete logarithm as-
sumption, as well as computational arguments of knowledge based on the existence of
one-way functions. The definition of proof of knowledge was then refined by Bellare
and Goldreich [BG92] who addressed few shortcomings in the earlier formalizations.
Later, Lindell [Lin03] introduced a related notion called witness-extended emulation,
which Groth [Gro04] then showed to imply the usual definition of argument of knowl-
edge in the public parameter model.
Aside from the flavours of their different properties, zero-knowledge proofs can
be compared with respect to their efficiency. The main metrics used to measure their
performance are interaction, communication and computational complexity, which
are discussed next.
2.1.1 Interaction
The interaction of a proof system is measured by the number of messages prover and
verifier send to each other. A move consists of a single message from one party to the
other, while a pair of consecutive moves makes a round.
The first constant-round perfect zero-knowledge argument for all languages in NP
was constructed by Brassard, Crépeau and Yung [BCY91], which was based on the
hardness of the discrete logarithm problem and counted a total of 6 moves. Feige
and Shamir [FS89] then reduced the number of rounds, giving both a 4-moves perfect
zero-knowledge argument of knowledge based on the hardness of discrete logarithm
and a 4-moves computational zero-knowledge argument of knowledge based on one-
way permutations. Later, another 4-moves computational zero-knowledge argument
for all NP languages was given by Bellare, Jakobsson and Yung [BJY97] which only
relied on the existence of one-way functions. These arguments are optimal with re-
spect to the round complexity, as Goldreich and Krawczyk [GK96b] showed that 3
moves proofs and arguments cannot be constructed for non-trivial languages. In the
same work the authors showed the impossibility of constant round public-coin proof
systems, i.e. proof systems for which the verifier is restricted to send the outcome of
his random coin tosses to the prover. Public-coin proof systems were introduced by
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Babai [Bab85] under the name of Arthur-Merlin games and they were later shown to
be equivalent to the usual notion of (private-coin) interactive proof systems [GS89].
With respect to computational zero-knowledge proofs with statistical soundness,
the first constant-round construction for all languages in NP was given by Goldreich
and Kahan [GK96a], based on the existence of claw-free functions and which achieved
5 moves of interaction. Much later, Lindell showed how to construct 5-moves compu-
tational zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for all NP. These protocols are optimal
with respect to their round complexity as Katz [Kat12] showed that proofs with un-
bounded soundness require at least 5 moves.
The above lower bounds on the minimal amount of interaction can be circum-
vented by assuming the existence of an honestly generated common reference string,
which is shared between prover and verifier. Blum, Feldman and Micali [BFM88]
showed that, in this setting, it is possible to construct non-interactive computational
zero-knowledge proofs for all languages in NP, where the prover only sends a single
message to the verifier. The question on whether non-interactive statistical (and per-
fect) zero-knowledge arguments existed for all NP languages remained unanswered
for a long time. This was finally settled affirmatively by Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai
[GOS12] using groups equipped with a bilinear map.
An alternative approach to minimise interaction between prover and verifier is
to apply a general transform to an interactive proof system and turn it into a non-
interactive one. This methodology was first illustrated by Fiat and Shamir [FS86] who
used hash functions to construct signature schemes from interactive identification pro-
tocols. A similar transform was introduced by Fischlin [Fis05] to achieve straight-
line extractability, i.e., the security proof of (knowledge) soundness does not rely on
rewinding techniques. The security of these transforms is proven in the random oracle
model [BR93], in which the hash function is modelled as a truly random function. The
use of this model is controversial due to the existence of signatures and encryption
schemes that are provably secure in the random oracle model, but for which every in-
stantiation of the random oracle leads to an insecure scheme [GK03; CGH04; ABG+13].
More recently, similar transforms were suggested in [Lin15; CPS+16]. These are less
efficient than the Fiat-Shamir transform, but they can be proven secure in the non-
programmable random oracle model, and thus they weaken the assumptions made
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on the hash function.
2.1.2 Communication
The communication complexity of a proof system consists in the overall size of the
messages exchanged between prover and verifier. This is usually measured with re-
spect to either the size of the instance, e.g. the circuit size, or the size of the witness.
Using probabilistic checkable proofs (PCPs [AS92]), Kalai and Raz [KR08] con-
structed interactive zero-knowledge proofs for boolean circuits of constant depth, with
a communication complexity that is polynomial in the size of the witness. In the same
settings and for the same languages, Ishai et al. [IKO+09] used an innovative approach
based on multiparty computation (MPC) to construct interactive zero-knowledge proofs
of quasi-linear size in the length of the witness. Goldwasser, Kalai and Rothblum
[GKR15] also showed zero-knowledge proofs with quasi-linear communication in the
witness size, but extended these to boolean circuits with polylogarithmic depth. For
arbitrary boolean circuits, [IKO+09] showed a different construction with linear com-
munication complexity in the size of the circuit. In the non-interactive settings, Gen-
try et al. [GGI+15] used fully homomorphic encryption [Gen09] to construct zero-
knowledge proofs with proof size that is linear in the witness size plus an additive
polynomial factor in the security parameter.
It is unlikely [GH98; GVW02] that sublinear communication can be achieved in
proof systems with statistical soundness. For arguments, on the other hand, the situ-
ation is different as Kilian [Kil92] constructed a constant round zero-knowledge argu-
ment system with polylogarithmic communication complexity. In Kilian’s argument
the prover constructs a PCP and then hashes it using a Merkle tree to produce a short
proof for the verifier. Until recently, these techniques did not produce practical ar-
guments due to the cost involved in the computation of the PCP. The introduction
of interactive oracle proofs (IOPs) [BCS16] made this type of proof system a realis-
tic option, improving the efficiency of the prover. Most notably, the recent work by
Ben-Sasson et al. [BBH+18] presented a new IOP-based argument system, known as
STARKs, which also has polylogarithmic communication, and it is optimised for bet-
ter practicality. Another PCP-based approach was introduced by Ishai et al. [IKO07]
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to give arguments with a laconic prover, such that the communication from the prover
to the verifier is minimal and it consists of a constant number of ciphertexts only.
In the non-interactive settings, the first sublinear size argument was given by Mi-
cali [Mic94] using the Fiat-Shamir transform. Working in the common reference string
model and using non-falsifiable assumptions ([Nao03]), Groth [Gro10] gave a pairing-
based non-interactive zero-knowledge argument consisting of a constant number of
group elements. Follow-up works on succinct non-interactive arguments of knowl-
edge (SNARKs) have shown that it is possible to have both a modest size common
reference string and proofs as small as 3 group elements [BCC+12; GGP+13; PHG+16;
BCC+13; Gro16; GM17; GKM+18]. In [Gro16] it was shown that SNARKs need at least
2 group elements, although it is currently not known whether arguments of this size
exist.
2.1.3 Verifier Computation
In general, the verifier has to read the entire instance u since even a single deviating
bit may render the statement false. However, in many cases an instance can be repre-
sented more compactly than the witness and the instance may be small compared to
the computational effort it takes to verify a witness. In these cases it is possible to get
sublinear verification time compared to the time it takes to check the relation defin-
ing the language L. This is for instance the case for the SNARKs mentioned above,
where the verification time only depends on the size of the instance but not on the
complexity of the relation. Having low verifier complexity can be important even if
we are not interested in zero-knowledge and even for languages in P, as for instance
in the case of verifiable computation. Verifiable computation has taken two distinct
flavours in the literature: in the first a prover wishes to prove that they have correctly
computed a public function on a private input, e.g. private database searches; in the
second a verifier wishes to offload a large computation on a public input to a more
powerful prover. In the latter case, the influential work by Goldwasser, Kalai, and
Rothblum [GKR15] used efficient short probabilistically checkable proofs to get sub-
linear verifier computation. This was later made non-interactive in [GGP10]. Further
improvements were made by Cormode, Mitzenmacher and Thaler [CMT12; Tha13]
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yielding sub-linear verifcation time and quasi-linear prover time. These proof sys-
tems are very efficient for the verifier and have been implemented [VSB+13] but they
only work for languages in P.
2.1.4 Prover Computation
In the previous sections we discussed the incredible advances in improving the effi-
ciency of zero-knowledge proof systems with respect to interaction, communication
and verification time. Nowadays, the main challenge is to reduce the computational
cost of the prover. In this section we focus on the efficiency of proof systems for circuit
satisfiability and to check the correctness of the execution of RAM programs.
Boolean and Arithmetic Circuits. Many classic zero-knowedge proofs rely on cyclic
groups starting from the work by Schnorr [Sch91]. These techniques can be gener-
alised to NP-complete languages such as boolean and arithmetic circuit satisfiabil-
ity [CDS94; CD98; Gro09; BCC+16b]. In the last cited work, Bootle et al. gave discrete-
logarithm based arguments for arithmetic circuit satisfiability with logarithmic com-
munication and round complexity. The computational cost for the prover amounts to
O(N) group exponentiations, where N is the number of gates in the circuit. For the
discrete logarithm assumption to hold, the group must have superpolynomial size in
the security parameter λ, so exponentiations incur a significant overhead compared to
direct evaluation of the witness in the circuit: each group exponentiation costs ω(log λ)
field operations for a finite field of size |F| = λω(1). The SNARKs mentioned earlier
achieve very compact arguments and efficient verification time, while their main bot-
tleneck is in the prover computational cost. These arguments also rely on cyclic groups
and, similarly to the ones above, they require the prover to compute O(N) exponenti-
ations and incur a similar overhead.
Recently, Baum et al. [BBC+18] adapted techniques from [Gro09; BCC+16b] to the
lattice setting and constructed an interactive zero-knowledge argument for the satis-
fiability of arithmetic circuits with sublinear communication, i.e. O(√N log(N)) field
elements. In their argument the computational overhead for the prover is ω(log(N))
field operations, with respect to cost of evaluating the circuit.
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An alternative approach to these techniques is to use the “MPC in the head" para-
digm introduced in the aforementioned work by Ishai et al. [IKO+09]. The main idea
behind their general approach is for the prover to first execute in her head an MPC
protocol computing the verification circuit of some relation R, and then to commit to
the views of all the imaginary participants. Next, the verifier asks the prover to open
a subset of the committed views and checks the correctness of these as well as their
consistency with each other. Soundness and zero-knowledge follow from robustness
and privacy properties of the MPC protocol, respectively. Applying this framework to
efficient MPCs gives asymptotically efficient zero-knowledge proofs. For example, the
perfectly secure MPC of [DI06] is used in [IKO+09] to obtain zero-knowledge proofs
for the satisfiability of Boolean circuits with communication linear in the circuit size,
O(N), and a computational cost of Ω(λN), for circuits of size N and security param-
eter λ. Damgård, Ishai and Krøigaard [DIK10] used the MPC framework to construct
zero-knowledge proofs for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits. Their construction,
which reduces the computational overhead of the prover at expense of increasing its
communication, achieves polylog(λ)N complexity for both computation and commu-
nication. Instead of focusing on theoretical performance, ZKBoo [GMO16] and its
subsequent optimisation ZKB++ [CDG+17] are practical implementations of a “3PC
in the head" style zero-knowledge proof for boolean circuit satisfiability. Communi-
cation grows linearly in the circuit size in both proofs, and a superlogarithmic num-
ber of repetitions is required to make the soundness error negligible, but the speed
of the symmetric key primitives makes practical performance good. Following the
same paradigm, Ligero [AHI+17a] used an optimised version of the MPC of [DI06] to
construct arguments with O(λ√N) communication for both boolean and arithmetic
circuits. Despite the good practical efficiency, the asymptotic computational cost for
the prover remains quasi-linear in the size of the circuit.
Jawurek, Kerschbaum and Orlandi [JKO13] used a very different approach to build-
ing zero-knowledge proofs based on garbled circuits. Their approach proved [FNO15;
CGM16] to be very efficient in practice for constructing proofs for languages repre-
sented as boolean circuits. These techniques are appealing for proving small state-
ments, as they require only a constant number of symmetric-key operations per gate
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in the circuit, while the main bottleneck is in their communication complexity. Asymp-
totically, this approach yields computational and communication complexity ofO(λN)
bit operations and bits, respectively, when λ is the cost of a single symmetric-key op-
eration.
Ben-Sasson et al. [BCG+16a] constructed a 3-round public-coin IOP (with sound-
ness error 1/2) for Boolean circuit satisfiability with linear proof length and quasi-
linear running time for both the prover and the verifier. Moreover, the constructed
IOP has constant query complexity (the number of opening queries requested by the
verifier), while prior PCP constructions require sub-linear query complexity. Another
follow-up work by Ben-Sasson et al. [BCG+16b] gave 2-round zero-knowledge IOPs
(duplex PCPs) for any language in NTIME(T (n)) with quasi-linear prover computa-
tion in n + T (n). Aurora [BCR+18] is another IOP-based zero knowledge argument
for rank-1 constraint satisfaction problems (R1CS), which are a generalisation of arith-
metic circuits. This system achieves proofs of size O(log2N) fields element; quasi-
linear computation for the prover, i.e. O(N logN) field operations; and linear verifica-
tion, i.e. O(N) field operations.
Verification of outsourced computation [GKR15; CMT12; Tha13; WHG+16] mostly
focuses on verifying deterministic computation and does not offer zero-knowledge.
However, recent works augmented these with cryptographic techniques to also achieve
zero-knowledge [ZGK+17; WJB+17; WTS+18]. Hyrax [WTS+18] offers an implemen-
tation with good concrete performance. This system has sublinear communication
and verification, while the prover computation is dominated by O(dN + S logS) field
operations for a depth d and width S circuit when the witness is small compared to
the circuit size. If, in addition, the circuit can be parallelised into many identical sub-
computations, the prover cost can be further reduced to O(dN) field operations.
To summarise, in all the above proof systems the prover incurs in a super-linear
cost in the size of the instance. The recent work of [BCG+17], which is also presented
in this thesis, shows that it is possible to construct efficient proofs and arguments
where the prover only pays a constant computational overhead with respect to the
time needed to directly check the instance given the witness, e.g. the cost of evaluat-
ing the circuit. We construct both proofs and arguments for the satisfiability of arith-
metic circuits over a large field. For a circuit of size N , the prover computational costs
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consists of O(N) multiplications, while the verification cost only requires O(N) field
additions. The communication complexity of our proofs with unconditional sound-
ness is onlyO(N) field elements, while our arguments with computational soundness
have sub-linear communication of poly(λ)
√
N field elements when the commitments
are compact. Round complexity is also low. When we optimize for computational
efficiency the argument needs O(log logN) rounds.
Our work extends techniques from [Gro09] without requiring homomorphic prop-
erties of the underlying commitment scheme. To achieve this, we first replace the ho-
momorphic commitments with a combination of error correcting codes and standard
commitments, and we then introduce a new efficient technique to prove knowledge of
the openings of committed values. Since the commitment scheme does not need to be
homomorphic, we can construct it from either one-way functions or collision-resistant
hash functions. To get optimal computational efficiency we consider linear-time com-
putable instantiations of these primitives, such as from [IKO+08] and [AHI+17b], and
we obtain linear-time computable commitments.
From a technical point of view, our work shares some similarities with the one of
Cramer et al. [CDP12], which introduces techniques for verifying multiplicative rela-
tions of committed values. When applied to zero-knowledge proofs for the satisfiabil-
ity of Boolean circuits, the asymptotic communication and computation complexities
of [CDP12] are close to [IKO+09], although with smaller constants. Unlike [CDP12],
we do not require any homomorphic property from the commitment scheme, and in-
stead of relying on linear secret sharing schemes with product reconstruction, we only
require linear error-correcting codes.
From an high-level perspective, Ligero [AHI+17a] shares some similarities with
our arguments, even though the two results stemmed, independently, from two dif-
ferent research directions. Their construction does not rely on homomorphic commit-
ments, similarly to ours, but it uses instead Reed-Solomon codes and Merkle trees.
Compared to Ligero, we achieve better asymptotic performance for the prover. This
is partly due to the choice of error correcting codes we use in our instantiation, which
are computable in linear time [DI14]. If we were to replace them with Reed-Solomon
codes, we would get efficiency comparable with Ligero with respect to all metrics. The
converse, on the other hand, does not hold since the error correcting code is only one
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of the ingredients used to obtain linear time computation for the prover.
Our techniques do not fare as well in the case of Boolean circuits, as the soundness
of our arguments requires the field to be large and representing bits as field elements
would introduce a superconstant multiplicative overhead for the prover. We there-
fore stress that the significant performance improvement of our proofs and arguments
over the state of the art only relates to arithmetic circuits. Table 2.1 summarises the
efficiency of the most prover-efficient proofs and arguments.
Work Prover Verifier Communication Rounds Soundness
[DIK10] polylog(λ)N F× O(N) F× O(N) O(1) Statistical
Ligero [AHI+17a] O(N logN) F× O(N) F× O(λ√N) O(1) Computational
Aurora[BCR+18] O(N logN) F× O(N) F× O(log2N) O(logN) Computational
This Thesis O(N) F× O(N) F+ O(N) O(loglogN) Statistical
This Thesis O(N) F× O(N) F+ O(λ√N) O(loglogN) Computational
TABLE 2.1: Efficiency comparison of the most efficient proofs and argu-
ments for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits with respect to prover
computation. F× and F+ stand for the cost of field multiplications and
additions, respectively. Communication is measured in field elements
of size log |F| bits.
Correct Program Execution. In practice, most computation does not resemble circuit
evaluation but is instead done by computer programs processing one instruction at a
time. There has been a sustained effort to construct efficient zero-knowledge proofs
that support real-life computation, i.e., proving statements of the form “when exe-
cuting program P on public input x and private input y we get the output z." In the
context of SNARKs there are already several systems to prove the correct execution of
programs written in C [PHG+16; BFR+13; BCG+13a; WSR+15]. These systems gener-
ally involve a front-end which compiles the program into an arithmetic circuit which
is then fed into a cryptographic back-end. Much work has been dedicated to improve
both sides, resulting in systems achieving different trade-offs between efficiency and
expressiveness of the computation.
When we want to reason theoretically about zero-knowledge proofs for correct
program execution, it is useful to abstract program execution as a random-access ma-
chine that can address in each instruction an arbitrary location in memory and per-
form integer operations on it. For closer resemblance to real-life computation, we can
bound the integers to a specific word size and specify a more general set of opera-
tions the random-access machine can execute. TinyRAM [BCG+13b; BCG+13a] is a
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prominent example of a computational model bridging the gap between theory and
real-word computation. It comes with a compiler from C to TinyRAM code and un-
derpins several implementations of zero-knowledge proofs for correct program exe-
cution [BCG+13a; BCT+14; BCT+17; CTV15; BRS17; BBH+18], where the prover time
is Ω(T log2 λ) for a program execution that takes time T . Similar efficiency is also
achieved, asymptotically, by other proof systems that can compile (restricted) C pro-
grams and prove correct execution such as Pinocchio [PHG+16], Pantry [BFR+13] and
Buffet [WSR+15]. There are three main sources of this superlogarithmic overhead.
The first one is due to the cost of verifying Boolean operations over words of O(log λ)
length. Each of these is checked by using an arithmetic circuit of size O(log λ) that
takes the individual bits of each word as input. The second source of overhead is
due to the way memory consistency is checked. This is done by using a permutation
network, which can be implemented by an arithmetic circuit of quasi-linear size in T .
The last source of overhead is due to the cryptographic back-end used to prove that all
arithmetic circuits involved are satisfied. This usually relies on cyclic groups, such as
SNARKs, for which the prover incurs a computational superlogarithmic overhead, as
discussed in the previous section. A notable exception is STARK [BBH+18] that only
relies on the existence of collision-resistant hash functions. However, this scheme is
still susceptible to the first two sources of overhead.
Techniques from the aforementioned work of [JKO13] also found applications in
zero-knowledge proofs to check the execution of RAM programs [HMR15; MRS17].
These proofs achieve amortized sublinear communication complexity in the size of
the memory used by the program, however the computational overhead of the prover
is still large. For instances that can be represented as RAM programs terminating in
T steps and using memory of size M , a stand-alone execution of these proofs yields
communication and computation with polylog(M) overhead compared to the running
time T of the RAM program.
In all the above proof systems to check the correct execution of programs, the com-
putational overhead for the prover is superlogarithmic with respect to the execution
time of the program. The recent work of [BCG+18], which is presented in this the-
sis, constructed the first arguments for the correct execution of a TinyRAM program
achieving a sublogarithmic overhead. More precisely, our work reduces the prover’s
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overhead from Ω(log2 λ) to an arbitrarily small superconstant α = ω(1). In our proofs
and arguments, the verification time is sublinear in the execution time of the program.
In order to reduce the three sources of overhead discussed above, we diverge from
the previous approaches. Firstly, we introduce a different type of decomposition to
efficiently check boolean operations using field arithmetic. This is combined with an
efficient proof for lookup relations, which is used to check that committed values are
consistent with a committed lookup table. Secondly, instead of using permutation
network to check memory consistency, we use a technique based on the invariance
of roots in polynomials as first suggested by Neff [Nef01] in the context of verifiable
shuffles. This technique was recently used for a similar purpose in vSQL [ZGK+17],
a system for verifying database queries. Lastly, instead of relying on cyclic groups,
we adopt the same techniques we previously introduced to check the satisfiability
of arithmetic circuits. The efficiency of our proofs and arguments for the execution of
TinyRAM programs is given in Table 2.2, along with the efficiency of the most efficient
zero-knowledge arguments. The costs reported in the table are in the case prover and
verifier are implemented as TinyRAM programs.
Work Prover Verifier Communication Rounds Soundness
[BCT+14] O(αT log2 T ) ω(L+ |v|) ω(1) 1 Comp.
[BBH+18] Ω(T log2 T ) poly(λ)(log T + L+ |v|) ω(λ log T ) O(log T ) Comp.
This Thesis O(αT ) poly(λ)(√T + L+ |v|) poly(λ)(√T + L+ |v|) O(log log T ) Comp.
This Thesis O(αT ) poly(λ)(√T + L+ |v|) ω(T ) O(log log T ) Statistical
TABLE 2.2: Efficiency comparisons between our proofs and arguments
with the most efficient zero-knowledge arguments for the correct exe-
cution of TinyRAM programs, at security level 2−ω(log λ). Computation
is measured in TinyRAM steps and communication in words of length
W = Θ(log λ) with λ the security parameter and α = ω(1) an arbitrarily
small superconstant function. L is the length of the TinyRAM program,
|v| the size of the public inputs to the program, and T its running time.
Concurrently to [BCG+18], Zhang et al. [ZGK+18] developed and implemented a
scheme for verifying RAM computations. Like us and [ZGK+17], they avoid the use of
permutation networks by using permutation proofs based on polynomial invariance
by Neff [Nef01]. The idea underlying their technique to prove the correct fetch of an
operation is also related to the idea underpinning our lookup proofs. However, there
are significant differences between the techniques used in our works. For example,
they rely on techniques from [CMT12] to instantiate their proofs while we use tech-
niques based on ideal linear commitments [BCG+18]. The proofs in [ZGK+18] are not
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zero knowledge, since they leak the number of times each type of instruction is exe-
cuted, while our proofs are zero knowledge. In terms of prover efficiency, [ZGK+18]
focuses on concrete efficiency and yields impressive concrete performance. Asymp-
totically speaking, however, we are a polylogarithmic factor more efficient. This may
require some explanations because they claim linear complexity for the prover. The
reason is that they treat the prover as a TinyRAM machine with logarithmic word size
in their performance measurement. Looking under the hood, we see that they use bit-
decomposition to handle logical operations, which gives a constant overhead when
you fix a particular word size, (e.g. 32 bits) but asymptotically the cost of this is loga-
rithmic since it is linear in the word size. Also, their commitments are based on cyclic
groups and the use of exponentiations introduces another superlogarithmic overhead
for the prover when implemented in TinyRAM. Lastly, our arguments are based on
assumptions that are currently believed to be post-quantum and thus they may offer
some security against quantum adversaries.
2.2 Group Signatures
Group signatures, put forward by Chaum and van Heyst [CvH91], are a fundamental
cryptographic primitive allowing a member of a group to anonymously sign messages
on behalf of it. Group membership is administered by a designated group manager.
In the case of a dispute, the group manager or a designated opening authority has the
ability to identify the signer and attribute the signature to her.
Group Signatures without Revocation. After their introduction, a very prolific line
of research has emerged on group signatures. The first efficient construction of group
signature was given by Ateniese et al. [ACJ+00] based on both the Strong-RSA as-
sumption and the DDH assumption in the random oracle model [BR93]. At that time,
however, the security of group signatures was not very well understood and early con-
structions were proven secure via informal arguments using various interpretations of
their requirements.
To rectify this situation, Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [BMW03] formalised
the security definitions for static groups, in which the group members are fixed once
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and for all during the setup phase. In their model, the group manager is also granted
the authority of opening signatures and she is assumed to be fully trusted, except
she may leak information to the adversary. Later on, Bellare, Shi and Zhang [BSZ05]
and Kiayias and Yung [KY06] independently provided formal security definitions for
partially dynamic groups, in which new group members can join the group at any time
but cannot leave. The former model, following the suggestion of [CM98], separates
the opening authority from the group manager, while the latter considers both roles
overseen by the group manager. Aside from this, the main difference between the
two models is that in [KY06] the group manager is trusted to give correct openings
without providing proofs of attributions. More recently, Sakai et al. [SSE+12] extended
the security model of partially dynamic groups by including the notion of opening
soundness, which ensures that a valid signature only traces to one user.
Numerous efficient constructions secure in the above models have been suggested
both in the random oracle model [ACJ+00; CL04; NS04; FI06; FY04; KY05; DP06;
BCN+10; LLN+16; LLM+16; DS18] and in the standard one [ACH+05; Gro06; BW06;
Gro07; BW07; AFG+16].
Group Signatures with Revocation. Since revocation is an essential feature of group
signatures, different approaches have been proposed to remove members from the
group. Bresson and Stern [BS01] realise revocation by requiring that the signer proves
at the time of signing that her group membership certificate is not among those con-
tained in a public revocation list. Along this line, Nakanishi et al. [NFH+10] gave an
efficient scheme in the random oracle model based on revocation lists, offering con-
stant size as well as signing and verification time. In the standard model, Libert, Peters
and Yung [LPY12b; LPY12a] gave a number of efficient constructions of group signa-
tures which use the subset cover framework [NNL01], originally used in the context
of broadcast encryption, to form revocation lists.
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02] introduced dynamic accumulators, extending
ideas of [BdM93] and [BP97], to handle efficient revocation of users. Accumulators al-
low the manager to give a compact representation of the set of current group members,
who can then efficiently prove their membership in the accumulated set. Since then,
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many other constructions adopted a similar approach to perform revocation [TX03;
CG04; DKN+04; Ngu05].
Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [BBS04] showed how to achieve revocation by includ-
ing information into a revocation list which allow unrevoked members to locally de-
rive a new group public key and a new signing key. A similar approach was used both
in [Son01] and [CG04] to extend [ACJ+00] scheme in order to support revocation and,
in the case of [Son01], to additionally provide forward security.
Brickell [Bri04] considered a different approach to revocation known as Verifier Lo-
cal Revocation (VLR). This was subsequently formalized by Boyen and Shacham [BS04]
and further used in several constructions such as [NF07; LV09; LNR+18]. In VLR, the
revocation information (i.e. revocation lists) is only sent to the verifiers (as opposed
to both verifiers and signers), who can check whether a particular signature was gen-
erated by a revoked member. A similar approach is also used in Direct Anonymous
Attestation (DAA) protocols [BCC04]. Traceable Signatures [KTY04] extend this idea,
with a group manager that can release a trapdoor for each member, enabling their
signatures to be traced back to the individual user.
Fully Dynamic Group Signatures from Ring Signatures. A generic approach to
construct fully dynamic group signatures from accountable ring signatures was sug-
gested in [BCC+15] and described in [BCC+16a]. Introduced by Rivest, Shamir and
Tauman [RST01], ring signatures differ from group signatures by not having appointed
authorities: signers decide upon which users to include into their anonymity set. Ac-
countable ring signatures [XY04] additionally provide a way to identify the author
of a signature, but differently from group signature the opening entity is chosen by
the users at signing time. Bootle et al. [BCC+15] also gave an efficient instantiation
of accountable ring signatures in the random oracle model based on the DDH as-
sumption. By following [BCC+16a], this and other schemes of accountable ring signa-
tures [LZC+16; KP17; DLO+18] can be used to obtain fully dynamic group signature
schemes with efficiency similar to their ring counterpart.
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Shortcomings in Existing Models. While static and partially dynamic group signa-
tures have been properly formalised [BMW03; BSZ05; KY06; SSE+12] and their secu-
rity definitions are now broadly accepted, the same cannot be said about their fully
dynamic groups counterpart. Different revocation paradigms assume different, often
informal, models which do not necessarily generalise to other approaches.
A first step to address this situation was done by Bootle et al. [BCC+16a], who
proposed a general model for fully dynamic group signatures. Their definitions cap-
ture strong security requirements and include, when possible, security against mali-
cious key generation for the authorities. This model was recently extended by Backes
et al. [BHS18] to include two additional security properties called join and leave pri-
vacy, guaranteeing the privacy of users over their group membership status. El Kaa-
farani et al. [EKS18] also extended this security model in order to formalise anony-
mous reputation systems, which allows a set of user review products anonymously.
Despite not assuming a specific design paradigm, the model of [BCC+16a] makes
several implicit assumptions regarding the functioning of group signatures, which
limit its generality and applicability. For example, their model considers a fairly strong
notion of traceability which implicitly restricts the way the manager can perform re-
vocation of users, precluding the natural use of revocation lists.
In Chapter 7 we make a step further in modelling fully dynamic group signatures
by considerably updating and generalising [BCC+16a]. Our model does not preclude
current design approaches, it offers stringent security properties, and it exhibits the
following refinements over existing models:
• We offer security definitions both in the case of a single group manager and in
the case where her role is separated from the opening authority and consider,
when possible, malicious key generation for the authorities.
• We abstract the requirements the model imposes on the register. Specifically,
we do not assume the existence of a PKI or restrict the way the register can be
instantiated.
• Our model captures a stronger correctness property, which is guaranteed even
in case the system is populated with malicious users and a malicious opening
authority.
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• We consider a more general notion of traceability, covering both the one defined
in [BCC+16a] and the one achieved by revocation list approaches.
• Our model allows concurrent joining sessions between the users and the group
manager. Existing models restrict the state of the manager to be compartmen-
talised, thus making each joining session independent. By relaxing this, our
model captures stronger notions of correctness and traceability.
• We formalise two additional security properties called opening binding and open-
ing soundness capturing that signatures cannot be attributed, respectively, to mul-
tiple users, nor to anybody other than the legitimate signer.
Group Signatures from Post-Quantum Assumptions. Driven by the advances on
quantum computing, post-quantum cryptography has received increasing attention in
the recent years. This trend includes research on group signatures. Starting from the
work of Gordon et al. [GKV10], progressively more efficient lattice based constructions
have been proposed [CNR12; LLL+13; LNR+18; NZZ15; LNW15; LMN16; LLM+16;
BCN18; LNW+18]. Among these, the only schemes supporting revocation of users are
the VLR scheme of [LNR+18] and the fully dynamic group signature of [LNW+18],
which is proven secure in [BCC+16a] model.
Aside from lattice assumptions, another typical approach to achieve post-quantum
security is to rely only on symmetric-key primitives. In [AW04] and [CG04] it was
shown, however, that fully-anonymous group signatures imply IND-CCA secure pub-
lic key encryption, thus separating group signatures from symmetric-key primitives.
Nonetheless, [CG04] showed that by relaxing the anonymity property it is possible to
construct group signatures from one-way functions and non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs, which can be both instantiated using symmetric-key primitives. The weaker
notion of anonymity achieved by this generic construction does not protect against
key-exposure attacks. Following a similar approach to [CG04] and building on recent
developments of zero-knowledge proofs, Boneh et al. [BEF19] proposed an efficient
construction of group signatures based on symmetric-key primitives and weaker an-
onymity guarantees.
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Preliminaries and Definitions
3.1 Notation
Let S be a set, we write s ← S for sampling an element s from the set S, where the
sampling is assumed to be uniformly at random, unless otherwise specified. We write
y ← A(x) for an algorithm A that runs on input x and outputs y. We write AB(z,·)(x)
to indicate that A can execute B on a fixed input z, oblivious to A, and on an arbitrary
input a to receive the output of B(z, a). When an algorithm is invoked several times
and keeps state between invocations, we may explicitly refer to the state stA as an
additional input and write x← A(a; stA). A simple example is a single invocation of a
probabilistic algorithm that may run in two steps: it first samples randomness r, stored
in the state, and then runs the rest of the algorithm x ← A(a; r) deterministically. For
algorithms A and B, (x; y) ← 〈A(a);B(b)〉 denotes the the joint execution of A, with
input a, and B, with input b, where at the end A outputs x and B outputs y.
We use a security parameter λ ∈ N to indicate the desired level of security, with
the intention that the higher it is, the more secure the scheme would be. In general,
when we refer to polynomial time algorithms we mean that they run in polynomial
time in the security parameter, and therefore we give, often implicitly, the security
parameter written in unary 1λ as input to the algorithms. We abbreviate deterministic
polynomial time as DPT and probabilistic polynomial time as PPT.
Definition 3.1. We say that a function f : N→ [0, 1] is negligible if for any constant c > 0
there exists λ0 such that for all λ > λ0
f(λ) < λ−c,
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or equivalently if f(λ) = λ−ω(1). We say that a function g : N → [0, 1] is overwhelming
if 1 − g is negligible. Given two functions f, g we write f(λ) ≈ g(λ) if |f(λ) − g(λ)| is
negligible.
For a positive integer n, [n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n} and [0, n] denotes {0, 1, . . . , n}.
We write Σ[n] for the symmetric group on the set [n]. We use bold letters such as v for
row vectors and let F be a finite field. For v ∈ Fn and a set J = {j1, . . . , jk} ⊂ [n]
with j1 < · · · < jk we define the vector v|J to be (vj1 , . . . ,vjk). Similarly, for a matrix
V ∈ Fm×n we let V |J ∈ Fm×k be the submatrix of V restricted to the columns indicated
in J .
In the next chapters we will make extensive use of the well-known Schwartz-
Zippel Lemma [Sch80; Zip79] which we recall next.
Lemma 3.1 (Schwartz-Zippel). Let q ∈ F[X1, . . . , Xn] be a non-zero multivariate polyno-
mial of total degree d, then
Pr
[
(x1, . . . , xn)← Sn: q(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 0
]
≤ d|S|
The typical application of this lemma is to test the identity of two polynomials.
Given q1(X1, . . . , Xn), q2(X1, . . . , Xn) it is sufficient to pick (x1, . . . , xn) ← Fn and
check if q1(x1, . . . , xn)− q2(x1, . . . , xn) = 0. As we are interested in arguing that pairs
of polynomials are identical with overwhelming probability, we set S = F for a finite
field of superpolynomial size, i.e. |F| = λω(1), and restrict our attention to polynomials
with total degree polynomial in the security parameter, i.e. d = poly(λ).
3.2 Models of Computations
In the next chapters we will give proofs of knowledge for statements of the form “I
know some x such that y is equal to f(x)”, where the instance f represents some com-
putation on a private input x. A natural way to express any computation is by using
circuits. However, in practice one may be interested in statements that are not imme-
diately expressed in this form, e.g. the execution of a computer program. Alongside
circuits we thus consider RAM programs, which model computation and memory ac-
cess more closely to how computers works. Concretely, in Chapters 4 and 5 we will
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give proofs of knowledge for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits and the correct ex-
ecution of TinyRAM programs. When stating the efficiency of prover and verifier, we
will consider them to be implemented as either arithmetic circuits or TinyRAM pro-
grams, with the aim of measuring the overhead incurred by prover and verifier with
respect to directly evaluate the circuit or execute the program.
3.2.1 Arithmetic Circuits
An arithmetic circuit over a field F is a directed acyclic graph whose vertices are called
gates. Gates of in-degree 0 are called input gates, which are associated with variables
xi over F or with constant field elements. All other gates in the circuit are either multi-
plication gates or addition gates, which are labelled as⊗ and ⊕, respectively. Here we
only consider circuits consisting of fan-in 2 gates, i.e. all multiplication and addition
gates have in-degree equal to 2, but we allow for arbitrary fan-out.
Arithmetic circuits naturally compute polynomials over a field F. In the example
circuit in Figure 3.1, the output y1 corresponds to the polynomial 7x1(x2 + 3).
The size of a circuit refers to the total number of addition and multiplication gates,
while the depth is the longest path between inputs and outputs. The width of a circuit
usually refers to the maximum number of gates in the same layer of the circuit. The
example circuit in Figure 3.1 has size equal to 7, depth equal to 5 and width equal to
3. The size of the circuit corresponds to the total number of operations required to
evaluate it, while the depth is the minimal number of sequential operations required
to evaluate the circuit by using as many parallel processes as the width of the circuit.
3.2.2 TinyRAM
TinyRAM is a random-access machine architecture operating on W -bit words and us-
ingK registers. Here we describe the key features of TinyRAM and we refer the reader
to [BCG+13b] for the full specifications. A state of the TinyRAM machine consists of
the following:
• A program P consisting of a list of L instructions.
• A program counter pc storing, in a W -bit word, the line number of the program
instruction to be executed.
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FIGURE 3.1: Example of an arithmetic circuit.
• The content of the K registers reg0, . . . , regK−1, storing a W -bit word each.
• A condition flag flag of size one bit.
• M words of memory each of size W -bit, and with addresses 0, . . . ,M − 1.
The TinyRAM specification includes two read-only tapes to retrieve its inputs but
with little loss of efficiency we may assume the program starts by reading the tapes
into memory. The specification [BCG+13b] calls a program proper if it starts with a
preamble that reads all inputs into memory. As shown in [BCG+13b] this can be done
by an 8-line TinyRAM program in ∼ 5v steps, for an input tape of length v. We will
therefore skip the reading phase and assume the memory is initialised with the inputs
(and 0 for the remaining words). Also, we will assume on initialisation that pc, and
the registers are set equal to 0W and flag equal to 0.
The TinyRAM instruction set consists of 27 instructions that include bit-wise log-
ical operations, arithmetic operations, shifts, comparisons, jumps, and storing and
loading data in memory. We recall the list of allowed instructions in Table 3.1, from
which we removed the read instruction. Note that with respect to the original instruc-
tion set of [BCG+13b] the flag of the multiplication operations mull,umulh, smulh is
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flipped: the flag is set equal to 0 to denote overflow or underflow1.
Instruction Operands Effect Flag
and regi regj A compute ri as bitwise AND of rj and A result is 0W
or regi regj A compute ri as bitwise OR of rj and A result is 0W
xor regi regj A compute ri as bitwise XOR of rj and A result is 0W
not regi A compute ri as bitwise NOT of A result is 0W
add regi regj A compute ri = rj + A mod 2W overflow: rj + A ≥ 2W
sub regi regj A compute ri = rj − A mod 2W borrow: rj < A
mull regi regj A compute ri = rj × A mod 2W ¬ overflow: rj × A < 2W
umulh regi regj A compute ri as upper W bits of rj × A ¬ overflow: ri = 0
smulh regi regj A compute ri as upper W bits of the signed ¬ over/underflow: ri = 0
2W -bit rj ×s A (mull gives lower word)
udiv regi regj A compute ri as quotient of rj/A division by zero: A = 0
umod regi regj A compute ri as remainder of rj/A division by zero: A = 0
shl regi regj A compute ri as rj shifted left by A bits MSB of rj
shr regi regj A compute ri as rj shifted right by A bits LSB of rj
cmpe regi A compare if equal equal: ri = A
cmpa regi A compare if above above: ri > A
cmpae regi A compare if above or equal above/equal: ri ≥ A
cmpg regi A signed compare if greater greater: ri >s A
cmpge regi A signed compare if greater or equal greater/equal: ri ≥s A
mov regi A set ri = A flag unchanged
cmov regi A if flag = 1 set ri = A flag unchanged
jmp A set pc = A flag unchanged
cjmp A if flag = 1 set pc = A flag unchanged
cnjmp A if flag = 0 set pc = A flag unchanged
store A regi store in memory address A the word ri flag unchanged
load regi A set ri to the word stored at address A flag unchanged
answer A stall or halt returning the word A flag unchanged
TABLE 3.1: TinyRAM instruction set, excluding the read command.
The flag is set equal to 1 if the condition is met and 0 otherwise. If
the pc exceeds the program length, i.e., pc ≥ L, or we address a non-
existing part of memory, i.e., in a store or load instruction A ≥ M , the
TinyRAM machine halts with answer 1.
A program consists of a sequence ofL instructions, each taking up to three operands,
e.g.
add regi regj A
The first operand, regi, usually points to the register storing the result of the opera-
tion, add, computed on the words specified by the next two operands, regj , A. The
last operand A indicates an immediate value that could be either used directly in the
operation or to point to the content of another register. The program terminates by
using a special command answer that returns a word. We consider the program to
have succeeded if it answers 0, otherwise we consider the answer to be a failure code.
1This simplifies the consistency check of the flag in Chapter 5. This modification can be avoided by
introducing few additional constraints to check the consistency of the flag with the result of the instruc-
tion.
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We write regi and ri when referring to register i and to its content, respectively.
We write A to refer to either a register or an immediate value specified in a program
instruction and write A for the value stored therein. Depending on the instruction a
word amay be interpreted as an unsigned value in {0, . . . , 2W−1} or as a signed value
in {−2W−1, . . . , 2W−1 − 1}, which is represented in two’s complement. Given a word
(aW−1, . . . , a0) ∈ {0, 1}W , the unsigned value is
a =
W−1∑
i=0
ai2
i
while the signed value corresponding to the same word is
aσ = −aW−12W−1 +
W−2∑
i=0
ai2
i = −aW−12W + a
and aW−1 is used to encode the sign of the value. We distinguish operations over
signed values by using subscript s, e.g. a×s b and a ≥s b are used to denote product
and comparison over the signed values, respectively.
Implementing Field Arithmetic in TinyRAM. In our proof systems prover and ver-
ifier perform computation in a large finite field F and it will be convenient express
their efficiency in terms of TinyRAM operations. Typically, we have that | log(F)| > W
and thus field elements require e =
⌈
log(|F|)
W
⌉
words to be stored. Field addition can
then be computed with O(e) TinyRAM operations. The cost of field multiplication
depends on the implemented algorithm: schoolbook multiplication costsO(e2), while
using FFT it can be reduced up to O(e log(e) log log(e)) TinyRAM operations.
3.3 Proof of Knowledge and the ILC Channel
A proof system is defined by a triple of stateful PPT algorithms (G,P,V), which we call
the setup generator, the prover and verifier, respectively. The setup generator G creates
public parameters pp that will be used by the prover and the verifier. We think of pp as
being honestly generated, however, in the proofs we construct in the next chapters pp
consists of parts that are either publicly verifiable or could be generated by the verifier.
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The reason we place our definitions in the public parameter model is to simplify the
exposition and to improve the efficiency of our proofs, not for security.
3.3.1 Relations and Languages
Let R be a polynomial time decidable ternary relation consisting of tuples (pp, u, w).
Please note the special case where R ignores pp, in which case we have the standard
definition of an NP-relation. We define the language corresponding to the relation R
to be
LR =
{
(pp, u): ∃ w, (pp, u, w) ∈ R
}
We refer to u as the instance and w as the witness for the membership of the instance in
the language, i.e. (pp, u) ∈ LR. The public parameter pp will specify the security param-
eter λ, perhaps implicitly through its length, and may also contain other parameters
used for specifying the relation, e.g. a description of a field. Typically, pp will also
contain parameters that do not influence membership of R but may aid the prover
and verifier, such as the description of an encoding function that they will use.
3.3.2 Communication Channels
In a proof system, (P,V) is a pair of interactive algorithms communicating with each
other through a communication channel chan←→. We write 〈P(pp, u, w) chan←→ V(pp)〉 to de-
note their interaction mediated by the channel. We let viewV ← 〈P(pp, u, w) chan←→
V(pp)〉 be the view of the verifier in the execution, i.e., all his inputs and outputs, in-
cluding his random coins and messages exchanged with the channel. Similarly, we
let tranP ← 〈P(pp, u, w) chan←→ V(pp)〉 indicate the transcript of the communication be-
tween prover and channel. At the end of the interaction the verifier returns a bit b to
denote he accepts (b = 1) or rejects (b = 0). Without loss in generality, we let the prover
return tranP , and write (tranP ; b) ← 〈P(pp, u, w) chan←→ V(pp)〉 for the entire execution
of the protocol.
In the standard channel←→, all messages are forwarded between prover and veri-
fier. In this case we may drop←→ from the above notation. We also consider an ideal
linear commitment channel, ILC←→, or simply ILC, described in Figure 3.2. The ILC chan-
nel is defined by a field F and an integer k ∈ N, both specified in ppILC ← GILC(1λ).
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When using the ILC channel, the prover can submit a commit command to the chan-
nel to commit to vectors v ∈ Fk. The vectors remain secretly stored in the channel,
and will not be forwarded to the verifier. Instead, the verifier only learns how many
vectors the prover has committed to. The verifier can submit a send command to the
ILC to send field elements x ∈ F to the prover. In addition, the verifier can also submit
open queries to the ILC to obtain the opening of any linear combinations of the vectors
sent by the prover. We stress that the verifier can request several linear combinations
within a single open query, as depicted in Figure 3.2.
PILC VILC
FIGURE 3.2: Description of the ILC channel.
LPCP and LIP. Proof systems over the ILC share similarities with other information-
theoretic models, such as linear probabilistic checkable proofs (LPCP), introduced by
[IKO07], and linear interactive proofs (LIP), introduced by [BCI+13]. In an LPCP the
verifier sends queries to a PCP oracle consisting of vectors of field elements. The oracle
responds to each query with a single field element obtained by applying the same
linear function to the queried vector. A LIP is an interactive proof system where both
the prover and verifier send vectors of field elements, but the prover can only send
linear (or affine) transformations of the verifier’s previously sent vectors. However,
for our constructions it is important that the prover can compute on field elements
sent by the verifier and, for instance, evaluate polynomials.
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3.3.3 Proof of Knowledge
We say a proof system is public coin if the verifier’s messages to the communication
channel are chosen uniformly at random and independently of the actions of the
prover, i.e., the verifier’s messages to the prover correspond to the verifier’s random-
ness ρ. All our proof systems will be public coin. In a proof system over the ILC chan-
nel, sequences of commit, send and open queries can alternate arbitrarily. However,
since our proof systems are public coin we can without loss of generality assume the
verifier does one large open query at the end of the protocol and then decides whether
to accept or reject. We sometimes refer to a proof system over the ILC for which the
verifier only makes a single query at the end of the proof as non-adaptive.
Definition 3.2 (Proof of Knowledge). A proof system (G,P,V) for a relation R is called a
proof (argument) of knowledge over a communication channel chan←→ if it has perfect com-
pleteness and statistical (computational) knowledge soundness as defined below.
Completeness. Given an instance in the language, completeness guarantees that if
both prover and verifier follow the specifications of the proof system, then the verifier
should accept the proof.
Definition 3.3 (Perfect Completeness). A proof system (G,P,V) for a relation R is per-
fectly complete if for all PPT adversaries A
Pr
 pp← G(1λ); (u,w)← A(pp); (tranP ; b)← 〈P(pp, u, w) chan←→ V(pp, u)〉:
(pp, u, w) /∈ R ∨ b = 1
 = 1
Knowledge Soundness. Soundness guarantees that a cheating prover should not
be able to convince the verifier about the validity of a false statement. Knowledge
soundness in addition guarantees that if a prover can convince the verifier about the
validity of a statement, then she should know a valid witness for it.
Definition 3.4 ((Strong) Knowledge Soundness). A proof system (G,P,V) for a relation
R has computational (strong) knowledge soundness if for all DPT P∗ there exists an
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expected PPT extractor E such that for all PPT adversaries A
Pr
 pp← G(1λ); (u, s)← A(pp);w ← E〈P∗(pp,u;s) chan←→V(pp,u)〉(pp, u):
(pp, u, w) /∈ R ∧ b = 1
 ≈ 0
Here the oracle 〈P∗(pp, u; s) chan←→ V(pp, u)〉 runs a full protocol execution and if the proof
is successful it returns the transcript tranP∗ of the prover’s communication with the channel.
The extractor E can ask the oracle to rewind the proof to any point in a previous transcript and
execute the proof again from this point on with fresh public-coin challenges from the verifier.
We let b ∈ {0, 1} be the verifier’s output in the first oracle execution, i.e., whether it accepts or
not, and we think of s as the state of the prover, including its randomness.
If the definition holds also for unbounded P∗ and A we say the proof has (strong) statisti-
cal knowledge soundness.
If the definition holds for a non-rewinding extractor, i.e., E only requires a single tran-
script of the prover’s communication with the channel, we say the proof system has knowledge
soundness with straight-line extraction.
The definition can be paraphrased as saying that if the prover in state s makes a
convincing proof, then E can extract a witness for the instance u. Therefore, knowledge
soundness implies soundness as if E extracts a witness for u, then the instance is clearly
in the language.
We note that in the definition of knowledge soundness in the ILC model, the out-
put of the transcript oracle includes the messages the prover sent to the ILC. Since the
commitment channel behaves as an ideal functionality, it is guaranteed that the prover
knows the content of the committed messages. In this setting, it is sufficient for the
extractor to show that if the prover does not know a witness, then the committed mes-
sages will lead to an invalid transcript with overwhelming probability. Looking ahead
to the following chapters, we will show how to compile a proof of knowledge over the
ILC into one over the standard channel by instantiating the ideal commitment with a
concrete commitment scheme. In this way we can separate the statistical properties of
the proof of knowledge constructed over the ILC from the computational properties
introduced by the different instantiations of the commitment scheme.
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Our definition above is stronger than the usual definition of knowledge soundness
in the public parameter model [DF02]. The difference is that, in standard definition,
the knowledge extractor can interact freely with the cheating prover, while in our
definition we restrict E to observe accepting transcripts obtained from the interaction
of the cheating prover with the honest verifier. We recall the standard definition of
knowledge soundness following the C-style formulation of [Unr12]. It is straightfor-
ward to see that the definition above implies the following.
Definition 3.5 (Knowledge soundness). A proof system (G,P,V) for a relation R has
computational knowledge soundness with knowledge error κ(λ) if for all DPT P∗ there
exists an expected PPT extractor E and such that for all PPT adversaries A
Pr
 pp← G(1λ); (u, s)← A(pp);w ← EP∗(pp,u;s)(pp, u):
(pp, u, w) ∈ R
+ κ(λ) ≥
Pr
 pp← G(1λ); (u, s)← A(pp); (tranP∗ ; b)← 〈P∗(pp, u; s) chan←→ V(pp, u)〉:
b = 1

If the definition holds also for unboundedP∗ andAwe say the proof has statistical knowledge
soundness.
Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge. A proof of knowledge is zero-knowledge if
it does not reveal any information about the witness apart from what can be inferred
from the validity of the statement. In the next chapters we will show public-coin
proofs of knowledge that have special honest-verifier zero-knowledge. This means that if
the verifier’s challenges are known, or even adversarially chosen, then it is possible to
simulate the verifier’s view without the witness. In other words, the simulator works
for verifiers who may use non-uniform random coins in choosing their challenges but
that follow the specification of the protocol as an honest verifier would.
Definition 3.6 (Special Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge). A public-coin proof of knowl-
edge (G,P,V) for a relationR is computationally special honest-verifier zero-knowledge
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(SHVZK) if there exists a PPT simulator S such that for all stateful interactive PPT adver-
saries A that output randomness ρ for the verifier,
Pr
 pp← G(1λ); (u,w, ρ)← A(pp); viewV ← S(pp, u, ρ):
(pp, u, w) ∈ R ∧ A(viewV) = 1
 ≈
Pr
 pp← G(1λ); (u,w, ρ)← A(pp); viewV ← 〈P(pp, u, w) chan←→ V(pp, u; ρ)〉:
(pp, u, w) ∈ R ∧ A(viewV) = 1

We say the proof is statistically SHVZK if the definition holds also against unboundedA, and
we say the proof is perfect SHVZK if the probabilities are exactly equal.
From Special Honest-Verifier to General Zero-Knowledge. Special honest-verifier
zero-knowledge only guarantees the simulator works for verifiers following the proof
system specifications. Generally, SHVZK may not give a sufficient level of privacy
and it may be preferable to consider general zero-knowledge, i.e. where the simulator
works for arbitrary malicious verifier strategies. Nonetheless, constructing efficient
SHVZK proofs is considered an important step towards the realisation of general zero-
knowledge proofs as there exists several transformations that allow to convert one to
the other with little impact on their efficiency. Here we recall few of these transforma-
tions intended for generic public coin proof systems.
In the Fiat-Shamir transform [FS86] the verifier’s challenges are computed us-
ing a cryptographic hash function applied to the transcript up to the challenge. The
Fiat-Shamir transform is more generally used to turn a public-coin proof into a non-
interactive one. Since interaction with the verifier is no longer needed, general zero-
knowledge is immediately achieved. If the hash function can be computed in linear
time in the input size, then the Fiat-Shamir transform only incurs an additive linear
overhead in computation for the prover and verifier. The drawback of the Fiat-Shamir
transform is that security is usually proved in the random oracle model [BR93] where
the hash function is modelled as an ideal random function.
In the common reference string model and using a trapdoor commitment scheme,
Damgård [Dam00] gives a transformation yielding concurrently secure protocols for
Σ-Protocols, i.e. preserving zero-knowledge even in the case of several concurrent
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executions of the same proof system. The idea is for the prover to commit to its first
message using a trapdoor commitment scheme, which is then opened in the last move
of the protocol. The transformation was optimized by Groth [Gro04] using the idea
that for each public-coin challenge x, the prover first commits to a value x′, then the
verifier sends a value x′′, after which the prover opens the commitment and uses the
challenge x = x′ + x′′. The coin-flipping can be interleaved with the rest of the proof,
which means the transformation preserves the number of rounds and only incurs a
very small efficiency cost to do the coin-flipping for the challenges.
If one does not wish to rely on a common reference string for security, one can use a
private-coin transformation where the verifier does not reveal the random coins used
to generate the challenges sent to the prover (hence the final protocol is no longer pub-
lic coin). One example is the Micciancio and Petrank [MP03] transformation (yielding
concurrently secure protocols) while incurring a small overhead of ω(log λ) with re-
spect to the number of rounds as well as the computational and communication cost
in each round. The transformation preserves the soundness and completeness errors
of the original protocol; however, it does not preserve statistical zero-knowledge as
the obtained protocol only has computational zero-knowledge.
There are other public-coin transformations to general zero-knowledge e.g. Gol-
dreich et al. [GSV98]. The transformation relies on a random-selection protocol be-
tween the prover and verifier to specify a set of messages and it restricts the verifier
to choose challenges from this set. However, the transformed proof only achieves
inverse polynomial soundness error, and thus requires ω(1) sequential repetitions to
reduce the soundness error to a negligible function.
3.3.4 Efficiency Measures
There are several metrics to consider when assessing the efficiency of proofs of knowl-
edge. The main four parameters we will consider are round complexity, communica-
tion complexity, prover’s and verifier’s computation.
The round complexity µ measures the number of messages between prover and
verifier. A move is a single message going from one party to the other and a round
consists of a pair of moves, one from the prover to the verifier and one from the verifier
to the prover. The last round of the proof system may consist of a single move from
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the prover to the verifier. In the ILC channel a prover’s move consists of sending a
commit command to the ILC, which forwards the number of committed vectors to
the verifier, and a verifier’s move consists of sending a send command to the the ILC,
which forwards the message to the prover.
The communication complexity consists of the overall size of the messages sent
during the protocol and we measure it in either the number of field elements of size
log |F| or the number of W -bits words. In the ILC channel we separate it into prover’s
communication, counting the number of vectors sent by the prover to the ILC channel,
and verifier’s communication, counting the number of send messages the verifier for-
wards to the prover. In addition to these we consider the query complexity qc counting
the number of open queries made by the verifier, i.e. the number of linear combina-
tions the ILC is being asked to open.
The prover’s computation TP and verifier’s computation TV correspond to the
number of operations performed by the two parties, respectively. We measure these
in either the number of field operations or TinyRAM steps.
3.4 Linear-Time Linear Error-Correcting Codes
A code over an alphabet Σ is a subset C ⊆ Σn. A code C is associated with an encoding
function EC : Σk → Σn mapping messages of length k into codewords of length n. We
assume there is a setup algorithm GenEC which takes as input the description of an
alphabet Σ and the parameter k ∈ N, and it outputs an encoding function EC , which
is represented as either an arithmetic circuit or as a TinyRAM program.
In what follows, we restrict our attention to F-linear codes for which the alphabet
is a finite field F, the code C is a k-dimensional linear subspace of Fn, and EC is an F-
linear map. The rate of the code is defined to be kn . The Hamming distance between two
vectors x,y ∈ Fn is denoted by hd(x,y) and corresponds to the number of coordinates
in which x,y differ. The (minimum) distance of a code is defined to be the minimum
Hamming distance hdmin between distinct codewords in C. We denote by [n, k, hdmin]F
a linear code over F with length n, dimension k and minimum distance hdmin. The
Hamming weight of a vector x is wt(x) = |{i ∈ [n] : xi 6= 0}|.
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In the next sections, we will use families of linear codes achieving asymptotically
good parameters. More precisely, we require codes with linear length, n = Θ(k), and
linear distance, hdmin = Θ(k), in the dimension k of the code. We recall that random
linear codes achieve with high probability the best trade-off between distance and rate.
However, in this work we are particularly concerned with computational efficiency of
the encoding procedure and random codes are not known to be optimal in terms of
efficiency.
To obtain zero-knowledge proofs and arguments with linear cost for the prover,
we need to use codes that can be encoded in linear time. Starting from the seminal
work of Spielman [Spi96], there has been a rich stream of research [GI01; GI02; GI03;
GI05; DI14; CDD+16] regarding linear codes with linear-time encoding. In our proofs,
we can employ one of the families of codes presented by Druk and Ishai [DI14]. These
are defined over a generic finite field F and meet all the above linearity requirements.
Theorem 3.1 ([DI14]). There exist constants c1 > 1 and c2 > 0 such that for every finite field
F there exists a family of [dc1ke, k, bc2kc]F linear codes. These can be encoded by a uniform
family of linear-size arithmetic circuits, consisting of O(k) addition gates.
The above codes, as the all the other families of linear-time encodable codes, use
bipartite expander graphs which can be instantiated using the explicit construction of
[CRV+02]. By representing the encoding function as an arithmetic circuit, the size of
the circuit is of about 6Dk addition gates, where D = O(1) is the left-regularity of
the expander graph. If we represent the encoding function as a TinyRAM program,
encoding requires about 24Dke steps and 4(D + 1)ke words of memory, where e =
log(|F|)
W is the number of words required to store a field element.
In [DI14], Druk and Ishai suggested another family of codes which achieves better
parameters, meeting the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. This family can be still encoded
in linear time and would make our proofs and arguments more efficient, but without
having an impact on their asymptotic complexity. Differently from the one recalled
above, this construction is probabilistic. We opt for the explicit construction of Theo-
rem 3.1 which enables to verify the correct generation of the code.
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3.5 Commitment Schemes
A non-interactive commitment scheme allows a sender to commit to a secret mes-
sage and to later reveal the message in a verifiable way. Here we are interested in
commitment schemes that take an arbitrary length message as input, so the mes-
sage space is {0, 1}∗. A commitment scheme is defined by a pair of PPT algorithms
(CSetup,CCommit).
CSetup(1λ)→ ck: it receives the security parameter as input and returns a commit-
ment key ck.
CCommitck(m)→ c: given a messagem ∈ {0, 1}∗, it picks randomness r ← {0, 1}poly(λ)
and computes a commitment c = CCommitck(m; r).
A commitment scheme must satisfy binding, in the sense that it should be infeasible to
open a commitment to two distinct messages. A commitment scheme must be hiding,
meaning that the commitment does not reveal anything about the committed message.
Definition 3.7 (Binding). A commitment scheme is computationally binding if for all PPT
adversaries A
Pr
 ck ← CSetup(1λ); (m0, r0,m1, r1)← A(ck) :
m0 6= m1 ∧ CCommitck(m0; r0) = CCommitck(m1; r1)
 ≈ 0.
If this holds also for unbounded adversaries, we say the commitment scheme is statistically
binding.
Definition 3.8 (Hiding). A commitment scheme is computationally hiding if for all PPT
stateful adversaries A
Pr
 ck ← CSetup(1λ); (m0,m1)← A(ck); b← {0, 1}; c← CCommitck(mb) :
A(c) = b
 ≈ 1
2
,
where A outputs messages of equal length |m0| = |m1|. If the definition holds also for un-
bounded adversaries, we say the commitment scheme is statistically hiding.
We will be interested in using highly efficient commitment schemes. We say a com-
mitment scheme is linear-time if the time to compute CCommitck(m) is poly(λ)+O(|m|)
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bit operations, which we assume corresponds to poly(λ) + O( |m|W ) TinyRAM opera-
tions. We will also be interested in having small size commitments. We say a com-
mitment scheme is compact if there is a polynomial p(λ) such that commitments have
size at most p(λ) regardless of how long the message is. We say a commitment scheme
is public coin if there is a polynomial `(λ) such that CSetup(1λ) picks the commitment
key uniformly at random as ck ← {0, 1}`(λ). We will now discuss some candidate
linear-time commitment schemes.
Statistically Hiding Commitments. Applebaum et al. [AHI+17b] constructed low-
complexity families of collision-resistant hash functions, where it is possible to eval-
uate the hash function in linear time in the message size. Their construction is based
on the binary shortest vector problem (bSVP) assumption, which is related to find-
ing non-trivial low-weight vectors in the null space of a matrix over F2. Collision
resistant hash functions can be coupled with universal hash functions [CW77] to ob-
tain compact statistically hiding and computationally binding commitment schemes,
as shown by Halevi and Micali [HM96]. Their transformation is very efficient and it
only requires one application of the universal hash function on a short input2 and two
evaluations of the collision resistance hash function. Thus, if we instantiate it with
the collision resistant hash function with [AHI+17b], we obtain a compact linear-time
public-coin statistically hiding commitment scheme.
Statistically Binding Commitments. Ishai et al. [IKO+08] proposed linear-time com-
putable pseudorandom generators (PRGs) with arbitrary polynomial stretch based on
the PRGs with linear stretch in NC0 of Applebaum et al. [AIK08], which rely on the
intractability assumptions of decoding sparsely generated linear codes [Ale11]. More-
over, [IKO+08] suggested how to use these PRG to obtain linear-time statistically bind-
ing commitment schemes. Given a (not linear-time) statistically binding commitment
scheme CCommit, to commit to a long message m one first picks a short seed s for the
pseudorandom generator, stretches it to t = PRG(s) such that |t| = |m| and computes
CCommit′(m) := (CCommitck(s), t⊕m)
2More precisely, the construction requires to pick a random universal hash function mapping a ran-
dom string to the digest of the message. The cost of this step is usually comparable to one evaluation of
the hash function, as in the constructions suggested in [CW77; HM96]
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Assuming that the base commitment scheme CCommit is statistically binding and PRG
computable in linear time, the resulting commitment CCommit′ is a linear-time statis-
tically binding commitment scheme for messages of arbitrary length. It can also easily
be seen that commitments have the same length as the message, plus an additive poly-
nomial overhead that depends only on the security parameter. The construction also
preserves the public-coin property of the internal commitment scheme.
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Chapter 4
Proofs for the Satisfiability of
Arithmetic Circuits in the ILC
Model
In this chapter we give efficient zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for the satisfi-
ability of arithmetic circuits in the ILC model. We recall that in this model, which we
introduced in Section 3.3, prover and verifier interact using an Ideal Linear Commit-
ment communication channel, or ILC. The ILC allows the prover to commit to vectors
of length k over a finite field F by sending them to the channel. The ILC channel stores
the received vectors and communicates the number of vectors it received to the veri-
fier. The verifier can send messages in F to the prover via the channel and can query
the ILC to open arbitrary linear combinations of the committed vectors sent by the
prover. The field F and the vector length k are determined by the public parameters
ppILC ← GILC(1λ).
The efficiency of our proof system is affected by the parameter k. For an arithmetic
circuit with N addition and multiplication gates the best efficiency is achieved when
k ≈ √N . In our proofs both prover and verifier computational costs are linear in the
size of the circuit. More precisely, the prover has to compute O(N) field multiplica-
tions thus she achieves constant overhead with respect to the direct evaluation of the
circuit. On the other hand, the computational cost of the verifier is onlyO(N) additions
in the field. In Chapter 6 we will show how to compile proofs over the ILC into proofs
over the standard channel. Moreover, we will show efficient instantiations which pre-
serve the computational complexity prover and verifier have in the ILC model.
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Our proofs over the ILC achieve perfect completeness, perfect special honest ver-
ifier zero knowledge, and statistical strong knowledge soundness. The soundness of
our proofs crucially relies on the use of the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma and, therefore,
it is affected by the size of the underlying field. In order to get negligible soundness
error without incurring in repetitions of the proofs, we consider the size of the field to
be superpolynomial size, i.e. |F| ≈ λω(1).
In [Gro09], Groth gave several efficient zero-knowledge arguments for a wide class
of statements related to linear algebra. The main tool used in the arguments is a ho-
momorphic commitment scheme to vectors, which is instantiated with Pedersen com-
mitments. The proofs in this chapter can be seen as an abstraction of the arguments
of [Gro09] in an idealised vector commitment setting. By constructing proofs in this
model, we can extract the information theoretic properties of these arguments, decou-
pling them from the computational cryptographic assumptions used. In Chapter 6
we will then introduce a generic transformation, which compiles proofs over the ILC
into proofs and arguments over the standard channel using different cryptographic
assumptions. At high level, this process enables to exploit techniques that are typ-
ically used in conjunction with homomorphic commitments into a setting were the
commitment scheme does not offer such a property.
Similarly to [Gro09], we follow a modular approach to construct our proofs. We
describe proofs to efficiently check that committed vectors contain publicly known
values, for the sum of committed vectors, and for the Hadamard (entry-wise) product
of committed vectors. We also outline the construction of a proof for a known permu-
tation relation, and refer to [BCG+17] for the full specifications. Lastly, we show how
to combine these building blocks to give a proof for the satisfiability of an arithmetic
circuit.
4.1 Relation for the Satisfiability of an Arithmetic Circuit
Consider an arithmetic circuit with a total of N fan-in 2 gates, which can be either
addition gates or multiplication gates over a finite field F. Each gate has two inputs,
which we refer to as left and right, and one output wire. We allow for arbitrary fan-out,
therefore the output wire of each gate can be attached to the input wires of several
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other gates. In total, we have 3N input and output wires feeding in and out of the
gates.
An instance consists of the description of an arithmetic circuit and comprises a
set of gates, the connection of wires between gates, and known values assigned to
some of the inputs and outputs. A circuit is said to be satisfiable if there exists an
assignment complying with all the gates, the wiring, and the known values specified
in the instance. More precisely, a witness for a given instance consists of assignments
to the input and output wires of each gate such that
(1) The known values specified in the instance match the corresponding wire as-
signments in the witness.
(2) The output of every addition gate corresponds to the sum of the input wires of
the same gate.
(3) The output of every multiplication gate corresponds to the product of the input
wires of the same gate.
(4) The value of an output wire (or an input gate) matches the values of all input
wires connected to it.
In our proof for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits, the prover commits to all the
wire assignments using the ILC channel and then shows that these satisfy the above
conditions. To facilitate these proofs, we format the instance and the witness, similarly
to [Gro09], so that it can be easily parsed by the prover and verifier when using the
ILC channel.
Formatting the Witness. The witness consists of the wire assignments to all input
and output wires, and we consider these to be arranged into row vectors vi ∈ Fk,
where k is the vector length of the ILC. Without loss of generality we assume both
the number of addition gates and the number of multiplication gates to be divisible
by k, which can always be satisfied by adding few dummy gates to the circuit, e.g.
0 ⊕ 0 = 0 or 0 ⊗ 0 = 0. We can then number addition gates from (1, 1) to (mA, k) and
multiplication gates (mA + 1, 1) to (mA + mM , k), where mA · k is the total number
of addition gates and mM · k is the total number of multiplication gates. We insert
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FIGURE 4.1: Representation of an arithmetic circuit and arrangements
of the wires into 6 matrices.
assignments to left inputs, right inputs and outputs of addition gates into entries of
three matrices A,B,C ∈ FmA×k, respectively. We sort entries to the matrices so that
wires attached to the same gate correspond to the same entry of the three matrices, as
shown in Figure 4.1. A valid assignment to the wires then satisfies A + B = C. We
proceed in a similar way for the mM · k multiplication gates to obtain three matrices
D,E, F ∈ FmM×k such thatD◦E = F , where ◦ denotes the Hadamard (i.e. entry-wise)
product of matrices. All the committed wires then constitute a matrix
V =

A
B
C
D
E
F

∈ F(3mA+3mM )×k
Formatting the Instance. We consider instances of the form u = (mA,mM , pi, {ui}i∈S).
As above, mA and mM determine the number of addition and multiplication gates in
the circuit. The vectors ui contain the publicly known assignments to wires. Without
loss of generality, we assume the gates to be sorted so that the wire values speci-
fied in the instance correspond to full rows in V and are indexed by S. Again, this
is without loss of generality because we can always add a few dummy gates to the
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FIGURE 4.2: Representation of the wiring of a circuit: cycles
((1, 2), (5, 1), (9, 1)) and ((8, 2), (12, 1)).
circuit and to the instance to complete a row. Lastly, pi is a permutation encoding the
wiring of the arithmetic circuit. For each wire, we can write a cycle ((i1, j1), . . . , (it, jt))
that lists the coordinates of entries in V corresponding to the same wire. Then we let
pi ∈ Σ[3mA+3mM ]×[k] be the product of all these cycles, which unambiguously defines
the wiring of the circuit. To give an example using the circuit in Figure 4.1, the output
wire of the first addition gate, V5,1 , also appears as input in the first multiplication
gate, V9,1, and the second addition gate, V1,2. Therefore, if they appear as entries
(1, 2), (5, 1), (9, 1) in the matrix V defined by the rows vi, then we would have the
cycle ((1, 2), (5, 1), (9, 1)) indicating entries that must be identical. The output of the
third multiplication gate, V12,1, feeds into the left input of the fourth multiplication
gate, V8,2, so this may give us a cycle ((8, 2), (12, 1)) of entries that should have the
same value. An illustration of these two cycles is given in Figure 4.2. The permutation
pi is the product of all these cycles that define which entries have the same value.
While keeping the above formatting in mind, we now write the relation RAC for
the satisfiability of an arithmetic circuit as follows.
RAC =

(pp, u, w) :=
(
(F, k, ∗) , (mA,mM , pi, {vi}i∈S) ,
({vi}i∈S¯) ) :
m = 3mA + 3mM ∧ pi ∈ Σ[m]×[k]
∧ S ⊆ [m] ∧ S¯ = [m] \ S
∧ A = (vi)mAi=1 ∧ D = (vi)3mA+mMi=3mA+1
∧ B = (vi)2mAi=mA+1 ∧ E = (vi)
3mA+2mM
i=3mA+mM+1
∧ C = (vi)3mAi=2mA+1 ∧ F = (vi)
3mA+3mM
i=3mA+2mM+1
∧ A+B = C ∧ D ◦ E = F
∧ V = (vi)mi=1 ∧ Vi,j = Vpi(i,j) ∀ (i, j) ∈ [m]× [k]

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4.2 ILC Proofs for Simple Relations
In our proof for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits, the prover starts by committing
to all the wires values and then she shows that these satisfy the conditions specified in
RAC. To do this we follow a modular approach. We start by giving proofs over the ILC
for simple relations and, in the next section, we combine these to give a full proof for
RAC. In this section we present ILC proofs for equality, sum and product relations. We
also give a decomposition of the proof for a known permutation relation, referring to
[BCG+17] for its complete specifications. All these relations involve vectors that have
been previously committed to by the prover. To indicate that a vector v in the witness
has been committed, we sometimes include [v] in the instance. To keep the notation
as light as possible, we only use this when there may be some confusion about which
vectors the statements refer to; for example, when we give the statement as input to
the verifier.
4.2.1 ILC Proof for the Correct Opening of Committed Vectors
We start with a proof to check the equality of vectors included in the instance with vec-
tors committed by the prover in the ILC, which corresponds to the following equality
relation.
Req =
 (ppILC, u, w) = ((F, k, ∗), ({ui}i∈S), ({vi}i∈S)) :∀ i ∈ S, ui = vi

In this proof the proverPeq has to simply commit to vectors by sending a command
(commit,v1, . . . ,vs) to the ILC. As soon as the prover commits, the ILC informs the
verifier he received s = |S| vectors. As we will use this proof as a building block for
more complex proofs, the vectors may have already been committed, and the verifier
notified. In this case no further action is required by the prover. The verifier picks
a random challenge x ← F and queries the channel to open the linear combination
X = (x, x2, . . . , xs). The channel replies with the opening v =
∑s
i=1 x
ivi. The verifier
then computes the same linear combination on his vectors and checks it against the
opening received by the channel. The description of the proof systems (GILC,Peq,Veq)
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is given in Figure 4.3, where we use the symbols / ∗ and ∗/ to delimit the lines that
may have already been executed in other proofs.
Peq((F, k), ({ui}i∈S), ({vi}i∈S))
/ ∗ Round 0:
ILC← • Send (commit,v1, . . . ,vs) to the ILC ∗/
Veq((F, k), ({ui}i∈S , {[vi]}i∈S))
/ ∗ Round 0:
ILC→ ◦ Get message s from the ILC ∗/
Query:
• x← F
• X := (x1, . . . , xs)
ILC← • Send (open, X) to the ILC
ILC→ ◦ Get response v from the ILC
• If v = ∑si=1 xiui return 1, else return 0
FIGURE 4.3: Proof of Knowledge for the Req relation. Steps marked
with ILC → ◦ and ILC ← • denote incoming and outgoing messages to
the ILC, respectively.
Theorem 4.1. (GILC,Peq,Veq) is a proof of knowledge for the relation Req in the ILC model
with perfect completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-line extraction
and perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
Proof. The completeness of the proof is trivial. If the ui are equal to the vi, then the
verifier accepts the proof with probability 1.
The proof system has statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-line
extraction. This is because the knowledge extractor has already access to the transcript
of the communication between the prover and the channel (see Definition 3.4), and
thus it sees the vectors vi. By the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, if the committed vectors
are not equal to the uj , then they pass the consistency check with probability at most
s
|F| , which is negligible.
The proof is perfect SHVZK since the verifier knows the values in the instance.
Given these, it is trivial to simulate the verifier’s view.
Efficiency. As we only use this proof as a building block, we assess its efficiency by
ignoring the first step of prover and verifier (marked with / ∗ and ∗/). Since assume
that the vectors have been previously committed by the prover, and since the verifier
does not send challenges to the prover, there is no additional communication between
prover and verifier and thus the round complexity is µ = 0. Otherwise the round
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complexity would be equal µ = 1. The verifier makes a single query to the ILC channel,
so the query complexity is qc = 1. The prover does not perform any computation. The
verifier’s computational cost is O(sk) multiplications in F.
Improved Verification. Although the above efficiency may look optimal, there is,
perhaps surprisingly, a more efficient way to perform the above verification that only
requires a linear number (O(sk)) of field additions. This can be done by first encod-
ing both the response v and the vectors uj using linear-time linear error correcting
codes with linear minimum distance, as the ones recalled in Theorem 3.1. Instead of
checking that the entire encoded response EC(v) is consistent with the encoded vec-
torsEC(ui), the verifier can spot check these. More precisely he can pickO(λ) columns
at random, compute the linear combination on these selected columns and check them
against the encoded response. If v is not equal to
∑s
i=1 x
iui, then they differ in at least
one entry. Since the error correcting code has linear minimum distance, then the veri-
fier has constant probability of catching an error. Therefore, by picking uniformly and
independently at random O(λ) columns, the probability of missing an error can be
made negligible. Encoding all the vectors only requires O(sk) of additions, while the
cost of evaluating the linear combinations in the selected columns amount to O(sλ)
multiplications. For large enough k  λ, the total number of multiplication is a sub-
linear number of multiplications, i.e. o(sk). Note that in our main proof we will set
k to be approximately equal to
√
N , where N is a (large) polynomial in λ. The above
strategy is similar to the one used by Damgård and Zakarias in [DZ13] to check the
zero product of matrices, while in our case it is used it to test the identity of vectors.
Table 4.1 reports the efficiency of the proof for the correct opening of committed
vectors with respect to the improved verification strategy.
Prover computation TPILC = //
Verifier computation TVILC = O(sk) F+
Prover communication t = //
Verifier communication CILC = 0
Query complexity qc = 1
Round complexity µ = 0
TABLE 4.1: Efficiency of the proof of knowledge for Req. F+ stands for
the cost of a single field addition.
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Psum((F, k), s, (A,B,C))
/ ∗ Round 0:
ILC← • Send (commit, A,B,C) to the ILC ∗/
Vsum((F, k), (s, [A], [B], [C]))
/ ∗ Round 0:
ILC→ ◦ Get message 3s from the ILC. ∗/
Query:
• x← F
• X := (x1, . . . , xs, x1, . . . , xs,−x1, . . . ,−xs)
ILC← • Send (open, X) to ILC
ILC→ ◦ Get response v from the ILC
• If v = 0 return 1, else return 0
FIGURE 4.4: Proof of Knowledge for theRsum relation.
4.2.2 ILC Proof for the Sum of Committed Matrices
Next, we show a proof of knowledge of committed matrices A,B,C ∈ Fs×k such that
A+B = C, as specified in the following relation
Rsum =
 (ppILC, u) = ((F, k, ∗), s, (A,B,C)) :A,B,C ∈ Fs×k ∧ A+B = C

As for the previous proof, the prover starts by committing to all the row vectors of
the matrices A,B,C. We assume the prover commits to the rows of the matrices in
order, starting with all the rows of A, B and then C. If the matrices have already
been committed to by the prover, she may remain inactive. The verifier receives the
message 3s from the ILC, notifying the reception of the committed vectors. Next, the
verifier picks a challenge x← F, constructs the query
X := (x1, x2, . . . , xs, x1, x2, . . . , xs,−x1,−x2, . . . ,−xs)
and then sends (open, X) to the ILC. The idea is that the i-th rows in the matrices
A,B,C are associated with the same power of x in the query, but the ones in C have
opposite sign. Therefore, we expect them to sum up to zero if A + B − C = 0 holds.
The description of the proof of knowledge forRsum is given in Figure 4.4 where steps
marked with ILC → ◦ and ILC ← • denote incoming and outgoing messages to the
ILC, respectively.
Theorem 4.2. (GILC,Psum,Vsum) is a proof of knowledge for the relation Rsum in the ILC
model with perfect completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-line
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extraction, and perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
Proof. The completeness of the proof is trivial as if A + B − C is equal to the zero
matrix, then the ILC answers with v = 0 with probability 1.
The proof has statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-line extraction.
This is because the knowledge extractor has access to the communication between the
prover and the channel, and thus sees the row vectors of matrices A,B and C. If
A + B 6= C then at least one column in A + B − C is not the zero vector. By the
Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, the probability of the ILC returning 0 is at most s|F| , which is
negligible.
The proof is perfect zero-knowledge as the verifier only sees the zero vector, which
can be trivially simulated.
Efficiency. As before, we assess the efficiency by ignoring the first step of prover and
verifier (marked with / ∗ and ∗/). In this case the round complexity is equal to 0 as
there is no additional communication between prover and verifier, as the verifier only
communicates with the ILC. The prover does not perform any computation. The veri-
fier makes one query to the ILC and its computational cost is dominated by computing
s − 1 multiplications in F to construct the query. Table 4.2 reports the costs of the the
proof of knowledge forRsum.
Prover computation TPILC = //
Verifier computation TVILC = (s− 1) F×
Prover communication t = //
Verifier communication CILC = 0
Query complexity qc = 1
Round complexity µ = 0
TABLE 4.2: Efficiency of the proof of knowledge for Rsum. F× stands
for the cost of a single field multiplication.
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4.2.3 ILC proof for the Hadamard Product of Committed Matrices
We now describe a proof of knowledge for the Hadamard (entry-wise) product of
matrices A,B,C ∈ Fmn×k such that A ◦B = C, as specified in the following relation
Rprod =
 (ppILC, u) = ((F, k), (mn), (A,B,C)) :A,B ∈ Fmn×k ∧ A ◦B = C

Main Idea. Firstly, we take a look to the case m = 1 such that matricesA,B,C consist
of n rows each. If we parse each matrix as the set of its row vectors, we have that
A ◦ B = C can be written as aj ◦ bj = cj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Unless they have already
been committed, the prover starts by committing to the vectors aj , bj , cj using the ILC.
Then the verifier picks a challenge x← F and sends it to the prover by forwarding the
command (send, x) to the ILC. After receiving x the prover computes the following
polynomials in the indeterminate Z with coefficient in Fk
a′(Z) =
n∑
j=1
ajx
jZj b′(Z) =
n∑
j=1
bjZ
−j
and compute their product in Fk[Z]
a′(Z) ◦ b′(Z) =
n∑
j=1
aj ◦ bjxj +
n−1∑
r=1−n,r 6=0
erZ
r
where ◦ denotes the the standard convolution product of polynomials with the Ha-
damard product applied to the coefficients. Note that the the products aj ◦ bj are all
positioned in the constant term of the polynomial a′(Z) ◦ b′(Z), while the products
ai ◦ bj for i 6= j are inside the cancellation terms er. The prover sends the command
(commit, {er}n−1r=1−n,r 6=0) to commit to vectors er. These correspond to the coefficient
of a′(Z) ◦ b′(Z) excluding its constant term. At this point the verifier picks a challenge
z ← F and queries the ILC to give the following linear combinations of the vectors
aj , bj , cj , er, which are all stored in the ILC.
a′(z) =
n∑
j=1
ajx
jzj b′(z) =
n∑
j=1
bjz
−j c′(z) =
n∑
j=1
cjx
j +
n−1∑
r=1−n,r 6=0
erz
r
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If the statement is true, i.e. aj ◦bj = cj , then the constant term in a′(Z)◦b′(Z) is equal∑n
j=1 cjx
j . The verifier finally checks whether a′(z) ◦ b′(z) = c′(z), in which case she
returns 1.
Observation 1. The above approach is clearly not zero knowledge, since the open-
ings returned by the ILC only depend on the challenges and the values in the witness.
To make the above solution zero-knowledge, in her first move the prover commits to
some blinding factors a′0, b′0 ← Fk and c′0 := a′0 ◦ b′0. Then, it is sufficient to extend the
linear combinations queried to the ILC by the (honest) verifier to include the blinding
factors, i.e.
a′(z) + a′0 b
′(z) + b′0 c
′(z) + c′0
Note that the polynomials defined in the protocol need to be changed to take into
account the blinders. We defer this to the full specification of the proof, which can be
found below.
Observation 2. Our final goal is to construct efficient proofs of knowledge for which
the prover only incurs a constant overhead in computation. The approach described
above however does not suffice to achieve this level of efficiency. The bottleneck for
the prover is in the computation of the product a′(Z) ◦ b′(Z), which has degree n and
coefficients in Fk. Using FFT multiplication algorithms, this product requires about
O(kn log(n)) field multiplications. Therefore the prover incurs in a O(log(n)) compu-
tational overhead with respect to compute the Hadamard product of matrices, which
costs O(kn) field multiplications.
Reducing the Prover’s Overhead. To overcome this issue we follow a technique in-
troduced in [Gro09], which allows to reduce computation for the prover at the cost of
increasing the interaction with the verifier. The main idea behind this technique is to
first group the rows into sets of m ≈ log(n) rows, and then to use a compression step
which reduces the size of the groups by a half. After log log(n) iterations, the number
of row vectors can be reduced by a factor 1log(n) , such that it is possible to follow the
approach described above without incurring in a superconstant overhead. Moreover,
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the compression steps only require a linear number of operations, keeping the overall
prover running time equal to O(mnk) field multiplications.
Consider matrices A,B,C with mn row vectors each: ai,j , bi,j , ci,j ∈ Fk for 0 ≤ i ≤
m−1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ n−1. Without loss of generality we assume that m = 2µ for some in-
teger µ ∈ N. We will compress 2mn vectors ai,j , bi,j of length k into 2n vectors a′j , b′j of
the same length. The compressed vectors are computed by first inserting vectors ai,j
and bi,j into distinct coefficients of 2n multivariate polynomials in Y0, . . . , Yµ−1, and
then by progressively evaluating these at µ challenges y0, . . . , yµ−1 sent by the veri-
fier. More precisely, vector ai,jxi is positioned in the j-th polynomial a′j(Y0, . . . , Yµ−1)
as coefficient of Y i00 · · ·Y iµ−1µ−1 , where x is the first challenge sent by the verifier, and
(iµ−1, iµ−2, . . . , i0) ∈ {0, 1}µ is the binary expansion of i. Computing these coefficients
only requires O(mnk) field multiplications. In a similar fashion the vector bi,j is em-
bedded into the coefficient of Y −i00 · · ·Y −iµ−1µ−1 in the polynomial b′j(Y0, . . . , Yµ−1), as
shown below.
a′j(Y0, . . . , Yµ−1) =
m−1∑
i=0
ai,jx
iY i00 Y
i1
1 . . . Y
iµ−1
µ−1 For 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1
b′j(Y0, . . . , Yµ−1) =
m−1∑
i=0
bi,jY
−i0
0 Y
−i1
1 . . . Y
−iµ−1
µ−1 For 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1
By evaluating all the 2n polynomials in Y0 := y0 we reduce the number of coefficients
in each of the polynomials by a factor 2, as shown in the following.
a′j(y0, Y1, . . . , Yµ−1) =
m
2
−1∑
i=0
(
a2i,jx
2i + a2i+1,jx
2i+1y0
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
α1,i,j
Y i11 . . . Y
iµ−1
µ−1 For 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1
b′j(y0, Y1, . . . , Yµ−1) =
m
2
−1∑
i=0
(
b2i,j + b2i+1,jy
−1
0
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
β1,i,j
Y −i11 . . . Y
−iµ−1
µ−1 For 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1
The coefficientsα1,i,j ,β1,i,j of each of the above 2n polynomials can be computed with
mk
2 multiplications and
mk
2 additions. By first evaluating these on Y1 := y1, and then
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the other challenges y2, . . . , yµ−1, the number of coefficients is halved at each evalua-
tion, until we obtain the following 2n vectors.
a′j := a
′
j(y0, . . . , yµ−1) =
m−1∑
i=0
ai,jx
iyi00 y
i1
1 . . . y
iµ−1
µ−1
=
m
2
−1∑
i=0
α1,i,jy
i1
1 . . . y
iµ−1
µ−1
= · · ·
= αµ−1,0,j +αµ−1,1,jyµ−1 For 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1
b′j := b
′
j(y0, . . . , yµ−1) =
m−1∑
i=0
bi,jy
−i0
0 y
−i1
1 . . . y
−iµ−1
µ−1
=
m
2
−1∑
i=0
β1,i,jy
−i1
1 . . . y
−iµ−1
µ−1
= · · ·
= βµ−1,0,j + βµ−1,1,jy−1µ−1 For 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1
As the cost of computing these evaluations is halved at each iteration, the above vec-
tors require in total O(mnk) field additions and multiplications to compute. At this
point we can proceed as in the case m = 1 and embed the above 2n vectors into the
coefficients of two polynomials in Z of degree n.
a′(Z) =
n−1∑
j=0
a′j(y0, . . . , yµ−1)x
jm+1Zj
b′(Z) =
n−1∑
j=0
b′j(y0, . . . , yµ−1)Z
−j
If we take the Hadamard product of the two polynomials above, the products a′j ◦
b′j end up in the constant coefficient, i.e., Z
0. Similarly, all other cancellation products
a′j ◦ b′j′ , for j 6= j′, end up in the coefficients er of other powers of Z. If we expand the
products of a′j ◦ b′j we can also observe that the products of ai,j ◦ bi,j are placed in the
constant term of the Yt, while all other products ai,j ◦ bi′,j for i 6= i′ are contained in
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the cancellation terms d+i ,d
−
i .
a′(Z) ◦ b′(Z) =
n−1∑
j=0
a′j ◦ b′jxjm+1 +
n−2∑
r=2−n,r 6=0
erZ
r
=
m−1,n−1∑
i=0,j=0
ai,j ◦ bi,jxi+jm+1 +
µ−1∑
t=0
(
d+t yt + d
−
t y
−1
t
)
+
n−2∑
r=2−n,r 6=0
erZ
r
Computing this product requires O(kn log(n)) field multiplications, which is linear in
mnk if we set m ≈ log(n). The cancellation terms d+t ,d−t have the following expres-
sions
d+t =
n−1∑
j=0
m
2t+1
−1∑
i=0
αt,2i+1,j ◦ βt,2i,j d−t =
n−1∑
j=0
m
2t+1
−1∑
i=0
αt,2i,j ◦ βt,2i+1,j
where α0,i,j := ai,jxi and β0,i,j := bi,j . Similarly to the computation of the αt,i,j ,βt,i,j ,
the computation of d+t ,d
−
t requires
mnk
2t+1
multiplications to compute. Summing over t
we obtain a total of O(mnk) multiplications. Therefore, the total computational cost
for both compressing the vectors and computing the above polynomial expression
is O(mnk) field multiplications, i.e. a linear number of operations in the size of the
matrices.
To summarise, we first outlined a way to check Hadamard products of vectors by
evaluating a polynomial expression at a random challenge point. Then, we showed a
compression technique which enables to keep the prover’s computational overhead
constant by increasing the interaction with the verifier. In each of the additional
rounds of interaction, the prover commits to a pair of cancellation vectors d+t ,d
−
t and
the verifier replies with the next challenge yt. The full specifications of the prover
Pprod and verifier Vprod of the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge over the ILC for the
relationRprod are given in Figure 4.5 and 4.6. As for the previous proofs of knowledge,
we use the convention that steps marked with ILC→ ◦ and ILC← • denote incoming
and outgoing messages to the ILC, respectively.
Theorem 4.3. (GILC,Pprod,Vprod) is a proof of knowledge for the relation Rprod in the ILC
model with perfect completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-line
extraction and perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
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Pprod((F, k, ∗), (mn), (A,B,C))
Round 1:
• Parse A = {ai,j}, B = {bi,j}, C = {ci,j} for (i, j) ∈ [0,m− 1]× [0, n− 1]
• Set µ := blog(m)c
• a′−1, b′−1 ← Fk
• c′−1 := a′−1 ◦ b′−1
/ ∗ ILC← • Send (commit, {ai,j}, {bi,j}, {ci,j}) to the ILC ∗/
ILC← • Send (commit,a′−1, b′−1, c′−1) to the ILC
Round 2:
ILC→ ◦ Get x from ILC
• For (i, j) ∈ [0,m− 1]× [0, n− 1]:
– α0,i,j := ai,jxi
– β0,i,j := bi,j
• d+0 :=
∑n−1
j=0
∑m
2
−1
i=0 α0,2i+1,j ◦ β0,2i,j , d−0 :=
∑n−1
j=0
∑m
2
−1
i=0 α0,2i,j ◦ β0,2i+1,j
ILC← • Send (commit,d+0 ,d−0 ) to the ILC
(For t = 1 to µ− 1)
Round t+ 2:
ILC→ ◦ Get yt−1 from ILC
• m′ := m2t
• For (i, j) ∈ [0,m′ − 1]× [0, n− 1]:
– αt,i,j := αt−1,2i,j +αt−1,2i+1,jyt−1
– βt,i,j := βt−1,2i,j + βt−1,2i+1,jy−1t−1
• d+t :=
∑n−1
j=0
∑m′
2
−1
i=0 αt,2i+1,j ◦ βt,2i,j , d−t :=
∑n−1
j=0
∑m′
2
−1
i=0 αt,2i,j ◦ βt,2i+1,j
ILC← • Send (commit,d+t ,d−t ) to the ILC
Round µ+ 2:
ILC→ ◦ Get yµ−1 from ILC
• For j ∈ [0, n− 1]:
– a′j := αµ−1,0,j +αµ−1,1,jyµ−1
– b′j := βµ−1,0,j + βµ−1,1,jy
−1
µ−1
• a′(Z) := a′−1 +
∑n−1
j=0 a
′
jx
jm+1Zj
• b′(Z) := b′−1 +
∑n−1
j=0 b
′
jZ
−j
• c′ := c′−1 +
∑m−1
i=0
∑n−1
j=0 ci,jx
i+jm+1
• d′ := ∑µ−1t=0 (d+t yt + d−t y−1t )
• e(Z) := ∑n−1r=1−n,r 6=0 erZr := a′(Z) ◦ b′(Z)−a′−1 ◦ b′−1−∑n−1j=0 a′j ◦ b′jxjm+1
ILC← • Send (commit, {er}n−1r=1−n,r 6=0) to the ILC
FIGURE 4.5: Prover Pprod for the proof of knowledge forRprod.
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Vprod((F, k, ∗), (mn, [A], [B], [C]))
Round 1:
/ ∗ ILC→ ◦ Get message 3mn from the ILC ∗/
ILC→ ◦ Get message 3 from the ILC
• x← F
ILC← • Send (send, x) to the ILC
(For t = 0 to µ− 1)
Round t+ 2:
ILC→ ◦ Get message 2 from the ILC
• yt ← F
ILC← • Send (send, yt) to the ILC
Round µ+ 2:
ILC→ ◦ Get message 2n− 1 from the ILC
Query:
• z ← F
ILC← • Send (open,a′(z), b′(z), c′ + d′ + e(z)) to the ILC
ILC→ ◦ Get openings (v1,v2,v3) from the ILC
• If v1 ◦ v2 = v3 return 1, else return 0
FIGURE 4.6: Verifier Vprod of the proof of knowledge forRprod.
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Proof. We start by showing completeness. If the statement is true then ai,j ◦ bi,j = ci,j
and
a′(z) ◦ b′(z) = a′−1 ◦ b′−1 +
n−1∑
j=0
a′j ◦ b′jxjm+1 +
n−1∑
r=1−n,r 6=0
erz
r
= a′−1 ◦ b′−1 +
m−1,n−1∑
i=0,j=0
ai,j ◦ bi,jxi+jm+1 +
µ−1∑
t=0
(
d+t yt + d
−
t y
−1
t
)
+
n−1∑
r=1−n,r 6=0
erZ
r
= c′−1 +
m−1,n−1∑
i=0,j=0
cxi+jm+1 +
µ−1∑
t=0
(
d+t yt + d
−
t y
−1
t
)
+
n−1∑
r=1−n,r 6=0
erz
r
= c′ + d′ + e(z)
where the first and the last terms correspond to the verification equation Vprod per-
forms on the queries a(z), b(z) and c′ + d′ + e(z). Therefore the verifier accepts with
probability 1.
For honest-verifier zero-knowledge, we describe how to simulate the verifier’s
view efficiently. Note that in a real transcript, the response to the first two opening
queries is uniformly distributed as a′−1, b′−1 are picked uniformly at random. The sim-
ulator picks v1,v2 ← Fk and sets v3 := v1 ◦ v2 and sets the response to the query to
be v1,v2,v3. The simulated response passes the verification check. Moreover, it is dis-
tributed uniformly at random conditioned on passing the verification, and thus it is
identically distributed to a real transcript. Hence, the proof system has perfect special
honest verifier zero knowledge.
Next, we show that the proof has statistical strong knowledge soundness with
straight-line extraction. The knowledge extractor is straight-line because it has access
to the communication transcript between the prover and the channel, and therefore it
sees the row vectors of matrices A,B,C composing the witness. It remains to show
that for any deterministic malicious prover P∗prod, if the committed vectors are not a
valid witness for Rprod, then the verifier has negligible probability of accepting the
statement. We prove this by induction on the values of µ. We begin with the base case
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µ = 0, for which m = 1. Consider the following polynomials in X,Z
a′(X,Z) = a′−1 +
n−1∑
j=0
a0,jX
j+1Zj
b′(X,Z) = b′−1 +
n−1∑
j=0
b0,jZ
−j
c′(X) = c′−1 +
n−1∑
j=0
c0,jX
j+1
e(X,Z) =
n−1∑
r=1−n,r 6=0
er(X)Z
r
The verifier’s check is equivalent to test the following polynomial identity at random
challenges x, z.
a′(X,Z) ◦ b′(X,Z)− c′(X) = e(X,Z)
The polynomial on the right-hand side has the coefficient of Z0 equal to 0, while the
coefficient of Z0 on the left-hand side is equal to
a′−1 ◦ b′−1 − c′−1 +
n−1∑
j=0
(a0,j ◦ b0,j − c0,j)Xj+1 (4.1)
If the statement is false, there exists at least one index j for which a0,j ◦ b0,j − c0,j 6= 0
and thus the polynomial (4.1) is non-zero. By the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, the prob-
ability of this polynomial evaluating to 0 at a random point x is at most n+1|F| . By ap-
plying the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma again, if the polynomials a′(x, Z)◦b′(x, Z)−c′(x)
and e(x, Z) are not equal, then the probability that a′(x, z) ◦ b′(x, z) − c′(x) = e(z)
over the random choices of z is at most 2n−2|F| . Overall, the probability of the verifier
returning 1 on a false statement is bounded by 3n−1|F| , which is negligible. Assume now
that for µ′ challenges y0, . . . , yµ′−1, the verifier has negligible probability of accepting
a false statement, then we show the same holds in the case of using µ′ + 1 challenges.
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Let m′ = 2µ′ and consider the following bivariate polynomials in Yµ′ , Z
a′(Yµ′ , Z) = a′−1 +
2m′−1,n−1∑
i=0,j=0
ai,jx
i+2m′j+1yi00 · · · yµ′−1Y
iµ′
µ′ Z
j
b′(Yµ′ , Z) = b′−1 +
2m′−1,n−1∑
i=0,j=0
bi,jy
−i0
0 · · · yµ′−1Y
−iµ′
µ′ Z
−j
c′ = c′−1 +
2m′−1,n−1∑
i=0,j=0
ci,jx
i+2m′j+1
d′(Yµ′) =
µ′−1∑
t=0
(
d+t yt + d
−
t y
−1
t
)
+
(
d+µ′Yµ′ + d
−
µ′Y
−1
µ′
)
e(Yµ′ , Z) =
n∑
r=−n,r 6=0
er(Yµ′)Z
r
The verifier’s check is equivalent to testing the following polynomial identity at ran-
dom challenges yµ′ , z.
a′(Yµ′ , Z) ◦ b′(Yµ′ , Z)− c′ − d′(Yµ′) = e(Z)
The coefficient of Z0 on the left-hand side is equal to
(a′−1◦b′−1−c′−1)+
m−1,n−1∑
i=0,j=0
ai,j ◦bi,jxi+jm+1 +
µ′−1∑
t=0
(
d+t yt + d
−
t y
−1
t
)
+
(
d+t Yµ′ + d
−
t Y
−1
µ′
)
(4.2)
By assumption, for a false statement the probability that
(a′−1 ◦ b′−1 − c′−1) +
m−1,n−1∑
i=0,j=0
ai,j ◦ bi,jxi+jm+1 +
µ′−1∑
t=0
(
d+t yt + d
−
t y
−1
t
)
= 0
over the random choices of x, y0, . . . , yµ−1 is negligible, and therefore the polynomial
(4.2) is non-zero with overwhelming probability. By the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, the
probability that the evaluation of (4.2) at a random challenge yµ′ gives 0 is negligible.
The rest of the proof follows as in the base case.
Efficiency. If we set µ ≈ log(m), the round complexity of the proof system is log(m)+
2. The verifier sends log(m) + 1 field elements to the prover through the ILC channel
and has a computational cost dominated by mn field multiplications to construct the
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opening queries and O(k) field multiplications to check it. The query complexity is
qc = 3 and the prover’s communication consists of commitments to 2(µ + n + 1)
vectors in Fk, excluding the commitments to the rows of the matrices A,B,C. The
prover has to compute coefficients αt,i,j ,βt,i,j and cancellation terms d+t ,d
−
t , which
overall requireO(mnk) field multiplications. To compute the other cancellation factors
er, the prover first computes the product a′(Z) ◦ b′(Z) which requires O(km log(m))
and then subtracts the coefficients of c′ and d′. The efficiency of the proof system is
summarised in Table 4.3.
Prover computation TPILC = O(kn log n + kmn) F×
Verifier computation TVILC = O(mn + k) F×
Prover communication t = 2(log(m) + n + 1) log |Fk|
Verifier communication CILC = (log(m) + 2) log |F|
Query complexity qc = 3
Round complexity µ = log(m) + 2
TABLE 4.3: Efficiency of the proof system for the Hadamard product
relation Rprod. F× stands for the cost of a single multiplication and
log |F| for the size of a field element.
4.2.4 ILC Proof for a Known Permutation Relation
We will now outline a proof of knowledge for the known permutation of the entries
in two matrices A,B ∈ Fmn×k. The corresponding relation is
Rkperm =
 (ppILC, u) = ((F, k) , (mn, pi), (A,B)) :A,B ∈ Fmn×k ∧ pi ∈ Σ[mn]×[k] ∧ Api(i,j) = Bi,j ∀(i, j) ∈ [mn]× [k]

In [Gro09], Groth gave a known permutation argument where the prover only has to
compute a linear number of field multiplications1. The idea behind the argument is
for the verifier to pick a random Vandermonde matrix V ∈ Fmn×k and challenge the
prover to show that
mn,k∑
i=1,j=1
Ai,jVpi(i,j) =
mn,k∑
i=1,j=1
Bi,jVi,j
1This is the computational cost for the prover if we ignore the cost of committing to vectors. The
argument relies on homomorphic commitments and is instantiated with Pedersen commitments [Ped91]
in groups of superpolynomial size. Therefore committing costs a linear number of exponentiations,
which dominates the computational cost of the prover.
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If we were to follow this approach, we would similarly get a proof for which the com-
putational cost of the prover is a linear number of multiplications. The verifier would
also incur a linear number of multiplications to compute the Vandermonde matrix
challenge. Here we outline how this can be improved by reducing the computational
cost of the verifier to achieve a linear number of additions.
To reduce the computational cost for the verifier, the main idea is to let the prover
help construct the challenge matrix used in the permutation proof, and then let the
verifier check that the matrix was correctly formed. Since our proof to check Req
relations only costs a linear number of additions to verify, we can reduce the compu-
tational cost for the verifier to a linear number of additions and sublinear number of
multiplications.
We represents elements (i, j) ∈ [mn]×[k] as integers (i−1)k+j ∈ [mnk] and think of
the permutation pi to be either in Σ[mn]×[k] or in Σ[mnk] depending on the representation
used. We assume that integers in [mnk] can be mapped injectively into elements of the
finite field F, and consider the auxiliary matrices V, V ′, J ∈ Fmn×k such that Vi,j =
(i− 1)k + j, V ′i,j = pi((i− 1)k + j), and Ji,j = 1 i.e.,
V =

1 2 · · · k
k + 1 k + 2 · · · 2k
. . .
· · · mnk

V ′ =

pi(1) pi(2) · · · pi(k)
pi(k + 1) pi(k + 2) · · · pi(2k)
. . .
· · · pi(mnk)

J =

1 1
. . .
1 1

Suppose the prover has committed to the rows of the two matrices A,B ∈ Fm×k.
The idea behind the construction is to let the the verifier pick random challenges x, y
and let the prover commit to matrices U = yV − xJ and U ′ = yV ′ − xJ . The verifier
can efficiently compute the entries of U and U ′ with 2mnk − 1 additions. Then, he can
efficiently check that the prover has committed to the correct matrices by using a proof
for an equality relationReq, which can be verified withO(mnk) additions. Notice that
Vpi(i,j) = V
′
i,j and therefore if B contains the permuted entries of A, then also B + yV
′
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FIGURE 4.7: Decomposition of the Known Permutation Proof Over the
ILC into proofs for simpler relations.
contains a permutation of the entries in A + yV . On the other hand, if the statement
is false, then with overwhelming probability over the choices of y there will be entries
in B + yV ′ that do not appear in A + yV . To show that these two matrices contain
the permuted entries of each another, the prover uses a (same-)product proof to show
that the product of all the entries in the matrix A+ U is equal to the product of all the
entries in B + U ′, i.e.,
mn,k∏
i,j
(Ai,j + yVi,j − x) =
mn,k∏
i,j
(Bi,j + ypi(Vi,j)− x) (4.3)
By the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma this is unlikely to hold over the random choice of x
unless indeed B + yV ′ contains a permutation of the entries in A+ yV .
The above idea relies on the invariance of polynomials under permutation of their
roots. This was already used by Neff [Nef01] in the context of verifiable shuffles and
later by Groth [Gro09] in proof systems for the unknown permutation relation.
At high-level our proof system for Rkperm decomposes into five sub-proofs as il-
lustrated in Figure 4.7.
Same-Product Relation. Before moving to the description of the proof system for
Rkperm we spell out the same-product relation Rsame-prod which is used to check that
(4.3) holds. More precisely, the relationRsame-prod checks that the product of all entries
in a matrix A is the same as the product of all entries of a matrix B, i.e.,
Rsame-prod =
 (ppILC, u) = ((F, k) , (mn), (A,B)) :A,B ∈ Fmn×k ∧ ∏mn,ki,j Ai,j = ∏mn,ki,j Bi,j

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We omit the description of the proof system (GILC,Psame-prod,Vsame-prod) over the ILC
for the above relation, which can be found in [BCG+17], and recall the following result
without proof.
Theorem 4.4 ([BCG+17]). (GILC,Psame-prod,Vsame-prod) is a proof system for the relation
Rsame-prod in the ILC model with perfect completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness
with straight-line extraction, and perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
This proof system uses as a building block the Hadamard product proof of Sec-
tion 4.2.3 and computationally achieves similar asymptotics. The costs of the proof
system are listed in Table 4.4.
Prover computation TPILC = O(kn log n + kmn) F×
Verifier computation TVILC = O(mn + k) F×
Prover communication t = O(mn) log |Fk|
Verifier communication CILC = (log(m) + 2) log |F|
Query complexity qc = 11
Round complexity µ = log(m) + 2
TABLE 4.4: Efficiency of the proof system for the same-product relation
Rsame-prod. F× stands for the cost of a single field multiplication and
log |F| for the size of a field element.
Proof System for the Known Permutation Relation. The description of the proof
system for the known permutation relation Rkperm is given in Figure 4.8. We assume
that the prover has already committed to the rows of matrices A,B and delimit this
step with / ∗ and ∗/. Notice that in case the matrices A and B are equal, the entries
in A lying on the same cycle in the decomposition of pi are guaranteed to be the same.
This special case is the one we will use in the next section within the proof for the
satisfiability of an arithmetic circuit, and specifically to check the consistency of the
wiring of the circuit.
Theorem 4.5. (GILC,Pperm,Vperm) is a proof system for the relationRkperm in the ILC model
with perfect completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-line extrac-
tion, and perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
Proof. We start by showing completeness. If the statement is true, then the matrices A′
and B′ are such that A′pi(i,j) = B
′
i,j . Therefore each entry of A
′ appears somewhere in
matrixB′. Perfect completeness follows by the perfect completeness of the sub-proofs.
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Pkperm(ppILC, (mn, pi), (A,B))
Round 1:
/ ∗ILC← • Send (commit, A,B) to the ILC ∗/
Round 2 to logm+ 2:
ILC→ ◦ Get message (x, y) from ILC
• For (i, j) ∈ [mn]× [k]
– Vi,j := (i− 1)k + j
– V ′i,j := pi((i− 1)k + j)
• U := yV − xJ
• U ′ := yV ′ − xJ
• A′ := A+ U
• B′ := B + U ′
ILC← • Send (commit, U, U ′, A′, B′) to the ILC
• Run Peq(ppILC, U, U)
• Run Peq(ppILC, U ′, U ′)
• Run Psum(ppILC, (mn), (A,U,A′))
• Run Psum(ppILC, (mn), (B,U ′, B′))
• Run Psame-prod(ppILC, (mn), (A′, B′))
Vkperm(ppILC, (mn, pi, [A], [B]))
Round 1
/ ∗ILC→ ◦ Get message 2mn from the ILC ∗/
• For (i, j) ∈ [mn]× [k]
– Vi,j := (i− 1)k + j
– V ′i,j := pi((i− 1)k + j)
• x, y ← F
• U := yV − xJ
• U ′ := yV ′ − xJ
ILC← • Send (send, x, y) to the ILC
Round 2 to logm+ 2:
ILC→ ◦ Get message 4mn from the ILC
• Run Veq(ppILC, (U, [U ]))
• Run Veq(ppILC, (U ′, [U ′])
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (mn, [A], [U ], [A′]))
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (mn, [B], [U ′], [B′]))
• Run Vsame-prod(ppILC, (mn, [A′], [B′]))
• If all the sub-proofs accept return 1, else
return 0
FIGURE 4.8: Proof of knowledge for the relationRkperm.
Next we show statistical strong knowledge soundness. As usual, the knowledge
extractor sees the vectors sent from the prover to the ILC, and therefore it has straight-
line extraction. The knowledge soundness of the equality and of the sum sub-proofs
guarantees that, apart with negligible probability, matrices U,U ′ are correctly formed
and that committed matrices A′, B′ are the sums of A + U , and B + U ′, respectively.
Moreover, from the knowledge soundness of the same-product proof, we get
∏
i,j(Ai,j+
yVi,j − x) =
∏
i,j(Bi,j + ypi(Vi,j)− x). If the statement is false, then A,B have different
entries and the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma tells us that also A + yV and B + yV ′ have
different entries with overwhelming probability, over the choices of y. By applying
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the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma again, the probability over the random choice of x ← F
of the above equality to hold is at most mnk|F| , which is negligible.
Finally, the proof system has perfect SHVZK. Matrices U and U ′ can be computed
given the statement and the random challenges sent from the verifier. These are suf-
ficient to simulate the view of the equality sub-proofs. The sub-proofs for the sum
relation can be trivially simulated. The simulator then is only required to execute the
simulator of the same-product sub-proof.
Efficiency. The round complexity of the proof is of one round more than the same-
product proof, and thus log(m)+3. The number of queries done by the verifier is equal
to the sum of the queries of the sub-proofs, i.e. qc = 15. The verifier communication is
O(log(m)) challenges and his computational complexity is dominated byO(mnk) field
additions. The communication complexity for the prover is O(mn) vectors of length
k, which are sent within the same-product sub-proof. The computational complexity
of the prover is dominated by the cost of the same-product proof, which is in turn
dominated by the cost of the product proof of Section 4.2.3, and therefore is equal to
O(mnk + kn log(n)). The efficiency of the proof system is summarised in Table 4.9.
Prover computation TPILC = O(kn log n + kmn) F×
Verifier computation TVILC = O(kmn) F+
Prover communication t = O(mn) log |Fk|
Verifier communication CILC = (log m + 3) log |F|
Query complexity qc = 15
Round complexity µ = log m + 3
FIGURE 4.9: Efficiency of the proof of knowledge for the Rkperm rela-
tion. F× stands for the cost of a single field multiplication, F+ stands
for the cost of a single field addition, and log |F| for the size of a field
element.
4.3 ILC Proofs for the Satisfiability of an Arithmetic Circuit
In this section we give our proof of knowledge for the satisfiablity of an arithmetic
circuit over the ILC. Given the relation specified in the previous section, we can rewrite
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the relationRAC for the satisfiability of an arithmetic circuit as follows.
RAC =

(pp, u, w) :=
(
(F, k, ∗) , (mA,mM , pi, {ui}i∈S) ,
({vi}i∈[m]) ) :
m = 3mA + 3mM ∧ S ⊆ [m]
∧ A = (vi)mAi=1 ∧ D = (vi)3mA+mMi=3mA+1
∧ B = (vi)2mAi=mA+1 ∧ E = (vi)
3mA+2mM
i=3mA+mM+1
∧ C = (vi)3mAi=2mA+1 ∧ F = (vi)
3mA+3mM
i=3mA+2mM+1
∧ V = (vi)mi=1
∧ (pp, {ui}i∈S , {vi}i∈S) ∈ Req ∧ (pp,mA, (A,B,C)) ∈ Rsum
∧ (pp,mM , (D,E, F )) ∈ Rprod ∧ (pp, (m,pi), (V, V )) ∈ Rperm

In the proof for arithmetic circuit satisfiability, the prover starts by committing to all
values {vi}mi=1 using the conventions we introduced in Section 4.1. She will then exe-
cute the following sub-proofs in parallel
• An equality proof for showing that consistency of the wire values ui∈S in the
instance with the committed vectors vi∈S .
• A proof for the sum of committed matrices A,B,C to show the consistency of
wire values with the addition gates in the circuit, i.e. A+B = C.
• A proof for the Hadamard product of committed matrices D,E, F to show the
consistency of wire values with the multiplication gates, i.e. D ◦ E = F .
• A known permutation proof to show the consistency of the wire assignments
with the wiring of the circuit: this is done by showing that the matrix V stor-
ing the assignments to the wire values remains unchanged when applying the
permutation pi encoding the wiring of the circuit, i.e. Vi,j = Vpi(i,j).
The description of our proof of knowledge for the relationRAC is given in Figure 4.10.
Theorem 4.6. (GILC,PAC,VAC) is a proof system for RAC in the ILC model with perfect
completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-line extraction, and perfect
special honest-verifier zero-knowledge.
Proof. Perfect completeness follows from the perfect completeness of the sub-proofs.
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PAC(ppILC, (mA,mM , pi, {ui}i∈S), ({vi}i∈[m]))
• A := (vi)mAi=1
• B := (vi)2mAi=mA+1
• C := (vi)3mAi=2mA+1
• D := (vi)3mA+mMi=3mA+1
• E := (vi)3mA+2mMi=3mA+mM+1
• F := (vi)3mA+3mMi=3mA+2mM+1
• U := (vi)i∈S
• V := (vi)3(mA+mM )i=1
ILC← • Send (commit, V ) to the ILC
• Run Peq(ppILC, U, U)
• Run Psum(ppILC, (mA), (A,B,C))
• Run Pprod(ppILC, (mM ), (D,E, F ))
• Run Pperm(ppILC, (3(mA+mM ), pi), (V, V ))
VAC(ppILC, (mA,mM , pi, {ui}i∈S , {[vi]}i∈[m]))
ILC→ ◦ Get message 3(mA +mM ) from the ILC
• m := 3(mA +mM )
• U := (ui)i∈S
• Run Veq(ppILC, U, [U ])
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (mA, [A], [B], [C]))
• Run Vprod(ppILC, (mM , [D], [E], [F ]))
• Run Vperm(ppILC, (m,pi, [V ], [V ]))
• If all the sub-proofs accept return 1,
Else return 0
FIGURE 4.10: Proof of knowledge for the relation RAC over the ILC
model.
Statistical strong knowledge soundness follows from the strong knowledge sound-
ness of the sub-proofs. The statistical strong knowledge soundness of the equality sub-
proof guarantees that commitments to values included in the instance indeed contain
the publicly known values. The correctness of the addition and the multiplication
gates follows from the statistical knowledge soundness of the respective sub-proofs.
Finally, as we have argued above, the permutation sub-proof guarantees that the com-
mitted values respect the wiring of the circuit. Since all sub-proofs have knowledge
soundness with straight line extraction, so does the main proof.
Perfect SHVZK follows from the perfect SHVZK of the sub-proofs. A simulated
transcript is obtained by combining the outputs of the simulators of all the sub-proofs.
Efficiency. The efficiency of our arithmetic circuit satisfiability proof in the ILC model
is given in Table 4.5. The computational cost is dominated by the permutation proof,
where the matrices have higher dimensions, so we choose m, n such that m = 3mA +
3mM = mn. The total number of gates is N = mnk3 . The asymptotic results displayed
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below are obtained when m = O(logN) and the vector length k specified by ppILC
is approximately
√
N . While k does not play a significant role in the efficiency over
the ILC, the compiled argument from Chapter 6 will achieve optimal communication
complexity over the standard channel for k ≈ √N . The query complexity qc is the
number of linear combinations the verifier queries from the ILC channel in the open-
ing query. The verifier communication CILC is the number of messages sent from the
verifier to the prover via the ILC channel and in our proof system it is proportional to
the number of rounds. Let µ be the number of rounds in the ILC proof and t1, . . . , tµ
be the numbers of vectors that the prover sends to the ILC channel in each round, and
let t =
∑µ
i=1 ti.
Prover computation TPILC = O(N) F×
Verifier computation TVILC = O(N) F+
Prover Communication t = O
(√
N
)
log |Fk|
Verifier communication CILC = O(log log(N)) log |F|
Query complexity qc = 20
Round complexity µ = O(log log(N))
TABLE 4.5: Efficiency of our proof of knowledge for the relation RAC
in the ILC model. F× stands for the cost of a single field multiplication,
F+ stands for the cost of a single field addition, and log |F| for the size
of a field element.
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Chapter 5
Proofs for the Execution of
TinyRAM Programs in the ILC
Model
In the previous chapter we constructed proofs for the evaluation of arithmetic cir-
cuits. In practice however, computation is usually not expressed in form of circuits,
but it is more conveniently expressed as computer programs. In this chapter we move
one step closer towards practicality and construct proofs for the correct execution of
RAM programs. More precisely we give proofs for the correct execution of TinyRAM
programs in the ILC model. TinyRAM is a particularly convenient RAM machine to
use when constructing zero-knowledge proofs for correct program execution: it has
an expressive architecture that allows to efficiently compile high-level languages into
machine code (see for example [BCG+13a]); the architecture contains a minimal in-
struction set which can be efficiently reduced to a set of algebraic operations. While
the proofs presented in this chapter are mostly of theoretical interest, we see them as
an important step towards reducing the concrete computational overhead of proofs
for correct execution in practice.
Our proofs achieve perfect completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness
and perfect special honest verifier zero knowledge in the ILC model. As in the previous
chapter, the knowledge soundness of our proofs relies on applications of the Schwartz-
Zippel Lemma and thus we set the ILC to operate on a large field, i.e. |F| ≈ λω(1).
Our proof system is highly efficient for computationally intensive programs for
which the execution time dominates the other parameters, i.e. memory and program
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length. For a TinyRAM program terminating in T steps, our prover computational
cost amounts to O(T ) field multiplications, while the verifier runs in O(√T ) field
multiplications. We also measure the performance of prover and verifier in TinyRAM
operations to get a more concrete figure of their computational overhead. We con-
sider TinyRAM to operate on words of length W = Θ(log(λ)) so that the program
can address and use a polynomial amount of memory M = poly(λ). Therefore, the
ratio e = log(|F|)W = ω(1) is superconstant in the security parameter, and the cost of a
field multiplication implemented in TinyRAM is α = O(e2). This means that if we
had to implement our prover as a TinyRAM program using the same word size as the
program in the instance, her running time would be O(αT ) steps, for an arbitrarily
small superconstant function α(λ) = ω(1). In Chapter 6 we will show how to compile
these ILC proofs into standard proofs and arguments over the standard channel. We
also suggest instantiations that preserve the computational efficiency achieved over
the ILC.
5.1 Overview
Typical applications of zero-knowledge proofs are concerned with assuring that a par-
ticipant in a protocol is behaving honestly. This can be formulated as checking that
a participant, supposedly running program P , on public input x and private input w
provides the correct output z. Without loss of generality, we can formulate the verifi-
cation as an extended program that takes public input v = (x, z) and answers 0 if and
only if z is the output of the computation. We therefore formulate correct program
execution as the program just answering 0.
In our proof system instances are of the form u = (P, v, T,M), where P is a
TinyRAM program, v is a list of words given as input to the program, T is a time
bound, and M is the size of the memory. A witness w is another list of words and can
be seen as the private inputs to the program. We assume without loss of generality
that the witness is appended by 0’s, such that |v| + |w| = M and that the program
starts with the memory initialised to these words.
The statement we want to prove is that the program P terminates with the instruc-
tion answer 0 within T steps, using M words of memory on the public input v, and
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private input w. We let the public parameter define the word size, the number of reg-
isters, and upper bounds on the program size, time and memory. Correct program
execution is given by the relation
RTinyRAM =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K, ∗), (P, v, T,M), w) :
P is a TinyRAM program with W -bit words, K registers,
and M words of addressable memory, which on inputs v and w
terminates in T steps with the instruction answer 0.

Our main interest is to prove the correct execution of programs that require “heavy
computation”, i.e. for which the number of executed steps outweigh the other param-
eters. We will assume throughout the chapter that T  L+M , where L is the number
of instructions in the program.
In practice, the typical approach ([BCG+13a; BCT+14]) to check the above relation
is to first reduce the statement to a set of arithmetic constraints or to an arithmetic
circuit, and then use an efficient proof system to verify the consistency of these. In all
existing systems to verify the correct program execution, the prover incurs in a poly-
logarithmic (ω(log λ)) overhead in computation. The source of this overhead in these
systems is both at the front-end level, i.e. in the arithmetization of the program, and at
the cryptographic back-end level, i.e. the choice of the proof system used for handling
the reduced statement. For the back-end, the choice of the proof system is usually
SNARK-based, in which the prover computes a linear number (in the circuit size) of
exponentiations in a cyclic group of superpolynomial size, each requiring a superlog-
arithmic number of field operations. The source of the overhead at the front-end has
to do with the circuit produced by the reduction which is of size Ω(T log2(T )). In this
chapter we focus on reducing the overheads at the back-end level and in Chapter 6 we
discuss instantiations of our ILC proofs which preserve their computational efficiency,
i.e. the compilation only introduces a constant computational overhead.
Improved Arithmetization. At an high level, [BCG+13a; BCT+14] check the execu-
tion of TinyRAM by committing to the execution trace of the program, which stores
the state of the computation at each step, embedded it into field elements. The cor-
rect transition from one step in the execution trace to the next one is checked by an
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arithmetic circuit taking as inputs the two states of the computation. To check that
the memory is correctly accessed during the execution, the prover commits to another
copy of the execution trace, but this time sorted first by memory access and then by
execution time, rather than execution time only. The consistency of two consecutive
accesses to the same memory location can be checked by another arithmetic circuit
taking as inputs two consecutive steps in the memory-sorted trace. The only thing left
to check is the consistency of the two committed execution traces, i.e. that they are a
permutation of each other.
One way to check the consistency of the two sorted traces is by using another arith-
metic circuit which embeds a permutation network, such as a Beneš network [Ben65].
For T nodes in the network, these require O(log(T )) layers of switches of constant
size, and can be evaluated by an arithmetic circuit of size O(T (log T )2). To reduce
this overhead, instead of evaluating a permutation by using an arithmetic circuit, we
simply check the existence of a permutation that maps one memory access to the next
one at the same address. This can be done much more efficiently using techniques
similar to the ones we outlined in Section 4.2.4, which were first suggested by Neff
[Nef01] in the context of verifiable shuffles. In this way, we avoid committing to the
memory-sorted execution trace and we check the memory directly on the time-sorted
trace.
We recall that the instruction set of TinyRAM (Table 3.1) contains both arithmetic
operations such as addition and multiplication of words, and logical operations such
as bit-wise XOR, AND and OR. To verify the execution of a logical instruction using
arithmetic operations one can decompose words into single bits that are handled indi-
vidually. Bit-decomposition makes it easy to implement the logical operations using
arithmetic circuits, but introduces an overhead when embedding bits into full size
field elements. More specifically, if a program uses a polynomial amount of memory
M = poly(λ), then we need to allow the word size used by the TinyRAM machine to be
at leastW = Ω(log(λ)) to be able to address all the memory used. Hence, if we use bit-
decomposition, the size of the arithmetic circuit used to check the transition of states
is proportional to W . Checking all T transitions in the execution trace is equivalent to
checking a circuit of size O(T log(λ)). To remove the overhead of bit-decomposition
we introduce a less costly decomposition. While additions and multiplications are
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manageable using a natural embedding of words into field elements, such a repre-
sentation is not well suited to logical operations. However, instead of decomposing
words into individual bits, we decompose them into interleaved odd-position bits
and even-position bits. A tuple (a3, a2, a1, a0) can for instance be decomposed into
(a3, 0, a1, 0) + (0, a2, 0, a0). The key point of this idea is that adding two interleaved
even bit nibbles yields (0, a2, 0, a0) + (0, b2, 0, b0) = (a2 ∧ b2, a2 ⊕ b2, a0 ∧ b0, a0 ⊕ b0).
Using another decomposition into odd-position and even-position bits we can now
extract the XORs and the ANDs. Using this core idea, it is possible to represent all
logical operations using field additions together with decomposition into odd and
even-position bits. This reduces the verification of logical operations to verify correct
decomposition into odd and even bits.
To enable decomposition proofs into odd and even-position bits, we develop a new
lookup proof that makes it possible to check that a field element belongs to a table of
permitted values. By creating a lookup table of all words with even-position bits, we
make it possible to verify such decompositions. Odd and even-bits decomposition
and lookup proofs also enable to verify that a field element represents represents a
valid word within the range [0, . . . , 2W − 1].
Chapter Outline. In the next section we describe how to embed the execution trace
of a TinyRAM program into field elements, the relation of correct program execution
induced by this encoding and describe the idea behind the even/odd-bit decomposi-
tion. In Section 5.3 we then look at the decomposition of the arithmetized TinyRAM
relation in terms of few building-block relations. In Section 5.4 we give an overview
of the proof systems for the building blocks. We refer to [BCG+18] for the full spec-
ifications of the unknown permutation and lookup proofs. Lastly, in Section 5.5 we
combine them to give a proof for the correct execution of a TinyRAM program.
5.2 Arithmetization of TinyRAM
As a first step towards the realisation of proofs for the correct execution of TinyRAM
programs we translate RTinyRAM into a more amenable relation involving elements
in a finite field. Given a TinyRAM machine with word-size W and a finite field F,
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we can in a natural way embed words into field elements by encoding a word a ∈
{0, . . . , 2W − 1} as the field element a · 1F = 1F + · · ·+ 1F (a times). We will use finite
fields of characteristic p > 22W − 2W−1 because then sums and products of words are
less than p and we avoid overflow when applying field operations to the embedded
words. We encode the program P , memory and states of a TinyRAM program as
tuples of field elements. We then introduce a new relation RfieldTinyRAM consisting of a
set of arithmetic constraints these encodings should satisfy to guarantee the correct
program execution. The relation will take instances u = (P, v, T,M), and witnesses w
consisting of the encodings of program, memory, the execution trace as well as a set
of auxiliary field elements. It will be the case that the encoding of the witness can be
done alongside an execution of the program in O(L+M + T ) field operations.
5.2.1 Formatting the Witness
Given a correct program execution we encode program, memory and states of the
TinyRAM machine as field elements and arrange them in a number of tables as pic-
tured in Figure 5.1. The execution table Exe, contains the field elements encoding the
states of the TinyRAM machine. It consists of T rows, where row t describes the state
at the beginning of step t. A row includes field elements that encode the time t, the pro-
gram counter pct, the instruction instpct corresponding to the program line pct, an im-
mediate value At, the values r0,t, . . . , rK−1,t contained in the registers reg0, . . . , regK−1
at time t, and the flag flagt. The next row contains the resulting state of the TinyRAM
machine at time t+ 1. Each row also includes a memory address addrt, and the value
vaddrt stored at this address after the execution of the step, as well as a constant number
of auxiliary field elements to be specified later that will be used to check correctness
of program execution.
The next table is the program table Prog, which contains the field elements en-
coding of the TinyRAM program P . Each row contains the description of one line of
the program, consisting of one instruction, at most three operands, and possibly an
immediate value, i.e. a constant value specified by the instruction. Note that the in-
struction and the operands are encoded together using a single single field element.
Furthermore, we introduce a constant number of auxiliary field elements in each row.
These entries can be efficiently computed given the program line stored in the same
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Time pc Instruction Immediate reg0 . . . regK−1 Flag Address Value auxExe
1 0 inst0 A0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . .
...
t pct instpct At r0,t . . . rK−1,t flagt addrt vaddrt . . .
t+ 1 pct+1 instpct+1 At+1 r0,t+1 . . . rK−1,t+1 flagt+1 addrt+1 vaddrt+1 . . .
...
T pcT answer 0 r0,T . . . rK−1,T flagT addrT vaddrT . . .
(A) The execution table Exe.
pc Instruction Immediate auxProg
0 inst0 A0 . . .
...
L− 1 instL−1 AL−1 . . .
(B) The program table Prog.
Address Initial value usd
0 0 0
1 v1 0
...
M − 1 vM−1 0
0 0 1
1 v1 1
...
M − 1 vM−1 1
(C) The mem-
ory table Mem.
Values
0
1
4
5
...∑W
2
−1
i=0 2
2i
(D) The table
EvenBits.
Values Powers
0 1
1 2
2 4
3 8
...
...
W − 1 2W−1
W 0
(E) Table Pow.
FIGURE 5.1: The execution table Exe, the program table Prog, the mem-
ory table Mem, the table EvenBits and the table Pow.
row and will help verifying its execution, e.g. we encode the position of input and
output registers as auxiliary field elements.
The memory table Mem has rows that list the possible memory addresses, their
initial values, and an auxiliary field element usd ∈ {0, 1}. For every pair of address and
corresponding initial value, the memory table Mem contains a row in which usd = 0
and another row in which usd = 1. Recall that the memory is initialised with input
words listed in v, w, i.e., the input words contributing to the instance and witness of
the relationRTinyRAM.
In addition to these, we also consider two auxiliary lookup tables EvenBits,Pow.
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The former contains the encoding of words of length W whose binary expansion has
0 in all odd positions. This table contains 2
W
2 field elements and will be used to check
that certain field elements encode a word of lengthW . The latter table stores in the first
column the encoding of integers in i ∈ [0,W ], and in the second column the powers
2i mod 2W . This table contains 2(W + 1) field elements and will be used to efficiently
check shift instructions.
5.2.2 Arithmetized TinyRAM Relation
Let (Exe,Prog,Mem,EvenBits,Pow) be the tables of field elements encoding the pro-
gram execution and the auxiliary values. We can now reformulate the correct execu-
tion of a TinyRAM program defined byRTinyRAM as a relation that imposes a number
of constraints to the entries in the tables:
RfieldTinyRAM =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗), (P, v, T,M),w) :
w := (Exe,Prog,Mem,EvenBits,Pow, ∗)
(pp, (P, v, T,M),w) ∈ Rcheck
(pp, (T,M),w) ∈ Rmem
(pp,⊥,w) ∈ Rstep

The relations Rcheck, Rmem,Rstep jointly guarantee that the witness w consists of field
elements encoding a correct TinyRAM execution that answers 0 in T steps using M
words of memory, public input v, and additional private inputs. More precisely,
• Rcheck: it checks the initial values v of the memory are correctly included into
Mem, the program P is correctly encoded in Prog, the tables EvenBits and Pow
contain the correct encodings of the auxiliary lookup tables, the initial state of
the TinyRAM machine is correct and that it terminates with answer 0 in step T .
• Rmem: it checks that memory usage is consistent throughout the execution of the
program. That is, if a memory value is loaded at time t then it should match the
last stored value at the same address.
• Rstep: it checks that each step of the execution has been performed correctly.
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In Section 5.3 we describe Rcheck, Rmem and Rstep, gradually decomposing them into
smaller and simpler relations. Ultimately, we specify each of these subrelations in
terms of some building blocks: equality, lookup, unknown permutation and range
relations.
5.2.3 Building-Block Relations
Next, we describe the building-block relations used in the decomposition ofRfieldTinyRAM.
As for the previous chapter the following relations refer to tables in the witness that
have been previously committed by the prover. In the instance, we sometimes de-
note commitments to tables as [Tab] to clarify which statement we refer to. However,
we avoid doing so in the description of the relations to reduce the complexity of the
notation.
Equality Relations. The equality relationReq checks that rows Tabi of a table Tab in
the witness encode tuples v1, . . . ,vm of given W -bit words
Req =
 (pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗), (v1, . . . ,vm),Tab) :Tab := {Tabi}i ∧ Tabi = vi · 1F ∀ i ∈ [m]

This is equivalent to the equality relation we introduced in Section 4.2.1. The only
difference here is that public entries in the instance may be represented as words,
instead of field elements. Therefore the equality relation above includes checking that
a word has been correctly encoded in a field element.
Lookup Relations. A lookup relation checks the membership of a tuple of field el-
ements w in the set of rows of a table Tab. This differs from the previous relation as
both w and Tab are in the witness.
Rlookup =
 (pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),⊥, (w,Tab)) :Tab := {Tabi}i ∧ ∃ i : Tabi = w

We extend this relation in the natural way to check the membership of multiple tuples
w1,w2, . . . in a table.
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Unknown Permutation Relations. An unknown permutation relation can be used
to check that two ordered sets of the same size are permutation of each other. Differ-
ently from the known permutation relation we introduced in Section 4.2.4, the permu-
tation may not be publicly known.
Rperm =
 (pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),m, ({ai,bi}
m
i=1, pi)) :
pi ∈ Σm ∧ api(i) = bi

Range Relations. We use a range relation to check that a field element a can be writ-
ten as a W -bit word, i.e., a is in the range [0, 2W − 1].
Rrange =
 (pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),W,a) :0 ≤ a ≤ 2W − 1

As we will see next, by including the table EvenBits in the witness we can reduce a
range relation to a lookup relation and a set of linear consistency checks.
5.2.4 Efficient Bit Decomposition for Range and Logical Relations
Embedding W -bit words into elements of a field of size p > 22W − 2W−1 enables ef-
ficient verification of arithmetic TinyRAM instructions since the sum and the product
of two W -bits word does not cause a modular reduction in the field. However, as we
embed words into a large field one has to additionally check that inputs and output
of an instruction can be represented as W -bits words. Another inconvenience is that
logical operations cannot be checked directly using field operations on the embed-
ded words. Both issues can be addressed by storing for each word a additional W
field elements embedding the binary decomposition of a. Looking ahead to the next
sections, this decomposition would make the prover incur a multiplicative overhead
proportional to W = Ω(log λ). As our main goal is to reduce this overhead, we devise
a different approach. In this section we introduce a new decomposition technique to
enable efficient verification of range and logical relations.
Let a be a field element that can be written as a W -bit word. For a =
∑W−1
i=0 ai2
i
such that ai ∈ {0F, 1F} we write a ↔ (aW−1, . . . ,a2,a1,a0) . While proving range
relations and logical operations, we find it helpful to split a into a pair of field elements
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ao,ae corresponding to the even-position bits and the odd-positions bits (shifted into
even-position) of the word stored in a, i.e.
ae ↔ (0,aW−2, . . . , 0,a2, 0,a0) ao ↔ (0,aW−1, . . . , 0,a3, 0,a1)
Given this decomposition one can recompute a as follows.
a = 2ao + ae
Range Relations. To check that a field element a is in the range [0, 2W −1], one could
use a lookup table of size 2W storing all values in the range and check that a is one of
the entries in the table. However, this would give a table of size 2W which is too large,
as 2W may even exceed the running time T of the program in the instance. Instead,
we can use a shorter table EvenBits of size 2
W
2 , storing all the words with odd-position
bits equal to zero. To check that a is in the range [0, 2W − 1] it is sufficient to check that
a = 2ao + ae for ao,ae ∈ EvenBits. This is summarised in the following relation
Rrange =
 (pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),⊥, (a, (ao,ae),EvenBits)) :(pp,⊥, ((ao,ae),EvenBits)) ∈ Rlookup ∧ a = 2ao + ae

This relation can be extended to a decomposition using κ = O(1) words of length Wκ ,
reducing the size of the lookup table to |EvenBits| = 2Wκ . Each range check then re-
quires κ lookups and a linear check over κ terms. To get good efficiency, it is important
that 2
W
κ  T . Here we assume for simplicity 2W2  T , which allows us to use κ = 2
but our proof system can be modified to handle any T = poly(λ) with an appropriate
choice of κ.
Bitwise AND and XOR. It turns out that the above decomposition can be also ex-
ploited to check the correctness of logical operations. Here we describe the high-level
idea and omit for example how to check the consistency of the flag. A full description
on how the check all the TinyRAM instructions is given in Section 5.3.3. Let a,b be the
inputs of the bit-wise AND or bit-wise XOR operation, and let c be the output. To ver-
ify the correctness of the operation, e.g. a ∧ b = c, consider the decompositions of the
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inputs into their odd and even-position bits, namely a = 2ao + ae and b = 2bo + be.
If we take the sum of the integers storing the even-positions ae and be we get
ae + be ↔ (0,aW−2, . . . , 0,a0) + (0,bW−2, . . . , 0,b0)
= (aW−2 ∧ bW−2,aW−2 ⊕ bW−2, . . . ,a0 ∧ b0,a0 ⊕ b0)
The above contains the bit-wise AND of the even bits of a and b placed in odd position
and the bit-wise XOR of the even bits of a and b in even position. We can consider
taking again the decomposition of ae + be into its odd and even-position bits, i.e.
eo ↔ (0,aW−2 ∧ bW−2, 0, . . . , 0,a0 ∧ b0)
ee ↔ (0,aW−2 ⊕ bW−2, 0, . . . , 0,a0 ⊕ b0)
such that ae + be = 2eo + ee. Then half of the bits of a∧ b are stored in eo and half of
the bits of a⊕ b are stored in ee. We can repeat the above procedure starting from the
odd-position bits of a and b to get the following
ao + bo ↔ (0,aW−1, . . . , 0,a1) + (0,bW−1, . . . , 0,b1)
= (aW−1 ∧ bW−1,aW−1 ⊕ bW−1, . . . ,a1 ∧ b1,a1 ⊕ b1) ↔ 2oo + oe
where oo stores half of the bits of a∧b and oe stores and half of the bits of a⊕b. Putting
everything together, given the decompositions ao,ae,bo,be,oo,oe,eo,ee ∈ EvenBits
such that the following hold
a = 2ao + aegg b = 2bo + begg ao + bo = 2oo + oegg ae + be = 2eo + ee
then the bit-wise AND and XOR of a and b are given by the followings
a ∧ b = 2oo + eo a⊕ b = 2oe + ee
To check that a ∧ b = c is then sufficient to commit to the above decompositions
and check their consistency with a and b as well as check that c = 2oo + eo. This can
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be summarised in the following relationRAND
RAND =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),⊥, (a,b,c, (ao,ae,bo,be,oo,oe,eo,ee),EvenBits)) :
(pp,⊥, (a, (ao,ae),EvenBits)) ∈ Rrange (pp,⊥, (ao + bo, (oo,oe),EvenBits)) ∈ Rrange
(pp,⊥, (b, (bo,be),EvenBits)) ∈ Rrange (pp,⊥, (ae + be, (eo,ee),EvenBits)) ∈ Rrange
c = 2oo + eo

A similar relation can be given for the bit-wise XOR and the other logical operations.
5.3 Decomposition of TinyRAM Relation
Here we gradually decompose the relationRfieldTinyRAM into the building-block relations
we introduced earlier, as well as a set of linear and quadratic constraints the entries
in w have to satisfy. Figure 5.2 illustrates the entire decomposition of RfieldTinyRAM into
progressively simpler relations.
FIGURE 5.2: Diagram of the decompositon of TinyRAM into equality,
lookup, permutation, range relations and arithmetic constraints.
5.3.1 Checking the Correctness of Values
The role ofRcheck is to check that w consists of the correct number of field elements that
can be partitioned into the appropriate tables and also to check that specific entries in
these tables are correct. In more details, the relationRcheck is specified by the following
conditions
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• The first row Exe1 of the execution table Exe contains the following values: time
is set equal to 1, the program counter pc1 is equal to 0, the instruction instpc1
is equal to the first instruction of the program, the immediate value A0 is the
first immediate value of the program, and the contents of the registers ri,1, the
memory address addr1 and its content value vaddr1 are all set equal to 0.
• The last row ExeT contains the following values: the time is set equal to T , the
instruction instpcT is answer, and the immediate value is 0. Without loss of gen-
erality we assume that the instruction answer 0 is positioned in the last line
(L− 1) of the Prog table.
• The auxiliary lookup table EvenBits contains the embeddings of all W -bit words
with 0 in all odd positions, i.e.
EvenBits =
0, 1, 4, 5 . . . , W2 −1∑
i=0
22i

• The auxiliary lookup table Pow contains the embeddings of all integers i ∈ [0,W ]
and their powers 2i mod 2W .
• The program table Prog contains the correct field element embedding of the pro-
gram P as well as the correct auxiliary entries. In the relationReq checking table
Prog we omitted the auxiliary entries which we have not yet specified. It will
later become clear that these entries can be efficiently computed given the pro-
gram P and checked within the above relation.
• The memory table Mem contains the correct embedding of the input words listed
in v and of the auxiliary entry usd. This only refers to the first |v| entries of the
memory table, as the rest is initialised with the private inputs w.
The above conditions are included in the relationRcheck.
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Rcheck =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗), (P, v, T,M),w) :
w := (Exe,Prog,Mem,EvenBits, ∗),
Exe := {Exet}Tt=1, Prog := {Progi}L−1i=0
Prog0 := (0, inst0,A0, . . .)
(pp, (1, 0, inst0,A0, 0, . . . , 0, . . .) ,Exe1) ∈ Req
(pp, (T, L− 1,answer, 0, . . .),ExeT ) ∈ Req(
pp,
(
0, 1, 4, 5, . . . ,
∑W
2
−1
i=0 2
2i
)
,EvenBits
)
∈ Req(
pp,
{
(i, 2i mod 2W )
}W
i=0
,Pow
)
∈ Req
(pp, P,Prog) ∈ Req (pp, v,Mem) ∈ Req

5.3.2 Checking Memory Consistency
The relation Rmem checks that the memory is used consistently across different steps
in the execution. For instance, if at step t a value is loaded from memory, then it
should be equal to the last value stored at the same address. If it is the first time a
memory address is accessed, we need to ensure consistency with its initial value. If
two consecutive memory accesses to the same address are placed into two adjacent
rows of Exe it is easy to check their consistency. However, this is generally not the
case since the Exe table is sorted by execution time rather than memory access. To
avoid committing to the memory-sorted execution trace we devise a way to check the
consistency of memory accesses located in any position of Exe. Overall the memory
consistency relationRmem decomposes as follows
Rmem =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗), (T,M),w) :
w := (Exe,Prog,Mem,EvenBits, pi, ∗),
Exe := {Exet}Tt=1 Mem := {Memj}2M−2j=0
(pp, T, (Exe, pi)) ∈ Rcycle, (pp, T, (Exe,EvenBits)) ∈ Rtime
(pp, (T,M), (Exe,Mem)) ∈ Rblookup, (pp, T,Exe) ∈ Rload

To help with checking the memory consistency, we include in each row of the exe-
cution table the following auxiliary entries
auxExe = τlink vlink vinit usd S L · · ·
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where τlink contains the previous time-step at which the current address was accessed.
In case this row stores the first time a location is accessed, we use τlink to store the
last time-step the location is accessed. This will be convenient to show that sequential
accesses to the same memory location can be arranged in cycles. Similarly, vlink stores
the value contained in the address after time τlink, unless this is the first time that
location is accessed, in which case it stores the last value stored in that location. The
value vinit is a copy of the initial value assigned to that memory location, which is also
stored in the memory table Mem. The value usd is a flag which is set equal to 0 if this
is the first time we access the current memory address, and 1 otherwise. The values
S, L are flags set equal to 1 in case the current instruction is a store or load operation,
respectively, and 0 otherwise. The values S, L are also stored in the auxiliary entries
of the program table and thus their consistency is checked byRcheck together with the
program.
auxProg = S L · · ·
Memory Accesses form Cycles. We check memory consistency by specifying cycles
of memory accesses, so that consecutive terms in a cycle correspond to the time of two
consecutive accesses to the same memory location. We let the memory access pattern
in the rows of Exe being in correspondence with a permutation pi ∈ Σ[T ] defined by
such cycles. By using the above auxiliary entries, the relation Rcycle checks that all
memory accesses (i.e. for which S + L = 1) relative to the same address addr are
connected into cycles, and that rows not involving memory operations (S + L = 0) are
not included in these cycles. Moreover, if two accesses are connected by a cycle the
relation checks that τlink stores the time of the previous access and vlink the content of
the memory at that time.
Rcycle =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗), T, (Exe, pi)) :
Exet := (t, . . . , addrt, vlinkt, τlinkt, . . . ,St, Lt, . . .) for t ∈ [T ]
at := (τlinkt, addrt, vlinkt,St + Lt) for t ∈ [T ]
bt := (t, addrt, vaddrt ,St + Lt) for t ∈ [T ]
((W,K,F, ∗), T, ({ai, bi}Ti=1, pi)) ∈ Rperm

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We recall that the unknown permutation relation over tuples ai, bj checks that exists
a permutation pi ∈ Σ[T ] such that bi = api(i) for i ∈ [T ], i.e.
t = τlinkpi(t) addrt = addrpi(t) vaddrt = vlinkpi(t) St + Lt = Spi(t) + Lpi(t)
To construct zero-knowledge proofs for the correct program execution of TinyRAM
programs, it is important not to leak the memory access pattern, as this may depend
on the secret inputs w of the program. Therefore, the permutation cannot be publicly
known.
Memory Accesses are in the Correct Order. Consecutive terms in a cycle should
correspond to the consecutive time-steps in which the memory is accessed. To check
that the memory cycles are time-ordered we can simply verify that1 t > τlinkt for any
given time-step t ∈ [T ]. Since memory accesses are connected into cycles, the first
time we access a new memory location the τlink entry stores the last point in time that
location is accessed by the program. In this case we verify that t ≤ τlinkt. To perform
these checks we use the auxiliary entry usd, which we set usd = 0 for the first time a
memory location is accessed, and usd = 1 otherwise.
The above inequalities can be checked by showing that either t − τlinkt − 1 ≥ 0 or
τlinkt− t ≥ 0, respectively. Moreover, by using the auxiliary value usd, both checks can
be combined
(1− usd)(τlinkt − t) + usd(t− τlinkt − 1) ≥ 0
Since we have a range relation in place we can then add a pair of field elements to, te ∈
EvenBits in the auxiliary entries of the execution table
auxExe = · · · to te · · ·
1For this to be sufficient we also need the time-steps stored in the execution table to be correct. This is
ensured by theRcheck andRcons (which appears later) relations.
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and check that (1 − usd)(τlinkt − t) + usd(t − τlinkt − 1) ∈ [0, 2W ]. The relation Rtime
incorporates the above conditions
Rtime =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗), T, (Exe,EvenBits)) :
Exet := (t, . . . , τlinkt, . . . , usdt, . . . , to, te, . . .) for t ∈ [T ]
∀ t ∈ [T ] : t := (1− usd)(τlinkt − t) + usd(t− τlinkt − 1) ∧
(pp,⊥, (t, (to, te),EvenBits)) ∈ Rrange

Memory Locations are in no more than one Cycle. To ensure that the cycles cor-
respond to sequences of memory addresses we also need that all the rows touching
the same memory address are included in the same cycle. Since the cycles are time-
ordered, they need to include one time-step for which usd = 0 to close a cycle. Thus,
we can ensure each memory location to be part of at most on cycle by letting usd to be
set equal to 0 at most once for each memory address. We introduce a bounded lookup
relation Rblookup to address this requirement. The relation checks that for any row in
Exe, the tuple (addrt, vinitt, usd) is contained in one row of the table Mem and that each
row (j, vj , 0) of Mem is accessed at most once by the program. At the same time this
relation checks that the values vinit stored in the execution table are consistent with the
initialisation of the memory.
Rblookup =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗), (T,M), (Exe,Mem)) :
Exet := (t, . . . , addrt, . . . , vinitt, usd, . . .) for t ∈ [T ]
∀ t ∈ [T ] : (pp,⊥, ((addrt, vinitt, usd) ,Mem)) ∈ Rlookup ∧
∀ (j, vj , 0) ∈ Mem : (. . . , j, . . . , vj , 0, . . .) occurs at most once in Exe

Load Instructions are Consistent. Finally, we are only left to check that if the pro-
gram executes a load instruction the value vaddrt loaded from memory is consistent
with the value stored at the same address at the previous access. Similarly, if load is
executed on a new memory location, then the value loaded should match with the ini-
tial value vinitt. No additional checks are required for store instructions. These checks
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are incorporated in the relationRload.
Rload :=

(pp, u, w) = ((W,K,F, ∗), T,Exe) :
Exet := (t, . . . , addrt, vaddrt , τlinkt, vlinkt, vinitt, usdt, . . .) for t ∈ [T ]
∀ t ∈ [T ] : Lt(vaddrt − vinitt + usdt(vinitt − vlinkt)) = 0

Later, when we will give proofs for all the arithmetic constraints included in the de-
composition of RfieldTinyRAM, it will be convenient to express them as either quadratic or
linear constraints. The one included in the relationRtime can be expressed as a pair of
quadratic constraints by introducing another auxiliary entry LUt in the execution table
and check that both the followings hold
LUt = usdt(vinitt − vlinkt) Lt(vaddrt − vinitt + LUt) = 0
5.3.3 Checking Correct Execution of Instructions
The relation Rstep guarantees that each step of the execution has been performed cor-
rectly. This involves checking for each row Exet of the execution table that the stored
words are in the range [0, 2W−1], the flagt is a bit, the program counter pct matches the
instruction as well as the immediate value At in the program, and that instt is correctly
executed. An instruction takes some inputs, e.g., values indicated by the operands
regj , A (or the flag) and as a result may change the program counter, a register value, a
value stored at a memory address, and the flag. Since we have already checked mem-
ory correctness, if the operation is a load or store we may assume the memory value
vaddrt is correct. Overall the relationRstep decomposes into three relationsRmux,Rcons
andRinst as follows.
Rstep =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),⊥,w) :
w := (Exe,Prog,Mem,EvenBits, ∗) ∧ Exe := {Exet}Tt=1
∀t ∈ [1, . . . , T − 1] :
(pp,⊥, (Exet,Exet+1)) ∈ Rmux
(pp,⊥, (Exei,Exei+1,Prog)) ∈ Rcons
(pp,⊥, (Exei,Exei+1,EvenBits)) ∈ Rinst

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To help checking the correctness of the instructions, the rows of the execution and
program tables include the following auxiliary entries
auxExe = . . . a b c d out sa sb sc sd sout sch . . .
auxProg = . . . sa sb sc sd sout sch
These consist of some temporary variables a,b,c,d, an output vector out, and some
selection vectors sa, . . . , sch which are also listed in the program table. The temporary
variables are used to store a copy of the inputs and outputs of an instruction. For ex-
ample, if we have to check an addition operation add regi regj A, we let c = ri,t+1,a =
rj,t,b = At and check c = a + b. The advantage of using the temporary variables is
that for each addition operation we check, we will always have the inputs and out-
put in a,b and c, instead of handling multiple registers holding inputs and output in
arbitrary order.
The Execution Table and the Program Table are Consistent. The consistency rela-
tion Rcons checks that the time is correctly incremented and that the program counter
is in the correct range, i.e. pct+1 ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1} and is incremented unless a jump-
instruction is executed. It also checks that the instruction, the immediate value and
the selection vectors stored in the execution table are consistent with the program
line indexed by pc. Furthermore, it checks that the content of the registers does not
change, unless specified by the instruction, e.g. the register storing the result of the
computation. For this we use a selection vector sch of length K + 2. Let E˜xet =
(pct, r0,t, . . . , rK−1,t, flagt) be the restriction of the row Exet to the entries concerning
the program counter, the register values and the flag. The selection vector sch has en-
tries equal to 0 in correspondence of entries of E˜xet changing during the execution,
and equal to 1 for entries that do not change in the execution. The consistency relation
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Rcons is defined as follows
Rcons =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),⊥, (Exet,Exet+1,Prog)) :
Exet := (t, pct, instt,At, . . . , r0,t, . . . , rK−1,t, . . . ,St, Lt, . . . , sa, sb, sc, sd, sout, sch) ∧
Exet+1 := (t
′, pct+1, . . . , r0,t+1, . . . , rK−1,t+1, . . .)
t′ = t+ 1 ∧ pct+1 ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1} ∧
sch ◦ (E˜xet+1 − E˜xet − (1, 0, . . . , 0)) = (0, 0, . . . , 0) ∧
(pp,⊥, ((pct, instt,At,St, Lt, sa, sb, sc, sd, sout, sch),Prog)) ∈ Rlookup

Notice that the entries of sch are determined by the program line and can be easily
computed from it. The above relation, together with Rcheck, guarantees that sch is
consistent with the program line is related to and that the copy of sch in the execution
table matches the one stored in the program table. This also applies to the rest of the
selection vectors.
Ensuring Temporary Values are Correct. A multiplexing relation Rmux is used to
check that values a,b,c,d are consistent with operands contained in instt. To check
operations on temporary values a,b,c and d it requires to multiplex the correspond-
ing register, immediate, and memory values in and out of the temporary values. This
is done with the aid of selection vectors sa, sb, sc, sd, which are bit-vectors encoding
the operands of an instruction. Each row of the execution table includes multiple vari-
ables that may be selected as an operand, e.g., pct,At, r0,t, . . . and variables in the next
row of the execution table pct+1,At+1, r0,t+1, . . . may also be selected. A selection vec-
tor will have a bit for each of these variables indicating whether it is picked or not. For
instance, if we let sa = (0, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) this corresponds to pick a as r0,t.
Let Exet = (pct,At, r0,t, . . . , rK−1,t, flagt, addrt, vaddrt) be the tuple of selectable en-
tries of row Exet and let sa, sb, sc, sd be binary vectors of length 2|Exet|. We can then
express the multiplexing relationRmux in terms of inner product relations as follows
Rmux =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),⊥, (Exet,Exet+1)) :
Exet := (t, . . . ,a,b,c,d,out, sa, sb, sc, sd, . . .)
a = sa ·
(
Exet||Exet+1
)
b = sb ·
(
Exet||Exet+1
)
c = sc ·
(
Exet||Exet+1
)
d = sd ·
(
Exet||Exet+1
)

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5.3.4 Instruction Checker Relation
Multiplexing the operands into temporary variables leaves us with the task of check-
ing that a given instruction is correctly executed on a,b,c and d. Since we want our
proof system to be zero knowledge, we cannot reveal which operation we execute in
a given step. This means, in particular, that our instruction checker relation Rinst has
to include checks for all the 26 TinyRAM instructions. However, we can still obtain
significant savings compared to using 26 independent instruction checkers. We make
the key observation that many operations are closely related. For instance checking a
subtraction operation sub regi regj A corresponds to check c = a+b with c = rj,t,a =
ri,t+1,b = At, which is of the same form as an addition operation. Using clever multi-
plexing we reduce the checking of the 26 possible instructions to check the correctness
of nine easily computable values AND,XOR,OR, SUM,SSUM,PROD,SPROD,MOD,
SHIFT and four additional values FLAG1,FLAG2,FLAG3,FLAG4 for the consistency of
the flag. We include all these values into the vector out, i.e.
out = (AND,XOR,OR, SUM,SSUM,PROD,SPROD,MOD, SHIFT,FLAG1,FLAG2,FLAG3,FLAG4)
Each instruction can be verified by checking that an appropriate subset of the values
are 0. For instance, we will check2 that SUM = a + b − c, and if the operation is an
addition, we will also check that SUM = 0. Similarly, we will define all the entries in
out in terms of a,b,c,d. For each operation only a subset of the entries in outwill be
relevant. As for the selection of the operands, we use a binary selection vector sout to
select which entries of out are relevant for each operation and check that sout◦out = 0,
where ◦ is the entry-wise product.
The instruction checker relation Rinst checks that entries a,b,c,d are in the range
[0, . . . , 2W − 1], the vector out is consistent with a,b,c,d, and that the relevant en-
tries in out are all equal to zero. We divide the entries of out into four groups:
logical (AND,XOR,OR), arithmetic (SUM,PROD,SSUM, SPROD,MOD), shift (SHIFT),
and flag (FLAG1,FLAG2,FLAG3,FLAG4). By specifying constraints to all these entries,
we can directly verify all the logical, arithmetic, and shifts operations after which the
2The actual definition of SUM will also incorporate the correctness of the flag.
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variables are named. TheRinst can be decomposed as follows.
Rinst =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),⊥, (Exet,Exet+1,EvenBits)) :
Exet := (t, . . . ,out, . . . , sout, . . .) ∧ sout ◦ out = 0
(pp,⊥, (Exet,Exet+1,EvenBits)) ∈ Rlogic
(pp,⊥, (Exet,Exet+1,EvenBits)) ∈ Rarith
(pp,⊥, (Exet,Exet+1,EvenBits)) ∈ Rshift

In what follows we describe the relationsRlogic,Rarith,Rshift, specifying what con-
straints the entries of out need to satisfy and the appropriate choices of selection vec-
tors sa, sb, sc, sd, sout for each TinyRAM operation. A summary of these selection
vectors for all the operations is given in Table 5.1.
Before moving to describe how to verify each group of operations, we recall that
each line in the program consists of a TinyRAM instruction (Table 3.1) and up to three
operands, e.g. add regi regj A. The first operand (regi) usually points at the register
storing the result of the operation (add) computed on the words specified by the next
two operands (regj , A). The last operand A indicates an immediate value that could
be either used directly in the operation or to point to the content of another register.
We refer to the value to be used in the operation generically as A, stressing that the
selection between either the immediate value or a register value can be handled by
using the appropriate selection vector.
Logical Operations. Logical operations can be verified using the odd/even-bits de-
composition introduced in Section 5.2.4. We recall that for bit-wise AND and XOR if
we let a,b store the inputs and consider their decomposition into the following
a = 2ao + aegg b = 2bo + begg ao + bo = 2oo + oegg ae + be = 2eo + ee
then the result of the operations can be computed as follows
a ∧ b = 2oo + eo a⊕ b = 2oe + ee
Let AND = 2oo + eo − c and XOR = 2oe + ee − c. We can verify the execution of an
instruction and regi regj A by setting the selection vectors so that a = At,b = rj,t,c =
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Operation sa sb sc sd sout sch
and At rj,t ri,t+1 / AND,FLAG1,FLAG2 ri, flag
or At rj,t ri,t+1 / OR,FLAG1,FLAG2 ri, flag
xor At rj,t ri,t+1 / XOR,FLAG1,FLAG2 ri, flag
not At 2
W − 1 ri,t+1 / XOR,FLAG1,FLAG2 ri, flag
add At rj,t ri,t+1 0 SUM ri, flag
sub At ri,t+1 rj,t 0 SUM ri, flag
mull At rj,t c ri,t+1 PROD,FLAG1,FLAG2 ri, flag
umulh At rj,t ri,t+1 d PROD,FLAG1,FLAG2 ri, flag
smulh At rj,t ri,t+1 d SPROD,FLAG1,FLAG2 ri, flag
umod ri,t+1 b At rj,t MOD,FLAG1,FLAG2,FLAG3 ri, flag
udiv a ri,t+1 At rj,t MOD,FLAG1,FLAG2,FLAG3 ri, flag
shl At rj,t c ri,t+1 SHIFT,FLAG4 ri, flag
shr At rj,t ri,t+1 d SHIFT,FLAG4 ri, flag
cmpe At ri,t c / XOR,FLAG1,FLAG2 flag
cmpa ri,t b At 0 SUM flag
cmpae ri,t b At 1 SUM flag
cmpg ri,t b At 0 SSUM flag
cmpge ri,t b At 1 SSUM flag
mov At pct+1 0 / XOR ri
jmp At ri,t+1 0 / XOR pc
cmov ri,t+1 At 0 rj,t MOD ri
cjmp pct+1 At 0 pct + 1 MOD pc
cnjmp pct+1 pct + 1 0 At MOD pc
store vaddrt ri,t 0 0 XOR /
load vaddrt ri,t+1 0 0 XOR ri
TABLE 5.1: Choices of selection vectors to ensure that Rinst is satis-
fied. The entries specified in the table correspond to the entries of
sa, sb, sc, sd, sout which are set equal to 1, while the rest are set equal
to 0. The entries specified in the table correspond to the entries of sch
which are set equal to 0. Where the selection vector is the zero vector
we write /. We assume that constant entries 0, 1, 2W − 1 are stored in
the execution table and that they can be selected by sa, sb, sc, sd.
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ri,t+1 and check that AND = 0. Similarly, a bit-wise XOR operation can be checked by
setting the same selection vectors as above and check that XOR = 0.
Bit-wise OR and NOT. Given a ∧ b and a ⊕ b we can compute a ∨ b in the following
way
a ∨ b = (a ∧ b) + (a⊕ b)
Let OR = XOR + AND +c. To verify the execution of or regi regj A it is sufficient to set
the selection vectors such that a = At,b = rj,t,c = ri,t+1 and check that OR = 0, which
happens if and only if c = a ∨ b.
The bit-wise NOT can be handled by computing the bit-wise XOR of A with the
word 2W − 1. We can use an additional auxiliary entry in the execution table storing
the word 2W − 1 and use the selector vector to route b to it.
Flag. The execution of the above logical operations can also affect the flag. Specifically,
the flag is set equal to 1 exactly when the output is equal to the 0 word. This can be
verified by letting
FLAG1 = flagt+1 · c FLAG2 = (flagt+1 + c) · aflag − 1
and checking both of them to be equal to 0. The first condition guarantees that at least
one among c and flagt+1 is zero, while the second guarantees that not both of them are
equal to zero. In fact, FLAG2 can be made equal to 0 by choosing aflag as the inverse of
flagt+1 + c unless their sum is 0.
We append the decompositions of a,b,c,d as well as oo,oe,eo,ee aflag to the aux-
iliary entries of the execution table, i.e.
auxExe = . . . ao ae bo be co ce do de oo oe eo ee aflag . . .
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We now give the Rlogic relation which includes all the above checks, as well as the
range checks on a,b,c,d.
Rlogic =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),⊥, (Exet,Exet+1,EvenBits)) :
Exet := (t, . . . , . . . ,a,b,c,d,out, . . . ,ao,ae,bo,be,co,ce,do,de,eo,ee,oo,oe,aflag, . . .)
out := (AND,XOR,OR, . . . ,FLAG1,FLAG2, . . .)
Exet+1 := (t+ 1, . . . , flagt+1, . . .)
(pp,⊥, (a, (ao,ae),EvenBits) ∈ Rrange (pp,⊥, (b, (bo,be),EvenBits) ∈ Rrange
(pp,⊥, (c, (co,ce),EvenBits) ∈ Rrange (pp,⊥, (d, (do,de),EvenBits) ∈ Rrange
(pp,⊥, (ao + bo, (oo,oe),EvenBits) ∈ Rrange (pp,⊥, (ae + be, (eo,ee),EvenBits) ∈ Rrange
XOR = 2oe + ee − c AND = 2oo + eo − c OR = XOR + AND + c
FLAG1 = flagt+1 · c FLAG2 = (flagt+1 + c) · aflag − 1

The choices for the selection vectors are given in Table 5.1. For example, an AND
operation is checked by using selection vectors such that a = At,b = rj,t,c = ri,t+1.
The entries of out that are equal to 1 are AND,FLAG1,FLAG2. The entries of sch that
are equal to 0 ri and flag, which are the entries that can be affected by the execution of
a bit-wise AND.
Integer Operations. Embedding W -bit words into elements of a field of size p >
22W −2W−1 enables efficient verification of arithmetic TinyRAM instructions since the
sum and the product of two W -bits word does not cause a modular reduction in the
field.
Addition and Subtraction. The execution of an addition operation add regi regj A can
be verified by picking selection vectors such that a = At,b = rj,t,c = ri,t+1 and then
checking that the following holds
a + b− c− 2Wflagt+1 = 0
Note that this is equal to 0 if and only if c contains the result of a + b with the flag
flagt+1 indicating overflow.
The same check can be used to verify a subtraction operation sub regi regj A by
swapping the role of the selection vector sb, sc and letting b = ri,t+1 and c = rj,t. The
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above equation is identically 0 if and only if b is equal to the difference of c and a
where the flag flagt+1 denotes borrow.
Let SUM = a+b−c−2Wflagt+1 +d. We can check both additions and subtractions
by letting d = 0 and checking that SUM = 0. While the temporary variable d is not
required for the verification of the above operations, we will see later that including
this variable simplifies the verification of other operations.
Multiplications. TinyRAM instruction set includes three multiplication instructions:
mull, for computing the lower word of the product of two unsigned integers; umull,
for computing the upper word of the product of two unsigned integers; umulh, for
computing the upper word of the product of two signed integers.
Let PROD = a·b−d−2Wc. We can then verify the correct execution ofmull regi regj A
by setting the temporary variables such that a = At,b = rj,t,d = ri,t+1, c to contain
some non-deterministic advice and check that PROD = 0. Note that the latter is equal
to 0 if and only if d stores the lower word of the product a · b and the upper word is
stored in c.
For the execution of umulh regi regj Awe can simply change the role of the selector
vectors sc, sd, letting c = ri,t+1 and d be some non-deterministic advice, and checking
that PROD = 0.
Signed Integers. SignedW -bit words use the two’s complement representation to store
an integer. We write σa for the most significant bit of a word a. We recall that according
to the two’s complement representation, a negative word a has σa = 1. We define the
corresponding field element aσ = −σa2W + a ∈ {−2W−1, . . . , 2W−1 − 1}. Note that in
case a is negative, the most significant bit of a, and thus of ao, is equal to 1. Given the
decomposition of a it is easy to check the sign is correct by testing ao+(1−2σa)2W−2 ∈
EvenBits, which is correct if and only if the most significant bit of ao is equal to σa.
Thus, in order to ensure that a,b,c,d are in the correct range, and the matching signs
and signed values are correct we include the following entries in the auxiliary inputs
of the execution table
auxExe = . . . aσ σa bσ σb cσ σc . . .
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To verify the execution of signed multiplication operations smulh regi regj A we
proceed similarly to umullh. Let SPROD = aσ · bσ − d − 2Wcσ. By selecting a =
At,b = rj,t,c = ri,t+1, and letting d be some non-deterministic advice, we can verify
the execution of signed multiplication by checking that SPROD = 0.
The consistency of the flag of the signed and unsigned multiplication operations
can be verified by checking FLAG1 = 0,FLAG2 = 0.
We notice that the two’s complement representation allows to perform additions
and subtractions by reusing the unsigned operation. However, in order to verify com-
parison operations for signed integers it will be helpful to define a signed counterpart
of SUM. Thus, we define
SSUM = aσ + b− cσ − 2Wflagt+1 + d
Modular Reduction. To check the execution of modular reduction umod regi regj A,
let d = rj,t, c be the modulus At, b be the quotient of the division dc , and a be the
remainder ri,t+1. We can then check that d − b · c − a = 0. This check however is
not sufficient to guarantee the correctness of the the operation umod. For example, in
case the modulus is set equal to 0, the operation should return 0 and set the flag equal
to 1. We can get around this by first checking that FLAG1 = 0 and FLAG2 = 0, which
ensures that flagt+1 = 1 if and only if c = 0. Then, by checking the following
− flag · d + d− b · c− a = 0 (5.1)
In case c = 0, we have that flagt+1 = 1 and then a = 0. Otherwise if c 6= 0, then
flagt+1 = 0 and the check corresponds to the previous one.
The last thing that we need to check in order to guarantee the correctness of the
computation is that a < c, in case c 6= 0. We can do this by doing a range check on
the value c− a− 1, which involves computing its odd/even-bits decomposition ro, re
and checking that c − a − 1 = 2ro + re. We can include the decomposition ro, re into
the auxiliary entries of the execution table
auxExe = · · · ro re · · ·
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and check both that ro, re ∈ EvenBits and that
(1− flagt+1)(c− a− 1− 2ro − re) = 0 (5.2)
Since the above checks also include the verification of the correctness of the quo-
tient, we can reuse them to check the execution of udiv operation. It is sufficient to
swap the selector vectors sa, sb so that ri,t+1 = b and check that Eq. (5.1). Again, this
check is not sufficient in the case of division by c = 0. In this case the operation is
expected to return 0 and set the flag equal to 1. The above check does not suffice since
it is merely checking that the remainder a is equal to 0, instead of the quotient b. This
can be addressed by additionally checking the following
b · flagt+1 = 0 (5.3)
In case c 6= 0, we still need to ensure that a < c to guarantee the correctness of the
result. Note that we can combine Eq. (5.2) and (5.3) into a single equation
FLAG3 = b · flagt+1 + (1− flagt+1)(c− a− 1− 2ro − re)
This does not affect the umod operation since in case flagt+1 = 1, the prover can
simply set the non-deterministic advice b equal to 0.
Looking ahead, Equation 5.1 will be used to check other operations by appropri-
ate choices of the selector vector. With this goal in mind, it will be useful to replace
Equation 5.1 with the following
MOD = flagt+1(b− d) + d− b · c− a
Note that replacing Eq. (5.1) with MOD = 0 does not affect the checks done for
umod,udiv. In case flagt+1 = 0, the two equations are equivalent. In case flagt+1 = 1,
we have that c = 0 which means that b − a = 0. In this case we get that FLAG3 = 0
implies b = 0, and hence a = 0, as in the case of Eq. (5.1).
The relationRarith incorporates all the checks for the above arithmetic operations.
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Rarith =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),⊥, (Exet,Exet+1,EvenBits)) :
Exet := (t, . . . , flagt, . . . ,a,b,c,d,out, . . . ,ao,bo,co, . . . σa, σb, σc, ro, re . . . , )
out := (. . . ,SUM,SSUM,PROD,SPROD,MOD, . . . ,FLAG3, . . .)
Exet+1 := (t+ 1, . . . , flagt+1, . . .)
(pp,⊥, (ao + (1− 2σa)2W−2,EvenBits) ∈ Rlookup
(pp,⊥,co + (1− 2σc)2W−2,EvenBits) ∈ Rlookup
(pp,⊥,bo + (1− 2σb)2W−2,EvenBits) ∈ Rlookup
σa, σb, σc, flagt, flagt+1 ∈ {0, 1} aσ = −σa2W + a
bσ = −σb2W + b cσ = −σc2W + c
SUM = a + b− c− 2Wflagt+1 + d PROD = a · b− d− 2Wc
MOD = flagt+1(b− d) + d− b · c− a
SSUM = aσ + b− cσ − 2Wflagt+1 + d SPROD = aσ · bσ − d− 2Wcσ
FLAG3 = b · flagt+1 + (1− flagt+1)(c− a− 1− 2ro − re)

Shift Operations. Operations shl regi regjA and shr regi regjA are used to shift the
word rj,t of A positions to the left, respectively to the right, filling the vacant posi-
tions with 0. The flag is set to the most significant bit and least significant bit of rj,t,
respectively.
Following the observation that to shift a word by A positions is equivalent to mul-
tiply or divide rj,t by 2A, we can treat shifts similarly to the integers operations shown
above. To efficiently check the correctness of shift operations we include into w the
table Pow storing the pairs (a, 2a mod 2W ) for a ∈ [0,W ]
Values Powers
0 1
1 2
2 4
3 8
...
...
W − 1 2W−1
W 0
TABLE 5.2: Table Pow.
In addition to Pow we store two additional values ashift,apower in the auxiliary
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entries of Exe. Say that a stores the value At, the offset of a shift operation. Then the
entry ashift can be used to check if At ∈ [W ] by checking that
ashift(ashift − 1) = 0 ∧ (1− ashift)(W − a− 2ro − re) = 0 (5.4)
where the first equation checks that ashift is a bit and the second checks that if a > W
then ashift = 1. The entry apower can be used to store the element 2a mod 2W in case
ashift = 0 and 0 otherwise. We can then check that apower is consistent with a by
checking that
(pp, (a + ashift(W − a),apower),Pow) ∈ Rlookup (5.5)
A left shift operation shl can be checked by setting b = rj,t,d = ri,t+1, respectively,
and checking that the following is equal to 0
SHIFT = apower · b− d− 2Wc (5.6)
where c is some non-deterministic advice. The consistency of the flag with the most
significant bit of rj,t is checked by the following
flagt+1 − σb = 0
Observe that if we had registers storing two words of W -bits each, shifting a W -
bit word to the right of A positions would correspond to shifting the same word to
the left by W − A positions and taking the resulting upper W bits. Since the size of
the field F is big enough, we can use the above observations to check a right shift as
a left shift. This allows us to reuse most of the above checks. It is sufficient to set
a = W − At,b = rj,t,d = ri,t+1, let c be some non-deterministic advice and check
conditions (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6) as well as the following
flagt+1 − ρb = 0
where ρb is the least significant bit of b. We can introduce an additional auxiliary value
bflag in the auxiliary information of the program and duplicated in the execution table
which is set equal to 1 for left shifts and equal to 0 otherwise. We can then merge the
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above flag checks in the following
FLAG4 = flagt+1 − bflagσb − (1− bflag)ρb.
We can now give the relationRshift for the correct execution of shifts operations.
Rshift =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),⊥, (Exet,Exet+1, (EvenBits,Pow))) :
Exet := (t, . . . , flagt, . . . ,a,b,c,d,out, . . . ,be, . . . ,bflag, σb, . . . ,ashift,apower)
out := (. . . ,SHIFT, . . . ,FLAG4)
Exet+1 := (t+ 1, . . . , flagt+1, . . .)
ashift ∈ {0, 1}
(pp,⊥,be + (1− 2ρb),EvenBits) ∈ Rlookup
(pp, (a + ashift(W − a),apower),Pow) ∈ Rlookup
SHIFT = apower · b− d− 2Wc
FLAG4 = flagt+1 − bflagσb − (1− bflag)ρb

Remaining Operations. The instruction relation Rinst ensures that logical, arith-
metic and shift operations are carried out correctly. The remaining TinyRAM oper-
ations that need to be checked are move and jump operations, memory operations,
and a terminating answer operation. The correct execution of these can be reduced
to check the correctness of the previous operations by choosing the selection vectors
appropriately.
Comparison Operations. The compare-equal instruction compe regi A sets the flag
equal to 1 if ri,t = At, and 0 otherwise. To check the execution of this operation we
can set a = At,b = ri,t and check that either their bit-wise XOR is equal to 0 or that
flagt+1 = 0. Therefore, we can reuse the checks specified for the bit-wise XOR to check
the compare-equal instruction.
The compare-above instruction compa regi A sets the flag equal to 1 if and only
if ri,t > At and to 0 otherwise. Let a = ri,t, c = At, d = 0, and b store some non-
deterministic advice. By checking that SUM = 0 we have that (a−c) = (2Wflagt+1−b).
Note that if flagt+1 = 1, the right-hand side is greater than 0 since b ∈ [0, 2W − 1] has
been checked by the relationRlogic, and therefore also the left-hand side is greater than
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0. Thus, if the flagt+1 = 1 then a > c. On the other hand, if flagt+1 = 0, the right-hand
side is less or equal than 0 and thus a ≤ c. The operation compg is the equivalent of
compa for the comparison of signed integers and can be checked in a similar way by
checking that SSUM = aσ + b − cσ − 2Wflagt+1 + d is equal to 0, where d is also set
equal to 0 and the other temporary variables are set as above.
Similarly, the compae regi A sets the flag equal to 1 if and only if ri,t ≥ At and
to 0 otherwise. We can set the selection vectors as for the previous operation while
setting d = 1. Whenever SUM = 0 we will have that (a − c) = (2Wflagt+1 − b − 1).
Now, flagt+1 = 1 makes the right-hand side greater or equal than 0, and thus a ≥ c.
On the other hand, flagt+1 = 0 makes the right-hand side strictly less than 0, giving
us a < c. The operation compge is the equivalent of compa for the comparison
of signed integers and can be checked in a similar way by checking that SSUM =
aσ + b − cσ − 2Wflagt+1 + d is equal to 0, where d is also set equal to 1 and the other
temporary variables are set as above.
Move and Jump Operations. The instruction mov regi A stores the value At into regi
and the instruction jmp A sets the program counter pct+1 equal to At. We can check
both these operations by storing input and output in a and b, respectively, and check
that their bit-wise XOR is equal to 0. We summarise the selection vectors for these
operations in Table 5.1.
The operation cmov is the conditional operation executing a mov instruction only
in the case the flagt is set equal to 1. It can be verified by setting the selection vectors
so that a = ri,t+1,b = At,c = 0,d = ri,t and check that MOD = 0. Note that when
c = 0, the latter amounts to check
flagt+1(b− d) + d− a = 0
which checks that At = ri,t in case flagt = 1 and that regi remains the same in case
flagt = 0, i.e. ri,t = ri,t. To conclude, by setting the entry of vector sch relative to the
flag equal to 1, we can check that flagt = flagt+1.
The conditional operation cjmp executes a jump operation only in case flagt = 1.
This can be checked in the same way as above by setting a = pct+1,b = At,c = 0,d =
pct + 1 and check that MOD = 0. The conditional operations cnjmp only performs
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a jump instruction if flagt = 0. It is sufficient to swap the roles of b a d and check
MOD = 0.
Memory Operations. The consistency of memory operations across the execution has
been checked by the memory check relationRmem. Among other things,Rmem verifies
that entries addrt and vaddrt are updated consistently. The last thing that remains to
check is that when performing load and store operations, the registers are updated
consistently to the value stored in vaddrt . This involves checking equality between
vaddrt and either the value stored in the input or output register, which can be done by
checking that their bit-wise XOR is equal to 0.
Answer. A correct program execution terminates in step T with answer 0. With little
loss of generality we can assume this is done by jumping to the last line of the pro-
gram, which has instruction answer A specifying immediate value A = 0, which we
check in Rcheck. A correct program execution only executes answer once so we also
need to ensure the program execution does not encounter an answer instruction pre-
maturely. We ensure this by removing all answer instructions from the program table
Prog such that no execution step checked byRinst for t = 1, . . . , T −1 can be an answer
instruction.
5.4 ILC proofs for Building Blocks
In the previous sections we described the arithmetization of TinyRAM and its full
decomposition into few building-block relations: equality, unknown permutation,
lookup, range relations and sets of quadratic constraints. Next, we give an outline
of the proof systems over the ILC for these building blocks, referring to [BCG+18] for
the complete specifications of the permutation and lookup proofs. The proof systems
described in this section refer to matrices and vectors committed using the ILC. In the
next section we will see how to parse the witness w into several matrices and how to
combine these building blocks to give proofs for the correct execution of TinyRAM
programs.
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5.4.1 ILC proofs for Equality Relations
The equality relation Req is analogous to the one we introduced in the Section 4.2.1,
were we also described a proof system in the ILC model. In Table 5.3 we restate the
efficiency of the proof system to check the equality of s public vectors with committed
vectors in the ILC.
Prover computation TPILC = //
Verifier computation TVILC = O(sk) F+
Prover communication t = //
Verifier communication CILC = 0
Query complexity qc = 1
Round complexity µ = 0
TABLE 5.3: Efficiency of the proof of knowledge for Req. F+ stands for
the cost of a single field addition.
5.4.2 ILC Proof for Unknown Permutation Relations
We will now give the outline of a proof system over the ILC for the relation Rperm.
To express the statement in a format that is more compatible with the ILC channel we
write the values to be permuted as entries in matrices. Therefore we reformulate the
unknown permutation relation as follows.
Rperm =
 (ppILC, u) := ((W,K,F, k) , (mn), (A,B, pi)) :A,B ∈ Fmn×k ∧ pi ∈ Σ[mn]×[k] ∧ Api(i,j) = Bi,j ∀(i, j) ∈ [mn]× [k]

The proof system for an unknown permutation relation unfolds (Figure 5.3) very sim-
ilarly to the case of a known permutation relation we outlined in Section 4.2.4. Define
J ∈ Fmn×k to be the matrix that has 1 in all entries, i.e.,
J =

1 1
. . .
1 1

Suppose the prover has committed to the rows of the two matrices A,B ∈ Fm×k.
The idea behind the construction is to let the verifier pick a random challenge x and
let the prover commit toA−xJ andB−xJ . The prover will now convince the verifier
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FIGURE 5.3: Decomposition of the unknown permutation proof over
the ILC.
that the product of the entries inA−xJ is equal to the product of the entries inB−xJ ,
i.e.
mn,k∏
i,j
(Ai,j − x) =
mn,k∏
i,j
(Bi,j − x).
As in the case of a known permutation, this can be done by executing a proof for the
same-product of matrices.
Permutation of Tuples. When checking the consistency of the memory, we use a
permutation relation over tuples of entries in the execution table rather than single
entries. This means that all entries in a tuple are subject to the same permutation. Over
the ILC this can be phrased as checking that entries in matrices {Ai}i are permutation
of entries in {Bi}i, for the same permutation pi. Our proof system can be extended to
check an unknown permutation of collection of matrices by introducing an additional
round of interaction between prover and verifier. It is sufficient to let the verifier pick
a random challenge z ← F and let the prover commit to the matricesA = zA1 +z2A2 +
z3A3 + . . ., and B = zB1 + z2B2 + z3B3 + . . .. The prover shows that the compressed
matrices A and B are correctly formed using a proof for the correct sum of committed
vectors (Section 4.2.23) and that these two matrices are permutation of each other. In
the specific case of the Rcycle relation, the last entry of the tuple consists of elements
of the form S + L which is used to distinguish between memory operations from the
rest. In our final proof the entries of S and L will be committed into distinct matrices.
These two can be merged into a single one in the compression step by weighting them
with the same power of z, i.e. z4L + z4S = z4(S + L).
3We only presented a proof for the sum of vectors rather than for their weighted sum. However,
it is easy to see that the proof can be generalised by changing the verifier’s opening query to include
the weights of the linear combination. In the notation, we differentiate the case of a weighted sum by
including the weights of the linear combination in the instance.
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The description of our unknown permutation proof forRperm on collection of ma-
trices is given in Fig. 5.4. As in the previous chapter we delimit steps that are executed
in other proofs with / ∗ and ∗/, and include [A] in the verifier’s inputs to denote that
the statement refers to the commitment of A in the ILC. Steps marked with ILC → ◦
and ILC← • denote incoming and outgoing messages to the ILC, respectively.
Pperm(ppILC, (mn, c), ({Ai, Bi}ci=1, pi))
Round 1:
/ ∗ILC← • Send (commit, {Ai, Bi}ci=1) to the ILC ∗/
Round 2:
ILC→ ◦ Get message z from the ILC
• A := ∑ci=1Aizi
• B := ∑ci=1Bizi
• z := (z, z2, . . . , zc)
ILC← • Send (commit, A,B) to the ILC
Round 3 to logm+ 4:
ILC→ ◦ Get message x from the ILC
• For (i, j) ∈ [mn]× [k]:
– J ′i,j := x
• A′ := A− J ′
• B′ := B − J ′.
ILC← • Send (commit, J ′, A′, B′) to the ILC
• Run Psum (ppILC, (mn, z), (A1, . . . , Ac, A))
• Run Psum (ppILC, (mn, z), (B1, . . . , Bc, B))
• Run Peq(ppILC, J ′, J ′)
• Run Psum(ppILC, (mn), (A′, J ′, A))
• Run Psum(ppILC, (mn), (B′, J ′, B))
• Run Psame-prod(ppILC, (mn), (A′, B′))
Vperm(ppILC, (mn, c, ({[Ai], [Bi]}ni=1)))
Round 1:
/ ∗ ILC→ ◦ Get message 2mnc from the ILC ∗/
• z ← F
• z := (z, z2, . . . , zn)
ILC← • Send (send, z) to the ILC
Round 2:
ILC→ ◦ Get message 2mn from the ILC
• x← F
• For (i, j) ∈ [mn]× [k]:
– J ′i,j := x
ILC← • Send (send, x) to the ILC
Round 3 to logm+ 4:
ILC→ ◦ Get message 3mn from the ILC
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (mn, z, [A1], . . . , [An], [A]))
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (mn, z, [B1], . . . , [Bn], [B]))
• Run Veq(ppILC, (mn, J ′, [J ′]))
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (mn, [A′], [J ′], [A])
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (mn, [B′], [J ′], [B])
• Run Vsame-prod(ppILC, (mn, [A′], [B′]))
• If all the sub-proofs accept return 1, else
return 0
FIGURE 5.4: Proof of knowledge for the relationRperm.
Theorem 5.1. (GILC,Pperm,Vperm) is a proof system for the relation Rperm in the ILC model
with perfect completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-line extrac-
tion, and perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
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Proof. We start by showing completeness. If the statement is true, then there exists
a permutation pi between the entries of matrices {Ai}i and the entries of {Bi}i. This
means that for the same permutation pi we have A′pi(i,j) = B
′
i,j . Therefore each entry
of A′ appears somewhere in matrix B′. Perfect completeness follows by the perfect
completeness of the sub-proofs.
Next we show statistical strong knowledge soundness. As usual the knowledge
extractor sees the vectors sent from the prover to the ILC, and therefore it has straight-
line extraction. The knowledge soundness of the sum sub-proofs, guarantees that
matrices A,B correspond to the weighted sums of Ai and Bi, respectively, apart with
negligible probability. By the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, if the statement is false then
with overwhelming probability (1 − c|F|) over the choices of z there will be entries
only contained either in A or B. The knowledge soundness of the equality and sum
sub-proofs guarantees that, apart with negligible probability, matrix J ′ is correctly
formed and that committed matrices A,B are the sums of A′+ J ′, and B′+ J ′, respec-
tively. Moreover, from the knowledge soundness of the same-product proof, we get∏
i,j(Ai,j − x) =
∏
i,j(Bi,j − x). By applying the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma again, the
probability over the random choice of x ← F of the above equality to hold is at most
mnk
|F| , which is negligible.
Finally, the proof system has perfect SHVZK. Matrix J ′ can be computed given
the statement and the random challenges sent from the verifier. This is sufficient to
simulate the view of the equality sub-proofs. The sub-proofs for the sum relation can
be trivially simulated. The simulator then is only required to execute the simulator for
the same-product sub-proof.
Efficiency. The round complexity of the proof is of two rounds more than the same-
product proof in the case of permutation of tuples, i.e. log(m) + 4 rounds. The number
of verifier’s queries is equal to the sum of the queries of the sub-proofs, i.e. qc = 16 in
the tuples case.
The verifier communication is O(log(m)) challenges. The computational cost for
the verifier is O(mn + k) field multiplications for the sum and same-product proofs.
The equality sub-proof normally requires a linear number of additions. However, here
the equality is used to check that matrix J ′ has entries all equal to x, and therefore
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most of the computation can be reused. In this case the verifier can check that the
response to the opening query is a vector with entries all equal to each other, and that
this value is consistent with the linear combination of one column of J ′. This only
requiresO(mn) field multiplications to compute. Therefore, the overall computational
cost of the verifier is dominated byO(mn +k) field multiplications, which is sublinear
in the size of the matrices. It is worth noting that the verification cost of the known
permutation proof of Section 4.2.4 is a linear number of additions.
The communication complexity for the prover isO(mn) vectors of length k, assum-
ing that the tuples are of constant size (c = O(1)), which is the only case we will use.
The computational complexity of the prover is dominated by the cost of the same-
product proof, which is in turn dominated by the cost of the product proof of Section
4.2.3 and therefore is equal to O(mnk + kn log(n)). The efficiency of the proof system
is summarised in Table 5.7.
Prover computation TPILC = O(kn log n + kmn) F×
Verifier computation TVILC = O(k + mn) F×
Prover communication t = O(mn) log |Fk|
Verifier communication CILC = (log m + 4) log |F|
Query complexity qc = 16
Round complexity µ = log m + 4
TABLE 5.4: Efficiency of the proof of knowledge for the Rperm relation.
F× stands for the cost of a single field multiplication, F+ stands for the
cost of a single field addition, and log |F| for the size of a field element.
5.4.3 ILC Proofs for Lookup Relations
Here we give an idea behind the proof system over the ILC for lookup relationsRlookup.
As above, we reformulate the lookup relationRlookup in terms of the entries in matrices
for compatibility with the ILC channel. We think of the entries of a lookup table to be
arranged in a matrix B ∈ FnB×k and all the values we want to check in the lookup
table to be arranged in a matrix A ∈ FnA×k. A lookup statement is that all entries Ai,j
in A are equal to some entry Bi′,j′ in B. The corresponding relation is
Rlookup =
 (ppILC, u) := ((W,K,F, k) , (nA, nB), (A,B)) :A ∈ FnA×k ∧ B ∈ FnB×k ∧ {Ai,j}nA,ki=1,j=1 ⊆ {Bi,j}nB ,ki=1,j=1

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In a completely identical way to the case of permutations of tuples, we can also extend
the lookup relation to work on collection of matrices {Ai}i, {Bi}i.
The idea behind the construction of the proof is similar to the one used for checking
permutations of entries in two matrices. Namely, we let the verifier pick a random
challenge x← F and have the prover show that
nA,k∏
i=1,j=1
(Ai,j − x) =
nB ,k∏
i=1,j=1
(Bi,j − x)e(i,j)
for some exponents ei,j , denoting the number of times the entry Bi,j in table B has be
looked up from table A. For the left-hand side, the proof proceeds as in the permuta-
tion proof, where the prover commits to matrix A− xJ for a matrix J with all entries
equal to 1. For the right-hand side the prover has to commit to a matrix
E =

e(1,1)1 . . . e(1,k)1
...
...
e(1,1)log(nAk)
. . . e(1,k)log(nAk)
e(2,1)1 . . . e(2,k)1
...
...
e(nB ,1)log(nAk)
. . . e(nB ,k)log(nAk)

∈ FnB log(nAk)×k
where e(i,j)k is the k-th bit in the binary decomposition of exponent e(i,j) associated
with the lookup table entry Bi,j . The prover then shows the following holds
• The entries of E are all zeros and ones, i.e (E ◦ E = E).
• The sum of the exponents is equal to the number of entries in matrix A, i.e.∑nB ,k
i=1,j=1 ei,j = nAk.
• Commit to a matrix F ∈ FnB log(nAk)×k whose entries are equal to (Bi,j −x)e(i,j)k .
The correctness of this matrix is checked using few additional product and sum
proofs.
• Use a same-product proof to show that product of entries inA′ = A−xJ is equal
to the product of entries in F .
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We refer to [BCG+18] for a description on how to perform each of the above checks
and for the full specifications of the proof system (GILC,Plookup,Vlookup). From there we
also recall the next theorem which we state without proof.
Theorem 5.2 ([BCG+18]). (GILC,Plookup,Vlookup) is a proof system for the relationRlookup in
the ILC model with perfect completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-
line extraction, and perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
This proof system uses as a building block the same-product proof which repre-
sents the dominant cost of the proof. The efficiency of the proof system is stated in
Table 5.5, with respect to the case of lookup tables of constant size tuples. In the ap-
plication of this proof, we typically have a much larger matrix A of elements that we
lookup and a smaller lookup table B, so that nA dominates nB log(nAk).
Prover computation TPILC = O(nAk + nBk log(nAk)) F×
Verifier computation TVILC = O(k + nA + nB log(nAk)) F×
Prover communication t = O(nA + nB log(nAk)) log |Fk|
Verifier communication CILC = (log(nB) + 4) log |F|
Query complexity qc = 65
Round complexity µ = log(nB) + 4
TABLE 5.5: Efficiency of the proof of knowledge for theRlookup relation.
F× stands for the cost of a single field multiplication, F+ stands for the
cost of a single field addition, and log |F| for the size of a field element.
Bounded Lookups. In the process of checking the consistency of the memory, we
introduced a bounded lookup relation to check that certain entries of the lookup table
B could occur at most once in matrix A. It is easy to extend the previous lookup proof
to incorporate the extra conditions required by a bounded lookup relation. The high
level decomposition of the bounded lookup proof system is given in Figure 5.6
FIGURE 5.5: Decomposition of the bounded lookup proof over the ILC.
In the decomposition of the TinyRAM relation, the bounded lookup relation is
used to check the consistency of tuples in rows of the execution table with rows of the
138 Chapter 5. Proofs for the Execution of TinyRAM Programs in the ILC Model
memory table Mem, which consist of three entries each (address, value, and usd). Let
B1, B2, B3 be the matrices composing the lookup table storing addresses, values, and
usd flags respectively. Without loss of generality assume that the part of the lookup
table that can be accessed at most once corresponds to the top half of the matrices
(B>1 , B>2 , B>3 ) while the part that can be accessed multiple times corresponds to the
bottom halves (B⊥1 , B⊥2 , B⊥3 ). Similarly, consider matrices A1, A2, A3 for the tuples of
entries that we want to check in the table. As for the unknown permutation proof, we
start compressing the above matrices into two matrices using a challenge z ← F from
the verifier, i.e.
A = A1z +A2x
2 +A3z
3 B = B1z +B2x
2 +B3z
3
Once the matrices have been compressed, prover and verifier run a lookup proof on
A and B. In the process, the prover has to commit to matrix E ∈ FnB log(nAk)×k that
encodes in binary form the number of times that each entry in B appears in A.
Let B> be the top half of the matrix B containing the entries that can occur at most
once in A, and B⊥ be the bottom half of B. The prover commits to another matrix
G ∈ FnB log(nAk)×k, the same size of E. This matrix contains zeros at entries relating to
the positions in E that describe all but the least significant bits of the number of times
B> occurs in A. All the remaining entries of G are set equal to 1.
E =

e(1,1)1 . . . e(1,k)1
e(1,1)2 . . . e(1,k)2
...
...
e(1,1)log(nAk)
. . . e(1,k)log(nAk)
e(2,1)1 . . . e(2,k)1
...
...
e(nB ,1)log(nAk)
. . . e(nB ,k)log(nAk)

G =

0 . . . 0
1 . . . 1
...
...
1 . . . 1
0 . . . 0
...
...
0 . . . 0

The correctness of the matrix G can be checked efficiently by using a proof system
for equality relations. Lastly, the prover shows that G ◦ E is the zero matrix. This
shows that E contains all zeroes for entries corresponding to B>, except possibly the
least significant bit, which may be a zero or a one. The description of the proof system
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over the ILC for the bounded lookup relationRblookup is given in Figure 5.6.
Pblookup(ppILC, (nA, nB), ({Ai}3i=1, {Bi}3i=1))
Round 1:
/ ∗ ILC← • Send (commit, {Ai, Bi}3i=1) to the ILC ∗/
Round 2 to lognB + 4:
ILC→ ◦ Get message z from the ILC
• z := (z, z2, z3)
• A := A1z +A2z2 +A3z3
• B := B1z +B2z2 +B3z3
• For (i, j) ∈ [nB log(nAk)2 ]× [k]:
– If i = 1 (mod log(nAk)): G>i,j := 0
– Else: G>i,j := 1
– G⊥i,j := 0
– O>i,j := 0
– O⊥i,j := 0
• G :=
(
G>
G⊥
)
, O :=
(
O>
O⊥
)
ILC← • Send (commit, A,B,G,O) to the ILC
• Run Psum(ppILC, (nA, z), (A1, A2, A3, A))
• Run Psum(ppILC, (nB, z), (B1, B2, B3, B))
• Run Peq(ppILC, G,G)
• Run Peq(ppILC, O,O)
• Run Plookup(ppILC, (nA, nB), (A,B))
• Run Pprod(ppILC, (nB log(nAk)), (G,E,O))
Vblookup(ppILC, (nA, nB, {[Ai]}3i=1, {[Bi]}3i=1))
Round 1:
/ ∗ ILC→ ◦ Get message 3(nA + nB) from the ILC ∗/
• z ← F
• z := (z, z2, z3)
ILC← • Send (send, z) to the ILC
Round 2 to lognB + 4:
ILC→ ◦ Get message nA+nB +2nB log(nAk) from
the ILC
• For (i, j) ∈ [nB log(nAk)2 ]× [k]:
– If i = 1 (mod log(nAk)): G>i,j := 0
– Else: G>i,j := 1
– G⊥i,j := 0
– O>i,j := 0
– O⊥i,j := 0
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (nA, z, [A1], [A2], [A3], [A]))
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (nB, z, [B1], [B2], [B3], [B]))
• Run Veq(ppILC, (G, [G]))
• Run Veq(ppILC, (O, [O]))
• Run Vlookup(ppILC, (nA, nB, [A], [B])).
• Run Vprod(ppILC, (nB log(nAk), [G], [E], [O]))
• If all the sub-proofs accept return 1,
else return 0
FIGURE 5.6: Proof of knowledge for the relation Rblookup. Matrix E is
the exponent matrix used inside the proof forRlookup
Theorem 5.3. (GILC,Pblookup,Vblookup) is a proof system for Rblookup in the ILC model with
perfect completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-line extraction, and
perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
Proof. We start by showing completeness. If the statement is true, then all entries in
(A1, A2, A3) are also entries in (B1, B2, B3). Moreover, entries in matrices B>i are only
accessed once in the Ai. The same holds for the compressed matrices A,B. Matrices
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G and O are constructed such that G ◦ E = O. Perfect completeness then follows by
the perfect completeness of all the sub-proofs.
Next we show statistical strong knowledge soundness. As usual the knowledge
extractor sees the vectors sent from the prover to the ILC, and therefore it has straight-
line extraction. The knowledge soundness of the sum sub-proofs, guarantees that
matrices A,B correspond to the weighted sums of Ai and Bi, respectively, apart with
negligible probability. By the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, if the statement is false then
with overwhelming probability (1 − 3|F|) over the choices of z either there will be en-
tries only contained either in A or B, or some entries of B> are included more than
once inA. The knowledge soundness of the equality sub-proofs guarantees that, apart
with negligible probability, matrices G and O are correctly formed. From the knowl-
edge soundness of the lookup proof, we get that all entries in A are contained in B,
apart with negligible probability. This proof also guarantees that matrix E is correctly
storing the number of times entries ofB occur inA. Finally, the knowledge soundness
of the product proof guarantees that if matrix B> has entries occurring more than
once in matrix A, then there is negligible probability that the verifier will accept that
G ◦ E = O.
Finally, the proof system has perfect SHVZK. MatricesG,O can be computed given
the statement. This is sufficient to simulate the view of the equality sub-proofs. The
sub-proofs for the sum relation can be trivially simulated. The transcript of a product
subproof can be simulated by picking responses v1,v2 ← Fk and v3 := v1 ◦ v2. The
simulator then calls the simulators of the lookup proof and terminates.
The efficiency of the bounded lookup proof (Table 5.6) is similar to the efficiency
of the lookup proof. We stress that the verification cost of the equality sub-proofs can
be reduced as in the case the unknown permutation proof, since the columns of the
matrix are all the same.
5.4.4 ILC Proof for Range Relations
In Section 5.2.4 we showed that range relations can be reduced to lookup and sum
relations. To perform range checks efficiently we batch them in a single proof. This
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Prover computation TPILC = O(nAk + nBk log(nAk)) F×
Verifier computation TVILC = O(k + nA + nB log(nAk)) F×
Prover communication t = O(nA + nB log(nAk)) log |Fk|
Verifier communication CILC = (log(nB) + 4) log |F|
Query complexity qc = 72
Round complexity µ = log(nB) + 4
TABLE 5.6: Efficiency of the proof of knowledge for the Rblookup rela-
tion. F× stands for the cost of a single field multiplication, F+ stands
for the cost of a single field addition, and log |F| for the size of a field
element.
is done by gathering all the values in a ∈ [0, 2W − 1] into a single matrix A and in-
sert their odd/even-bits decomposition (ao,ae) into two matrices Ao, Ae. Prover and
verifier perform a lookup proof for matrices Ao, Ae and matrix B storing the lookup
table EvenBits. The only thing that remains to show is that the values in A are con-
sistent with their odd/even-bits decomposition, i.e. A = 2Ao + Ae. The high-level
decomposition of the range proof system over the ILC is given in Figure 5.7.
FIGURE 5.7: Decomposition of the range proof over the ILC.
We omit the formal description of the proof system for range relations as it consists
of a straightforward combination of sum and lookup proofs. Furthermore, we have
to check several other arithmetic constraints over the entries of two consecutive rows
in the execution table. We can batch these together with the above sum relations in a
single proof. Overall, range relations will be checked by lookup proofs and a proof for
the consistency of arithmetic constraints which we describe next.
5.4.5 ILC Proof for Arithmetic Constraints
In the previous sections we decomposed the arithmetized TinyRAM relation into sev-
eral simpler relations, some of which contained arithmetic constraints over the entries
of one row of the execution table,Rtime,Rload or over pairs of consecutive rows in the
execution table, Rmux,Rcons,Rinst,Rlogic,Rarith,Rshift. One way to handle all these
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constraints would be to gather all of them into an arithmetic circuit over the entries
of Exe and then use the proof for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits we gave in the
Chapter 4. Since the set of constraints is the same for every pair of rows, the result-
ing arithmetic circuit would be a repetition of the same sub-circuit applied for every
pair of consecutive rows. Since we are interested to prove evaluations of the same
circuit many times on different inputs, there are batching techniques to perform this
check more efficiently. Since all the constraints we used are either linear constraints
or quadratic constraints over the entries of the execution table, we can use quadratic
arithmetic programs (QAP), which were used by [GGP+13] in the context of succinct
non-interactive argument of knowledge. Quadratic arithmetic programs are a means
to batch together a set of quadratic equations into a single polynomial equation. In
the interactive settings, similar batching techniques were used in [Bay14] and [BG18]
to construct arguments for batch evaluation of polynomials.
A quadratic arithmetic program QAP over a field F consists of three sets of poly-
nomials {ui(X)}mi=0, {vi(X)}mi=0, {wi(X)}mi=0 and a target polynomial t(X) such that
• All polynomials ui(X), vi(X), wi(X) and t(X) are in F[X].
• The polynomials ui(X), vi(X), wi(X) have degree strictly lower than n, for 1 ≤
i ≤ m.
• The degree of t(X) is equal to n.
The size of the QAP is the size of the sets of polynomials, i.e. m, while the degree of the
QAP is the degree of t(X), i.e. n.
Let QAP = (F, n, {ui(X), vi(X), wi(X)}mi=0, t(X)) be a quadratic arithmetic pro-
gram. Elements {ai}mi=1 ∈ F are said to constitute a valid assignment to the QAP if the
polynomial t(X) divides the following polynomial
(
u0(X) +
m∑
i=1
ai · ui(X)
)
·
(
v0(X) +
m∑
i=1
ai · vi(X)
)
−
(
w0(X) +
m∑
i=1
ai · wi(X)
)
Gennaro et al. [GGP+13] shows how to construct QAP for general arithmetic cir-
cuits, such that valid assignments to the wires of the circuit correspond to valid as-
signments of a QAP. Given a circuit with n inputs and s fan-in 2 multiplication gates
they show how to construct a QAP of size n+s and degree s ([GGP+13, Theorem 12]).
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Overall, the relations Rtime,Rload,Rmux,Rcons,Rinst,Rlogic,Rarith,Rshift specify a
constant number of quadratic constraints over entries of at most two rows, comprising
a constant number of field elements each. Therefore, by following [GGP+13] we can
construct a QAP of constant size and constant degree and give a proof that the entries
in two consecutive rows constitute a valid assignment to the QAP. Namely, we are
interested in giving a proof system for the following relation.
RQAP =

(ppILC, u, w) :=
(
(F, k), (QAP), ({ai}mi=1, {zj}n−2j=0 )
)
:
QAP := (F, n, {ui(X), vi(X), wi(X)}mi=0, t(X)) ∧
∀ i ∈ [m], ai ∈ F ∧ ∀ j ∈ [0, n− 2], zj ∈ F ∧
u(x) := u0(X) +
∑m
i=1 aiui(X) ∧ v(X) := v0(X) +
∑m
i=1 aivi(X)∧
w(X) := w0(X) +
∑m
i=1 aiwi(X) ∧ z(X) :=
∑n−2
i=0 ziX
i ∧
u(X) · v(X) = w(X) + t(X)z(X)

More precisely, we will give a proof to check the validity of T − 1 assignments to
the same QAP, corresponding to the entries of the T − 1 pairs of consecutive rows
in the execution table. Since the ILC allows to commit to vectors of length k, we can
extend the polynomial expression used to check the validity of one assignment to a
polynomial expression with vector coefficients to check k instances of the same QAP
at the same time. This is done by arranging the assignment to the same instance into
the same position of vectors ai ∈ Fk for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and check that t(X) divides each
component of the following vector of polynomials
(1 · u0(X) +
∑m
i=1 ai · ui(X)) ◦ (1 · v0(X) +
∑m
i=1 ai · vi(X))− (1 · w0(X) +
∑m
i=1 ai · wi(X))
where 1 is the vector of length k with entries all equal to 1.
Let mn be the number of vector assignments to be checked on the same QAP, i.e.
T ≈ mnk. In our proof system, the prover starts by committing to vectors {ai,j}m,mni=1,j=1
such that for every fixed j, the vectors {ai,j}mi=1 correspond to a batch of k QAP as-
signments as described above. Furthermore, let {a0,j}mnj=1 be the vectors with entries
all equal to 1. Then, the prover computes the quotient polynomials zj(X) for every
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j ∈ [mn]
zj(X) =
n−2∑
k=0
zk,jX
i
=
[(
m∑
i=0
ai,jui(X)
)
◦
(
m∑
i=0
ai,jvi(X)
)
−
m∑
i=0
ai,jwi(X)
]
/t(X) (5.7)
and commits to their coefficient {zk,j}n−2,mnk=0,j=1. At this point the prover shows that for
each j ∈ [mn] the following holds
(
m∑
i=0
ai,jui(X)
)
◦
(
m∑
i=0
ai,jvi(X)
)
=
m∑
i=0
ai,jwi(X) + zj(X)t(X)
These identities can be tested using the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma. The verifier picks
a random challenge x ← F and the prover evaluates the above polynomials in x to
obtain
aˆj =
m∑
i=0
ai,jui(x)
bˆj =
m∑
i=0
ai,jvi(x)
cˆj =
m∑
i=0
ai,jwi(x) +
m∑
i=1
zi,jx
it(x)
At this point the prover shows the consistency of the ai,j with the above evalua-
tions and that aˆj ◦ bˆj = cˆj for all j ∈ [mn]. The full description of the proof system for
a batch of mnk instances of the same QAP is given in Figure 5.8.
Theorem 5.4. (GILC,PQAP,VQAP) is a proof system for the (batched) relation RQAP in the
ILC model with perfect completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-
line extraction, and perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
Proof. We start by showing completeness. If the statement is true, then there exist
polynomials zj(X) of degree at most n− 2 such that
(
m∑
i=0
ai,jui(X)
)
◦
(
m∑
i=0
ai,jvi(X)
)
=
m∑
i=0
ai,jwi(X) + zj(X)t(X)
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PQAP(ppILC, (mn,QAP), ({{ai,j}mi=1, {zk,j}n−2k=0}mnj=1))
Round 1:
• Parse QAP as
(F, n, {ui(X), vi(X), wi(X)}mi=0, t(X))
• For j ∈ [mn]:
– a0,j := 1
– zj(X) :=
∑n−2
k=0 zk,jX
i (as in (5.7))
/ ∗ ILC← • Send (commit, {ai,j}m, mni=1,j=1) to the ILC ∗/
ILC← • Send (commit, {a0,j}mnj=1, {zk,j}n−2, mnk=0,j=1) to
the ILC
Round 2 to logm+ 3:
ILC→ ◦ Get message x from the ILC
• For j ∈ [mn]:
– aˆj :=
∑m
i=0 ai,jui(x)
– bˆj :=
∑m
i=0 ai,jvi(x)
– cˆj :=
∑m
i=0 ai,jwi(x) + zjt(x)
ILC← • Send (commit, {aˆj , bˆj , cˆj}mnj=1) to the ILC
• Run Peq(ppILC, {1}mnj=1, {a0,j}mnj=1)
• Run Psum(ppILC, (mmn, {u(x)i}mi=0),
({a0,j , . . .am,j , aˆj}mnj=1))
• Run Psum(ppILC, (mmn, {v(x)i}mi=0),
({a0,j , . . . ,am,j , bˆj}mnj=1))
• Run Psum(ppILC, (mmn, ({w(x)i}mi=0, t(x)),
({a0,j , . . . ,am,j , zj , cˆj}mnj=1))
• Run Pprod(ppILC, (mn), ({aˆj , bˆj , cˆj}mnj=1))
VQAP(ppILC, (mn,QAP, {{[ai,j ]}mi=1, {[zk,j ]}n−2k=0}mnj=1)
Round 1:
/ ∗ ILC→ ◦ Get message mmn from the ILC ∗/
ILC→ ◦ Get message nmn from the ILC
• x← F
ILC← • Send (send, x) to the ILC
Round 2 to logm+ 3:
ILC→ ◦ Get message 3mn from the ILC
• Parse QAP as
(F, n, {ui(X), vi(X), wi(X)}mi=0, t(X))
• Run Veq(ppILC, ({1}mnj=1, {[a0,j ]}mnj=1))
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (mmn, {u(x)i}mi=0,
{[a0,j ], . . . [am,j ], [aˆj ]}mnj=1))
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (mmn, {v(x)i}mi=0,
{[a0,j ], . . . , [am,j ], [bˆ]j}mnj=1))
• Run Vsum(ppILC, (mmn, ({w(x)i}mi=0, t(x),
{[a0,j ], . . . , [am,j ], [zj ], [cˆj ]}mnj=1))
• Run Pprod(ppILC, (mn, {[aˆj ], [bˆj ], [cˆj}mnj=1]))
• If all the sub-proofs accept return 1,
else return 0
FIGURE 5.8: Proof of knowledge for the batchedRQAP relation.
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The above equality holds also when evaluating the polynomials at x. The complete-
ness of the proof system then follows from the completeness of the sub-proofs.
Next, we show that the proof has statistical strong knowledge soundness. As usual
the extraction is straight-line since the extractor sees the transcript of the communica-
tion between the prover and the ILC channel, and thus obtain a witness. It remains
to show that for any deterministic malicious prover P∗, if the committed vectors are
not a valid witness for RQAP, then there is negligible probability of accept. By the
knowledge soundness of the equality sub-proof, the vectors a0,j are equal to 1 with
overwhelming probability. Also, by the knowledge-soundness of the sum proof, it
must be that for each j, the values aˆj , bˆj , cˆj were computed correctly, i.e.
aˆj =
m∑
i=1
ai,jui(x)
bˆj =
m∑
i=1
ai,jvi(x)
cˆj =
m∑
i=1
ai,jwi(x) +
m∑
i=1
zi,jx
it(x)
In case the statement is false, then the vectors ai,j do not form valid assignments for
the QAP. This means that there exists at least one component for which t(X) does not
divide (
m∑
i=0
ai,jui(X)
)
◦
(
m∑
i=0
ai,jvi(X)
)
−
m∑
i=0
ai,jwi(X)
By the knowledge-soundness of the product proof, we have that
(
m∑
i=1
ai,jui(x)
)
◦
(
m∑
i=1
ai,jvi(x)
)
=
m∑
i=1
ai,jwi(x) +
m∑
i=1
zi,jx
it(x).
If the statement is false, then the left-hand side polynomial and the right-hand side
polynomial are not equal. By the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, the above check has proba-
bility at most 2n−2F to succeed. Therefore, the proof system has statistical strong knowl-
edge soundness.
Finally, the proof system has perfect SHVZK. Given vector 1 it is possible to sim-
ulate the view of the equality sub-proof. The sub-proofs for the sum relations can be
trivially simulated. The transcript of a product subproof can be simulated by picking
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responses v1,v2 ← Fk and v3 := v1 ◦ v2. By the perfect SHVZK of the sub-proofs, the
transcript produced by the simulator has the same distribution of a real transcript.
Efficiency. Here we report the efficiency of the proof system for mnk batches of QAP
of size m = O(1) and degree n = O(1). The round complexity of the proof is of one
round more than the product proof of Section 4.2.3, i.e. log(m)+3 rounds. The number
of queries done by the verifier is equal to the sum of the queries of the sub-proofs, i.e.
qc = 7.
The verifier communication is O(log(m)) challenges. The computational cost for
the verifier is of O(mn + k) field multiplications for the sum and product proofs. The
equality sub-proof normally requires a linear number of additions. However, here the
equality is used to check that vectors have all entries all equal to 1. Therefore, the
cost of verifying this query can be reduced to only check the first component of the
response, and then check that all components of the response vector are equal. Thus,
this only requiresO(mn) field multiplications to verify. For a QAP of constant size and
degree, the overall computational cost of the verifier is dominated by O(mn + k) field
multiplications.
The communication complexity for the prover is O(mn) vectors of length k, as-
suming that the size of the QAP is constant. The computational complexity of the
prover is dominated by the cost of the Hadamard product proof which is equal to
O(mnk + kn log(n)). The efficiency of the proof system is summarised in Table 5.7.
Prover computation TPILC = O(kn log n + kmn) F×
Verifier computation TVILC = O(k + mn) F×
Prover communication t = O(mn) log |Fk|
Verifier communication CILC = O(log m) log |F|
Query complexity qc = 7
Round complexity µ = log m + 3
TABLE 5.7: Efficiency of the proof of knowledge for the RQAP relation,
in the case of batches of size mnk. F× stands for the cost of a single
field multiplication, F+ stands for the cost of a single field addition,
and log |F| for the size of a field element.
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5.5 ILC Proof for the Correct Execution of TinyRAM
In this section we combine the building-block proof introduced in the previous section
to construct a proof system for the correct execution of a TinyRAM program over the
ILC channel. We recall that we target programs performing intensive computation, for
which the execution time dominates both the program length and the memory usage,
i.e. T > L+M . In Section 5.3 we broke the relationRfieldTinyRAM (recalled next) down to
a number of sub-relations defined over a finite field F.
RfieldTinyRAM =

(pp, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗), (P, v, T,M),w) :
w := (Exe,Prog,Mem,EvenBits,Pow, pi)
(pp, (P, v, T,M),w) ∈ Rcheck
(pp, (T,M),w) ∈ Rmem
(pp,⊥,w) ∈ Rstep

The relation Rcheck checks that certain entries in the extended witness w contain pub-
licly known values included in the instance. This relation decomposes into five equal-
ity relations. The relationRmem checks the consistency of the memory throughout the
execution and it is decomposed into an unknown permutation relation, a bounded
lookup relation and a number of lookup and arithmetic constraints. Finally the rela-
tionRstep checks the execution of each TinyRAM instruction. This is decomposed into
several lookup and arithmetic constraints relations. Our strategy to prove that they
are all satisfied is to commit to the extended witness w using the ILC channel. Then,
we gather all the lookup relations and arithmetic constraints together and we give
proof for these, as well as for the equalities, permutation and bounded lookup.
To begin we describe how to arrange the extended witness into matrices, so that
they can be committed using the ILC. To facilitate the sub-proofs for arithmetic con-
straints, the witness is committed using a specific format. In addition to the above
relations, then we also need to check that the committed matrices are committed as
specified which is done by checking some additional relationRformat described below.
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5.5.1 Commitments to the Tables
In our proof system, the prover first commits to the extended witness w. The extended
witness includes the field elements in the execution table Exe, the memory table Mem,
the program table Prog, the auxiliary lookup tables EvenBits and Pow. The prover
arranges these tables in multiple matrices and commits to their rows using the ILC.
The prover arranges each column of the execution table in an ` × k matrix (such
as the T entries containing the time t, the T entries containing the program counter
pct, etc. are in the same matrix), and then she commits to each row of the resulting
matrices. Entries of Exe relative to the same TinyRAM state (i.e. entries to the same
row of the Exe) will be inserted in the same position across the different matrices.
Furthermore, in all these matrices the last entry of each column is duplicated in the
first entry of the next column. As an example, let us consider the first column of Exe
which contains field elements representing the time-steps of the execution. Without
loss of generality let T = (`− 1)k + 1, where T is the number of steps executed by the
program and k is the vector length of the ILC. The prover organizes the field elements
representing time in a matrix Et ∈ F`×k
Et =

1 ` 2`− 1 . . .
2 `+ 1 2` . . .
...
. . .
`− 1 2`− 2 3`− 3 . . . (`− 1)k
` 2`− 1 3`− 2 . . . T

Similarly, the prover organizes the rest of the Exe table into a constant number
of matrices Epc,Einst,EA, . . . one for each column. Let E be the matrix obtained by
stacking all matrices on top of each other and let E = {ei}, for ei ∈ Fk. The prover
commits to Exe by sending the command (commit,E) to the ILC.
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Each column of the program table is also committed to the ILC separately. In case
L ≤ k we can store each column of Prog in one vector, i.e.
P =

Ppc
Pinst
PA
. . .

=

0 1 . . . L− 1
inst0 inst1 . . . instL−1
A0 A1 . . . AL−1
. . . . . .

otherwise, multiple rows can be used. The prover commits the program table Prog by
sending (commit,P) to the ILC channel.
The memory table Mem, is arranged in matrix M in the following way.
M =

Maddr
Mv
Musd,0
Musd,1

=

0 1 . . . M − 1
v0 v1 . . . vM−1
0 0 . . . 0
1 1 . . . 1

The entries of the memory table are not committed twice for each value of the flag usd.
The reason we duplicated the memory in Section 5.2 is that in the bounded lookup
relation we must check that for each address addr, the entries associated with usd = 0
are accessed at most once. However in the proof we can parse the vectors and ar-
range them into sub-matrices without the need of recommitting to the rows. The
sub-matrices used in the bounded lookup proofs are M>, whose entries can only be
accessed once, and M⊥.
M> =

Maddr
Mv
Musd,0
 M⊥ =

Maddr
Mv
Musd,1

The prover commits the memory table Mem by sending (commit,M) to the ILC chan-
nel.
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The auxiliary lookup table EvenBits and the exponent table Pow can be committed
in a similar way using matrices R and S
R =

0 1 4 5 . . .
∑W
2
−1
i=0 ki2
2i
. . . ∑W
2
−1
i=0 2
2i
 S =
0 1 2 3 . . . W − 1 W
1 2 4 8
. . . 2W−1 0

where (kW
2
−1, . . . , k0) is the binary expansion of k. If any of the above tables have
rows that are shorter that k, these can be filled with zeros. These additional entries are
checked together with the correctness of the table by the relationRcheck. We also need
to ensure we use an odd/even-bits decomposition that allows to store |EvenBits|  T ,
for instance |EvenBits| = O(√T ). This can always be done by using a decomposition
into κ = O(1) words since W = O(log(n)).The prover commits the auxiliary lookup
tables EvenBits,Pow by sending (commit,R,S) to the ILC channel.
Format Relation. The reason we duplicate the last entry in each column of matrix E
is due to the way we check arithmetic constraints. This is done by using a QAP over
pairs of consecutive rows (in the execution table Exe) that correspond to entries in
consecutive rows in the sub-matrices of E. Since we batched k QAP together by using
vector coefficients, entries relative to the same QAP-assignment need to be in the same
component of the committed vectors. Therefore, the duplication of the last entries in
the columns allows to check the transition between consecutive states that would be
otherwise dislocated in different components of the committed vectors. On the other
hand, this introduces an additional consistency check for on the entries of the first and
last rows of matrices {Epc,Einst,EA, . . .} comprising E, as described by the following
relation.
Rformat =

(ppILC, u, w) := ((W,K,F, ∗),⊥,E) :
E := {Epc,Einst,EA, . . .}
∀ (t, j) ∈ {pc, inst, A, . . .} × [k − 1] : (Et)`,j = (Et)1,j+1

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Generally, these type of statements can be proven by showing that committed matrices
have entries that are shifted, which can be done similarly to a same-product relation4.
Let a, b be the two vectors that we want to check have shifted entries. The idea is for
the verifier to pick a challenge y ← F and let the prover weight entries of a and b
with shifted powers of y, e.g. (1, y, y2, . . . , ) and (y, y2, y3, . . .). Then, a same-product
proof can be used to check that product of the weighted entries in the vectors are the
same. We omit a description of the proof system (GILC,Pformat,Vformat) and refer to
[BCG+18] for the description of a proof for general shifts of committed matrices. The
proof system achieves the same features of the same-product proof: perfect complete-
ness, statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-line extraction and perfect
SHVZK. We remark that this statement involves only two vectors for each sub-matrix
of E, thus a constant number of vectors in total. The computational and communica-
tion costs for the relationRformat are stated in Table 5.8
Prover computation TPILC = O(k) F×
Verifier computation TVILC = O(k) F×
Prover communication t = O(1) log |Fk|
Verifier communication CILC = O(1) log |F|
Query complexity qc = 3
Round complexity µ = O(1)
TABLE 5.8: Efficiency of the proof of knowledge for theRformat relation.
F× stands for the cost of a single field multiplication, and log |F| for the
size of a field element.
5.5.2 Proof for the Correct TinyRAM Execution in the ILC Model
We are now in the position to describe the proof system for the correct execution of a
TinyRAM program over the ILC. Given the execution trace of the program, the prover
computes the extended witness w, arranges it into matrices E,P,M,R,S and commits
to them. Then she performs the following proofs
• A proof for the correct formatting of the matrices in E storing the execution table
Exe, i.e. for the relationRformat.
• Five equality proofs to check that public entries in the committed matrices E,P,M,R,
S are correct as described in the relationRcheck.
4To be more precise, the same-product relation proof of [BCG+17] is based on a proof for shift relations
of matrices.
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• A proof for an unknown permutation of collections of four sub-matrices of E as
described by the relationRcycle. In this proof we letA,B be the matrices obtained
by stacking the following matrices.
A := {Eτlink ,Eaddr,Evlink ,ES + EL} B := {Et,Eaddr,Evaddr ,ES + EL}
• A bounded lookup proof for the relation Rblookup. Namely, to check that entries
in E are contained in the lookup table formed by M> and M⊥, with entries in M>
restricted to at most one access. In this proof we let EM be the matrix obtained
by stacking the following matrices.
EM := {Eaddr,Evinit ,Eusd}
• A lookup proof for entries in E with respect to the lookup table P. This proof
checks the lookup conditions enclosed in the relation Rcons. In this proof we let
EP be the matrix obtained by stacking the following matrices.
EP := {Epc,Einst,EA,ES,EL,Esa ,Esb ,Esc ,Esd ,Esout ,Esch}
• A lookup proof for entries in E with respect to the lookup table R. This proof
checks the lookup conditions enclosed in the relationsRtime,Rlogic,Rarith,Rshift.
In this proof we let ER be the matrix obtained by stacking all the sub-matrices of
E on involved in range checks, i.e.
ER := {Eto ,Ete ,Eao ,Eae ,Ebo ,Ebe ,Eco ,Ece ,Edo ,Ede ,Eoo ,Eoe ,Eeo ,Eee . . .}
• A lookup proof for entries in E with respect to the lookup table S. This proof
checks the lookup conditions enclosed in the relation Rshift. In this proof we let
ES be the matrix obtained by stacking all the sub-matrices of E on involved in
lookups in table Pow, i.e.
ES := {Ea,Eapower}
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• A proof for the validity of (`−1)k assignments in E for the same quadratic arith-
metic program QAP. We let QAP check all the arithmetic constraints enclosed in
the relationsRload,Rtime,Rmux,Rinst,Rcons,Rlogic,Rarith,Rshift.
The prover and verifier for the relationRfieldTinyRAM are given in Figure 5.9.
PTinyRAM(ppILC, (P, v, T,M),w)
• w := (Exe,Prog,Mem,EvenBits,Pow, pi)
• Parse Exe,Prog,Mem,EvenBits,Pow as
E,P,M,R,S
ILC← • Send (commit,E,P,M,R,S) to the ILC
• Run Pcheck(ppILC, (P, v, T,M), (E,P,M,R, S))
• Run Pformat(ppILC,⊥,E)
• Run Pperm(ppILC, (`, 4), (A,B, pi))
• Run Pblookup(ppILC, (3`, 6Mk ), (EM, {M>,M⊥}))
• Run Plookup(ppILC, (O(`),O(Lk )), (EP,P))
• RunPlookup(ppILC, (O(`),O
( |EvenBits|
k
)
, (ER,R)))
• Run Plookup(ppILC, (`,O(1)), (ES,S))
• Run PQAP(ppILC,QAP,E)
VTinyRAM(ppILC, (P, v, T,M))
ILC→ ◦ Get message O(`) from the ILC
• Run Vcheck(ppILC, ((P, v, T,M), [E], [P], [M], [R], [S]))
• Run Vformat(ppILC,⊥, [E])
• Run Vperm(ppILC, (`, 4, [A], [B]))
• Run Vblookup(ppILC, (3`, 6Mk , [EM], {[M>], [M⊥]}))
• Run Vlookup(ppILC, (O(`),O
(
L
k
)
, [EP], [P]))
• Run Vlookup(ppILC, (O(`),O
( |EvenBits|
k
)
, [ER], [R]))
• Run Vlookup(ppILC, (`,O(1), [ES], [S]))
• Run VQAP(ppILC,QAP,E)
• If all sub-proofs accept return 1, else return 0
FIGURE 5.9: Proof of knowledge for the relation RfieldTinyRAM in the ILC
model
Theorem 5.5. (GILC,PTinyRAM,VTinyRAM) is a proof system forRfieldTinyRAM over the ILC chan-
nel with perfect completeness, statistical strong knowledge soundness with straight-line extrac-
tion, and perfect special honest-verifier zero-knowledge.
The properties of the proof system follow from the properties achieved by each of
the building-blocks used in the construction.
Efficiency. To model feasible computation, we allow the TinyRAM program to run
in a polynomial number of steps T = poly(λ) and use a polynomial number of words
of memory M = poly(λ). Assuming T,M ≥ λ, this means log T = Θ(log λ) and
logM = Θ(log λ). To address all the memory used by the program we therefore need
the word size to be at least W = Ω(log λ). To keep the circuit size of a processor
modest, it is reasonable to keep the word size low, so we will assume W = Θ(log λ).
Our proof system also works for larger word sizes but it is less efficient when the word
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size is superlogarithmic. Note that we can store register values in memory at the cost
of a constant factor overhead in computation and thus, without loss of generality, we
assume K = O(1). Our proof system is designed for a setting where the running time
is large, so we will assume T  L+M .
Let k the vector length of the ILC channel and let T = `k, so that the execution
table is arranged in ` rows of length k. Although here our main goal is to optimise
prover complexity, the optimal verification complexity is achieved when k ≈ ` ≈ √T .
In the next chapter, we will set the vector length in this way to also optimize the
communication complexity over the standard channel.
The round complexity of the proof system is equal to the maximum round com-
plexity of the sub-proofs, which is achieved by the unknown permutation proof count-
ing loglog(`) + 4 rounds. This round complexity is attained when all the Hadamard
product sub-proofs involved in the proof system are optimized for prover complexity,
i.e. for matrices consisting of O(`) rows then ` = mn and m = log(`). The query com-
plexity is constant since all the sub-proofs use a constant number of queries. The total
count is qc = 298.
Prover communication is dominated by the communication costs of the lookup
proofs, which amount to O(` + M+Lk log(`)) vectors in Fk. When all the product
subproofs used in the system are optimised towards prover computation, then also
the dominant computational cost for the prover is dominated asymptotically by the
lookup proofs. Overall, the cost is O(`k + (M + L) log(`k)) = O(T + (M + L) log(T ))
field multiplications. When the running time of the program dominates the both the
memory and the program length, then the computational cost for the prover is domi-
nated by a liner number (O(T )) of field multiplications.
The verifier communication is proportional to the round complexity of the system
and countsO(loglog(`)) field elements. The verifier complexity is dominated byO(L+
|v|) field additions, to check the encoding of the program table and initialisation of the
memory, and O(` + k) field multiplications, to verify all the remaining sub-proofs.
Therefore, when k = ` =
√
T , the verification cost is a sublinear number of field
multiplications, assuming that M,L <
√
T .
To give a more concrete figure on the computational overhead paid by the prover,
we can measure the above performances in terms of TinyRAM operations, using a
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TinyRAM machine with the same word size as used by the program in the instance. To
get negligible knowledge error we need the field to have superpolynomial size |F| =
λω(1). This means we need a superconstant ratio e = log |F|W = ω(1). On a TinyRAM
machine, field elements require e words to store and using school book arithmetic
field operations can be implemented in α = O(e2). Therefore, the running time of the
prover implemented in a TinyRAM program would terminate within O(αT ) steps,
where α is an arbitrarily small superconstant function α = ω(1).
The efficiency of the proof system for the execution of TinyRAM programs is given
in Table 5.9
Prover computation TPILC = O(T ) F×
Verifier computation TVILC = O(
√
T ) F×
Prover communication t = O(√T ) log |Fk|
Verifier communication CILC = O(loglog(T )) log |F|
Query complexity qc = 298
Round complexity µ = O(loglogT )
TABLE 5.9: Efficiency of the proof of knowledge for RfieldTinyRAM in the
ILC model. F× is the cost of a single field multiplication and log |F| the
size of a field element. The efficiency is reported in table is for ` =
√
T
and assuming that program length and memory are L,M = O(√T ).
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Chapter 6
Compiling ILC Proofs into Standard
Proofs and Arguments
In this chapter we show how to compile proofs of knowledge over the ILC channel into
proofs of knowledge over the standard channel. The compiler uses a linear error cor-
recting code and a commitment scheme to realise the functionality of the ILC channel
over the standard channel. If the commitment scheme is statistically binding, the com-
piled proof has statistical strong knowledge soundness. If the commitment scheme is
computationally binding, the compiled proof has computational strong knowledge
soundness.
In the compiled proof, the prover has to open linear combinations of some en-
coded vectors. To preserve zero knowledge we need to ensure that these openings
do not reveal any information about the witness. We achieve this by introducing a
new primitive that we call exposure-resilient encoding and apply it to the codewords
before revealing the openings.
We then apply the transformation to our proofs of Chapters 4 and 5 and we obtain
efficient proofs for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits and the for the correct execu-
tion of TinyRAM programs in the standard channel. We instantiate both proofs with
linear-time error correcting codes and linear-time commitments. In the case of cir-
cuit satisfiability, we obtain the first proof system achieving constant overhead for the
prover, optimal verification time and sublinear size proofs. In the case of TinyRAM ex-
ecution, we achieve the first proof system with (arbitrarily small) superconstant over-
head, sublinear verification time and sublinear size proofs.
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6.1 Exposure-Resilient Encodings
In the next section we encode messages, using a linear code, and then commit to them.
Later, we need to open parts of committed codewords to enable checks on relations
between encoded messages. At the same time, our aim is to perform these checks
without revealing anything about the encoded messages.
We achieve this by defining the notion of exposure-resilient encoding. Informally,
an exposure-resilient encoding of a function f(x) is a randomised function f˜(x; r) such
that, given f˜(x; r) it is possible to re-compute f(x), while revealing parts of f˜(x; r)
should perfectly hide f(x).
This primitive has similarities with other existing primitives. Exposure-resilient
functions introduced by Canetti et al. [CDH+00] are functions which are fed with ran-
dom inputs. Differently from our encodings, the entire output should look random,
even when part of the input is revealed. Applebaum et al. [AIK06] define randomised
encodings, for which the encoded output does not reveal anything about the input
other than the output of the function itself. On the one hand, we relax their definition
by only revealing part of the encoded output, while on the other, we strengthen it by
requiring to hide any information about the input, as well as the unrevealed parts of
the output. In [ISV+13], Ishai et al. introduced zero-knowledge codes, which achieve
a similar goal to our exposure-resilient codes. Their notion is used to describe codes
that natively achieve a good degree of exposure-resilience as described above. Dif-
ferently, we start from a code with nice properties, such as large minimum distance,
and we apply an encoding to make it exposure-resilient, while preserving its original
properties. As it turns out, a good encoding does not necessarily make a good code.
Thus, by following our formalisation, it will be easier to argue about the properties of
the resulting exposure-resilient encoding.
For v ∈ Fn and a set J = {j1, . . . , jk} ⊂ [n] with j1 < · · · < jk we recall that the
notation v|J stands for the vector (vj1 , . . . ,vjk). Similarly, for a matrix V ∈ Fm×n we
write V |J ∈ Fm×k for the sub-matrix of V restricted to the columns indicated in J .
Let c ∈ Fnq , and J ⊆ [n], we recall that the notation c|J indicates the projection of c
onto the coordinates in J .
Definition 6.1 (Exposure-Resilient Encoding). Let k, k′, n, n′ be positive integers and let
6.1. Exposure-Resilient Encodings 159
f : Fk → Fn be a function. For a subset J ⊆ [n′] we say that f˜ : Fk × Fk′ → Fn′ is a
J-Exposure-Resilient Encoding (ERE) of f if it is correct and exposure resilient.
• Correctness: There exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm D that on input
f˜(x; r) computes f(x).
• Exposure resilience: For any x ∈ Fk the distribution f˜(x; r)|J induced by a uniform
choice of r ← Fk′ is distributed uniformly over F|J |.
When f is the encoding function of a linear code C, then we say that the (mini-
mum) distance h˜dmin of f˜ is the minimum distance between f˜(x; r) and f˜(y; s) for any
distinct x,y ∈ Fk. We now show a simple randomised construction of an exposure-
resilient encoding of a linear error-correcting code which preserves its minimum dis-
tance.
Theorem 6.1. Let C be a [n, k, hdmin]F code with associated encoding function EC . Then, the
following function E˜C : Fk × Fn → F2n
E˜C(x; r) :=
(
EC(x) + r, r
)
is an J-ERE of EC for any J ⊆ [2n] satisfying {j ∈ J : j + n ∈ J} = ∅. Moreover, the
minimum distance of E˜C is h˜dmin = hdmin.
Proof. The above construction is clearly correct as it is possible to efficiently re-compute
EC(x) from E˜C(x; r) = (EC(x) + r, r).
The encoding is also exposure resilient. Let J1 = J ∩ [n] and J2 = J \ J1. Then
E˜C(x; r)|J1 = EC(x)|J1 +r|J1 = EC(x)|J1 +E˜C(x; r)|J1+n. Since {j ∈ J : i+n ∈ J} = ∅,
no j ∈ J1 can satisfy j + n ∈ J2. Given r|J1 uniformly distributed on F|J1| indepen-
dently from r|J2 , then E˜C(x; r)|J1 is also distributed uniformly and independently
from E˜C(x; r)|J2 . By construction, E˜C(x; r)|J2 is uniformly distributed, so E˜C(x; r)|J
is uniformly distributed.
By the linearity of E˜C , the minimum distance of E˜C it is equal to the minimum
Hamming weight of E˜C(x; r) for x 6= 0. Note that for any j ∈ [n] for which r|{j} is
non-zero, at least one of E˜C(x; r)|{j} and E˜C(x; r)|{j+n} is non-zero. Therefore, for any
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x 6= 0 and any r, the following holds
wt(E˜C(x; r)) ≥ wt(E˜C(x;0)) = wt(EC(x)) ≥ hdmin
We note that if the original code C admits a linear time encoding function EC , then
E˜C is also computable in linear time.
Corollary 6.1. Let E˜C be a J-ERE constructed as in Theorem 6.1 for J ⊆ [2n] satisfying
{j ∈ J : i + n ∈ J} = ∅. There exists a linear time simulator S that given as input x ∈ Fk,
and y ∈ F|J | returns r ∈ Fn such that the output distribution of r ← S(x,y) is uniform in
Fn, conditioned on E˜C(x; r)|J = y.
Proof. Let J1 := J∩[n] and J2 := J\J1. The simulator S(x,y) simply sets r|J1 := y|J1−
EC(x)|J1 and r|j2−n := y|j2 for all j2 ∈ J2 and then picks the rjs for the remaining
n− |J | values of j uniformly and independently from F.
The above notion of exposure-resilience is also related to the privacy property of
secret sharing schemes. It is well known that linear secret sharing schemes can be
constructed from linear codes [Mas95; CCG+07; CDD+15]. In the next sections, we
could just as well replace the use of our ERE with a linear-time linear secret sharing
scheme. In fact, our ERE can even be seen as a 1-private linear secret sharing scheme.
Even though it does not make a good secret sharing scheme, it turns out to be enough
for our purposes. Moreover, our ERE results in a more efficient instantiation than
using known linear-time linear secret sharing schemes [DI14; CDD+15], which use
linear universal hash functions.
6.2 From the ILC Channel to the Standard Channel
In this section, we present our compiler to realise the ILC channel over standard com-
munication channel. Recall that in the ILC channel the prover commit to vectors of
length k by submitting them to the channel and the verifier can then query the ILC to
open linear combinations of the committed vectors.
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The idea behind the compilation of an ILC proof is that, instead of committing
to vectors V = {vi}ti=1 using the ILC, the prover first encodes each vector vi in V as
EC(vi) using a linear error-correcting codeEC . In any given round, we can think of the
codewords as rows EC(vi) in a matrix EC(V ). Then, instead of committing to the rows
of the matrix, the prover commits to the columns of EC(V ) using a non-interactive
commitment scheme and sends the commitments to the verifier. When the verifier
wants to open a linear combination of the original vectors, he sends the coefficients
q = (q1, . . . , qt) to the prover, who responds with the linear combination v′ = qV .
To ensure the prover is not returning a wrong response v′, the verifier performs spot
checks on the encoded response EC(v′) and the committed codewords in the rows
EC(V ). The verifier may request a random j-th entry of each committed codeword
EC(vi), corresponding to the j-th column of the error-corrected matrix EC(V ). Since
the code EC is linear, the revealed elements should satisfy
EC(v′)|j =
t∑
i=1
qiEC(vi)|j = qEC(V )|j
The verifier repeats this check on multiple columns, so that if the code has sufficiently
large minimum distance and the prover gives a wrong response v′, then he has high
probability to catch at least one column j where the above equality does not hold.
Revealing entries in a codeword may leak information about the encoded vector.
To get SHVZK, instead of directly committing to the codewords of EC , we commit to
the output of the exposure-resilient encoding E˜C we constructed in Theorem 6.1. This
doubles the length of the rows of the committed matrix but ensures that then nothing
is revealed about the encoded messages, as long as the prover only opens a set J for
which E˜C is a J-ERE. The spot checking technique using E˜C is illustrated in Figure
6.1. In the following, we write ei for the encoding of vector vi and E for the encoding
of the matrix V using the ERE, i.e.
ei := E˜C(vi; ri) = (EC(vi) + ri, ri) E := E˜C(V ;R) = (EC(V ) +R,R)
In addition to the above, the verifier queries the prover on a random linear combina-
tion γ ∈ Ft and spot checks the response as for the previous queries. This is to ensure
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V =
 v0...
vt
 E˜C−−−→ E =
 EC(v0) + r0 r0... ...
EC(vt) + rt rt

q
y qy
j1
. . . q
y
jλ
q
y
jλ+1
. . . q
y
j2λ
qV =
(
v′
) E˜C−−−→ ( EC(v′) + r′ r′ )
FIGURE 6.1: Vectors vi organised in matrix V are encoded row-wise as
matrix E = E˜C(V ;R). The vertical line in the right matrix and vector
denotes concatenation of matrices. The prover commits to each column
of E. On query q he answers with v′ = qV and r′ = qR. The verifier
asks for openings to a set of columns J = {j1, . . . , j2λ} in E and checks
their consistency with E˜C(v′; r′).
that if the prover commits to some vectors ei that are far from being codewords, the
verifier then has high probability to detect some errors. The linear combination q
queried by the ILC verifier does not necessarily suffice to ensure this, since in gen-
eral the query is not chosen uniformly at random. One could, for instance, imagine
that there was a vector vi that was never queried in a non-trivial way, and hence the
prover could choose it to be far from a codeword. To make sure this extra challenge γ
does not reveal information to the verifier, the prover picks a random blinding vector
v0 ← Fk, which is added as the first row of V and will be added to the challenge linear
combination γ queried by the verifier. This is similar to what is used in some of the
ILC proofs in the previous chapters, e.g. the Hadamard product sub-proof of Section
4.2.3, to guarantee that the ILC responses to the opening queries made by the verifier
did not reveal any information about the committed vectors.
6.2.1 The Compiler
Let (GILC,PILC,VILC) be a non-adaptive µ-round SHVZK proof system over the ILC for a
relation R. Recall that non-adaptive means that the verifier waits until the last round
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to query linear combinations and that these are queried all at once instead of the de-
pending on each other response.1 All the ILC proofs presented in the previous chap-
ters are non-adaptive. Let GenEC be a generator that, given as input the description
of a finite field F and a length parameter k, it outputs a [n, k, hdmin]F code C with
constant rate and linear minimum distance, i.e. n = Θ(k) and hdmin = Θ(k). Let
E˜C be the exposure-resilient encoding of C as constructed in Theorem 6.1. Finally, let
(CSetup,CCommit) be a non-interactive commitment scheme.
We now give our proof system (G,P,V) for the relationR over the standard chan-
nel. The prover starts by invokingPILC on input the instance and the witness, to obtain
vectors {vi}t1i=1 to commit. Let these vectors be arranged in matrix V1. The prover en-
codes the rows of these matrices to obtain matrix E1 = E˜C(V1;R1). In addition to
these, the prover picks a random vector v0 ← Fk and encodes it to obtain e0. The
prover then commits to the columns of matrix E01 :=
e0
E1
. We overload the nota-
tion and write c1 ← CCommit(E01; s1) for the process of committing independently
each column vector E01|i using randomness s1|i. The prover forwards the commit-
ments to the verifier and terminates her move. The verifier invokes VILC to generate a
first message x1 and forwards it to the prover.
The following rounds of the proof unfolds similarly to the first one: the prover
invokes PILC to produce a matrix Vi ∈ Fti×k, she encodes its rows and then commits to
the columns of the encoded matrix Ei. Upon receipt of the commitments, the verifier
replies with a challenge produced by the internal VILC. Given matrices V1, . . . , Vµ,
R1, . . . , Rµ and E1, . . . , Eµ we define
V =

V1
...
Vµ
 R =

R1
...
Rµ
 E =

E1
...
Eµ

In the last move of the ILC proof system the verifier produces a query Q ∈ Fqc×t
for the ILC. The verifier forwards the query to the prover, together with a random
challenge γ ← Ft, where t is the number of rows in V,R and E. The prover answers
1The construction can be easily modified to an adaptive ILC proof. For each round of queries in the
ILC proof, there will one extra round in the compiled proof.
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the queries γ, Q by computing the following linear combinations
v′ = v0 + γV r′ = r0 + γR V ′ = QV R′ = QR
Lastly, the verifier picks at random a set J ⊆ [2n] of 2λ columns such that {j ∈ J :
j + n ∈ J} = ∅ and |J ∩ [n]| = λ. We refer to a set with these properties as admissible.
The verifier challenges the prover to open the commitments indexed by J sent in ev-
ery round of the proof. The verifier checks all the openings to the commitments and
then checks the consistency of these with the J-entries of the encodings of (v′, r′) and
(V ′, R′), i.e.
E˜C(v′; r′)|J = e0|J + γE|J E˜C(V ′;R′)|J = QE|J
If all the checks pass, the verifier returns the response of the internal VILC on input the
opening query Q, otherwise he returns 0. The full description of the compiled proof
system (G,P,V) is given in Figure 6.2
6.2.2 Security Analysis
Here we show that if (GILC,PILC,VILC) is a proof of knowledge with straight-line extrac-
tion for the relationR over the ILC, then the compiled proof (G,P,V) of Figure 6.2 is a
proof of knowledge without straight-line extraction for the same relation over the stan-
dard channel. Assuming the commitment scheme is statistically binding and compu-
tationally hiding the compiled proof achieves statistical strong knowledge soundness
and computational SHVZK. If the commitment scheme is computationally binding
and statistically hiding, the output of the compilation is an argument of knowledge
with computational strong knowledge soundness and statistical SHVZK.
Theorem 6.2 (Completeness). If the proof system (GILC,PILC,VILC) for the relation R over
the ILC is perfectly complete, then the proof system (G,P,V) in Figure 6.2 is perfectly complete
for the same relationR.
Proof. Given the correct openings to the commitments indexed by J , the verifier’s spot
checks on succeed with probability 1. Since the error correcting code C is linear, then
the exposure-resilient encoding of Theorem 6.1 is also linear. By the linearity of the
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P(pp, u, w)
• Parse input:
– Parse pp = (ppILC, EC , ck)
– Parse ppILC = (F, k, ∗)
– Get n from EC
• Round 1:
– v0, r0 ← Fk
– e0 ← E˜C(v0; r0)
– (commit, V1)← PILC(ppILC, u, w)
– R1 ← Ft1×k
– E1 ← E˜C(V1;R1)
– E01 :=
(
e0
E1
)
– c1 ← CCommit(E01; s1)
– Send (c1, t1) to the V
• Rounds 2 ≤ i ≤ µ:
◦ Get challenge xi−1 from the V
– (commit, Vi)← PILC(xi−1)
– Ri ← Fti×k
– Ei ← E˜C(Vi;Ri)
– ci ← CCommit(Ei; si)
– Send (ci, ti) to the V
• Round µ+ 1:
◦ Get (γ, Q) from the V
– v′ ← v0 + γV
– r′ ← r0 + γR
– V ′ ← QV
– R′ ← QR
– Send (v′, r′, V ′, R′) to the V
• Round µ+ 2:
◦ Get J from the V
– Send (E01|J , s1|J , . . . , Eµ, sµ|J) to V
G(1λ)
• ppILC ← GILC(1λ)
• Parse ppILC := (F, k, ∗)
• EC ← GenEC(F, k)
• ck ← CSetup(1λ)
• Return pp = (ppILC, EC , ck)
V(pp, u)
• Parse input
– Parse pp = (ppILC, EC , ck)
– Parse ppILC = (F, k, ∗)
– Get n from EC
– Give input (ppILC, u) to the VILC
• Rounds 1 ≤ i < µ:
– Receive (ci, ti)
– (send, xi)← VILC(ti)
– Send xi to the P
• Round µ:
◦ Get message (cµ, tµ) from the P
– t :=
∑µ
i=1 ti
– γ ← Ft
– (open, Q)← VILC(tµ)
– Send (γ, Q) to the P
• Round µ+ 1:
◦ Get (v′, r′, V ′, R′) from the P
– Pick admissible J ⊂ [2n]
– Send J to the P
• Round µ+ 2:
◦ Get (E01|J , s1|J , . . . , Eµ, sµ|J)
– Check:
? E˜C(v′; r′)|J = e0|J + γE|J
? E˜C(V ′;R′)|J = QE|J
? c1|J = CCommit(E01|J ; s1|J)
? . . .
? cµ|J = CCommit(Eµ|J ; sµ|J)
– If any check fails return 0
– Return b← VILC(V ′)
FIGURE 6.2: Construction of (G,P,V) from (GILC,PILC,VILC), commit-
ment scheme (CSetup,CCommit) and error correcting code C.
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ERE then both E˜C(v′; r′) = e0 + γE and E˜C(V ′;R′) = QE hold with probability 1. If
(pp, u, w) ∈ R then (ppILC, u, w) ∈ R. By the completeness of ILC proof, the internal
verifier VILC accepts with probability 1 and so does verifier V .
Theorem 6.3 (Knowledge Soundness). If (GILC,PILC,VILC) is a proof system for the rela-
tionR over the ILC with statistically strong knowledge soundness with a straight-line extrac-
tion, and (CSetup,CCommit) is computationally (statistically) binding, then the proof system
(G,P,V) in Figure 6.2 has computational (statistical) strong knowledge soundness for the
same relationR.
Proof. We prove the computational case, the statistical case follows similarly.
In order to argue that (G,P,V) is computationally knowledge sound, we will first
show that for every DPT P∗ there exists a deterministic (but not necessarily efficient)
P∗ILC convincing the verifier over the ILC with (almost) the same probability of P∗ over
the standard channel. Namely, that for every DPT P∗ there exists P∗ILC such that for all
PPT A
Pr

pp← G(1λ); pp = (ppILC, ∗); (u, s)← A(pp);
(tranP∗ ; b)← 〈P∗(s)←→ V(pp, u; (ρILC, ρ))〉;
(tranP∗ILC ; bILC)← 〈P∗ILC(u, pp; s)
ILC←→ VILC(ppILC, u; ρILC)〉:
b = 1 ∧ bILC = 0

≈ 0 (6.1)
where ρILC is the randomness the verifier V gives in input to the internal verifier VILC.
Next, we will define an expected PPT transcript extractor Etran that given access to a
rewindable oracle 〈P∗(u, pp; s)←→ V(pp, u; (ρILC, ρ))〉 outputs a view t˜ranP∗ILC follow-
ing the same distribution of a real communication transcript between P∗ILC and the ILC
channel in the execution of 〈P∗ILC(s, pp, u)
ILC←→ VILC(ppILC, u; ρILC)〉. Formally, we will
show there exists an expected PPT Etran such that for all PPT A
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Pr

pp← G(1λ); pp = (ppILC, ∗); (u, s)← A(pp);
t˜ranP∗ILC ← E
〈P∗(pp,u;s)←→V(pp,u)〉
tran (pp, u);
(tranP∗ILC ; bILC)← 〈P∗ILC(pp, u; s)
ILC←→ VILC(ppILC, u; ρILC)〉:
b = 1 ∧ tranP∗ILC 6= t˜ranP∗ILC

≈ 0 (6.2)
where b is the output of V on the first execution of the oracle and ρILC given to VILC
is the randomness used by the internal copy of V on the first execution of the oracle.
Note that if (6.1) holds and b = 1, then with overwhelming probability bILC = 1.
Assuming for a moment that both (6.1) and 6.2 hold we describe the knowledge
extractor E for (G,P,V) over the standard channel. The knowledge extractor E runs
the transcript extractor Etran and answers to the oracle queries of Etran with its own
oracle. Eventually, E obtains a transcript t˜ranP∗ILC from Etran. Since the ILC proof system
has straight-line extractability, E then executes the ILC knowledge extractor on input
t˜ranP∗ILC and receives a witness w˜ ← EILC(ppILC, u, t˜ranP∗ILC). Assuming (6.2), the out-
put distribution of Etran is identically distributed to a real communication transcript
between P∗ILC and the ILC, and thus w˜ is distributed as the output of EILC in its own
knowledge soundness game. Assuming (6.1), if b = 1 then with overwhelming prob-
ability also bILC = 1. By the strong knowledge soundness of (GILC,PILC,VILC) there is
a negligible probability that (pp, u, w˜) /∈ R ∧ bILC = 1, hence (G,P,V) is also strong
knowledge sound.
To conclude the proof it is sufficient to show the existence of P∗ILC and Etran satis-
fying both (6.1) and (6.2), which we show, respectively, in Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2
below.
Lemma 6.1. If the commitment scheme (CSetup,CCommit) is computationally binding, then
for every DPT P∗ there exists P∗ILC such that for all PPT A
Pr

pp← G(1λ); pp = (ppILC, ∗); (u, s)← A(pp);
(tranP∗ ; b)← 〈P∗(s)←→ V(pp, u; (ρILC, ρ))〉;
(tranP∗ILC ; bILC)← 〈P∗ILC(u, pp; s)
ILC←→ VILC(ppILC, u; ρILC)〉:
b = 1 ∧ bILC = 0

≈ 0 (6.1)
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Proof. Our constructed P∗ILC runs an internal copy of P∗. Recall that we do not re-
strict P∗ILC to run in polynomial time, this is sufficient since the proof system over
the ILC achieves statistical strong knowledge soundness. When the internal P∗ in
round i sends a message (ci, ti), P∗ILC simulates P∗ on every possible continuation
of the transcript, to obtain the most frequently occurring valid opening ((Ei)|j , (si)|j)
of (ci)|j for each j = 1, . . . , 2n. P∗ILC then uses these openings to form matrices E∗i .
For each row e∗` of these matrices, P∗ILC finds a vector v` and randomness r` such that
hd(E˜C(v`, r`), e∗` ) <
hdmin
3 if such a vector exists. If for some 1 ≤ ` ≤ ti no such vector
v` exists, then P∗ILC aborts. Otherwise we let Vi and Ri denote the matrices formed
by the row vectors v` and r` in round i and P∗ILC sends Vi to the ILC. Notice that by
Theorem 6.1 the minimum distance of E˜C is at least hdmin, so there is at most one such
vector v` for each e∗` . The prover P∗ILC proceeds in the same way for all the µ rounds in
which the internal prover P∗ sends commitments to the verifier and then terminates.
Notice that the VILC communicates over the ILC with our constructed P∗ILC and at the
end he queries a challenge Q to the ILC, for which he receives V ′ = QV from the ILC.
Next, we show that if P∗ makes the verifier V accept, then with overwhelming
probability VILC interacting with our P∗ILC described above will also accept. Since the
verifier V only accepts if its internal copy of VILC accepts, there are only three ways
we could have 〈P∗(pp, u; s) ←→ V(pp, u; (ρILC, ρ))〉 accept without 〈P∗ILC(pp, u; s)
ILC←→
VILC(ppILC, u; ρILC)〉 being also accepting
1. If P∗ makes an opening to a commitment that is not its most frequent opening
for that commitment.
2. If P∗ILC aborts because for some ` there is no v`, r` such that
hd(E˜C(v`, r`), e∗` ) <
hdmin
3
3. If P∗’s response to the verifier’s queries contains a matrix V ∗ 6= V ′ .
We will now argue that there is a negligible probability for V to accept in case each of
the above events happen.
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Case 1. The verifier V only accepts if the openings to the commitments indexed by
the challenge set J are all valid. Since P∗ runs in polynomial time and the commit-
ment scheme is computationally binding, there is only negligible probability that P∗
sends valid openings for some of the commitments in J that are not the most frequent.
Therefore there is only a negligible probability of V accepting in this case.
Case 2. On query (γ, Q), the prover P∗ answers with response (v∗, r∗, V ∗, R∗). In
this case we show that if matrix E∗ contains row e∗` that are not close to a codeword
E˜C(v`; r`) for some v`, r`, then with overwhelming probability (e∗0 + γE∗) is also far
from E˜C(v∗; r∗), and therefore the verifier V is likely to reject the proof.
Namely, we show that if there exist a linear combination qE∗ for some q ∈ Ft such
that hd
(
C˜, qE∗
)
≥ hdmin3 , then the probability that hd(C˜, e∗0 + γE∗) < hdmin6 is at most
1
|F| . This also implies the above claim about all row vectors in E
∗.
Assume that hd
(
C˜, qE∗
)
≥ hdmin3 , then for any r ∈ F∗ we have
hd
(
C˜, e∗0 + γE∗
)
+ hd
(
C˜, e∗0 + (γ + rq)E∗
)
≥ hd
(
C˜, qE∗
)
≥ hdmin
3
To see this, write e∗0 + γE∗ = c1 + d1 and e∗0 + (γ + rq)E∗ = c2 + d2 with c1, c2 ∈ C˜
and wt(d1) = hd
(
C˜, e∗0 + γE∗
)
,wt(d2) = hd
(
C˜, e∗0 + (γ + rq)E∗
)
. Now
qE∗ =(e∗0 + (γ + rq)E
∗ − (e∗0 + γE∗))r−1
=(c2 + d2 − c1 − d1)r−1
=(c2 − c1)r−1 + (d2 − d1)r−1
Where (c2 − c1)r−1 ∈ C˜ and (d2 − d1)r−1 has at most
wt(d1) + wt(d2) = hd
(
C˜, e∗0 + γE∗
)
+ hd
(
C˜, e∗0 + (γ + rq)E∗
)
non-zero elements. This implies that at most one of e∗0 + γE∗ and e∗0 + (γ + rq)E∗ can
have distance less than hdmin6 to C˜. That is, there is at most one γ ∈ Ft in {(γ + rq) :
r ∈ F} that can have distance less than hdmin6 to C˜. Hence, there is probability at most
1
|F| that a random γ ∈ Ft satisfies hd
(
C˜, e∗0 + γE∗
)
< hdmin6 .
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Therefore with overwhelming probability we have that
hd(E˜C(v∗; r∗), e∗0 + γE) ≥
hdmin
6
This means that either in the first half of the codeword E˜C(v∗; r∗) or in the second half,
there will be at least hdmin12 values of j where it differs from e
∗
0 + γE
∗. It is easy to see
that the λ values of J in one half of [2n] are chosen uniformly and independently at
random conditioned on being different. Since the minimum distance of the code is
linear, then the verifier has only negligible probability of missing an index where the
above words disagree. Hence, the verifier V will reject the proof with overwhelming
probability.
Case 3. We recall that on query (γ, Q), the prover P∗ answers with (v∗, r∗, V ∗, R∗).
From the previous claim we have that P∗ILC does not abort and constructs matrix V
which is sent to the ILC. The ILC channel answers the query Q from VILC with matrix
V ′ = QV . For the last case we show that if P∗ answers the query with a matrix
V ∗ 6= V ′, then QE∗ is not close to the codeword E˜C(V ∗;R∗) and the verifier is likely to
reject the proof when checking these two on indexes in J .
From the previous case, we have that for all q ∈ Ft, we have hd(C˜, qE∗) < hdmin3 ,
otherwise the verifier rejects with high probability. Assuming this, here we show that
exists r∗ for which
hd(E˜C(qV ; r∗), qE∗) <
hdmin
3
We prove this by induction on the number of non-zero elements wt(q) in q. This is
trivially true for wt(q) = 0. For wt(q) = 1 it follows from our definitions of vectors v`
which are chosen by P∗ILC such that hd(E˜C(v`, r`), e∗` ) < hdmin3 . Assume by induction
that it is true for all vectors in Ft of hamming weight less or equal κ and consider a
vector q with wt(q) ≤ 2κ. We can now write q = q′ + q′′ where wt(q′),wt(q′′) ≤ κ. By
the induction hypothesis, there exists r′ such that hd(E˜C(q′V ; r′), q′E∗) < hdmin3 and
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similar for q′′. Since q = q′ + q′′ this implies
hd
(
E˜C
(
qV ; r′ + r′′
)
, qE∗
)
= hd
(
E˜C
(
(q′ + q′′)V, r′ + r′′
)
, (q′ + q′′)E∗
)
≤ hd
(
E˜C
(
q′V ; r′
)
, q′E∗
)
+ hd
(
E˜C
(
q′′V ; r′′
)
, q′′E∗
)
< 2
hdmin
3
From the previous case we know there exists v and r such that hd(E˜C(v; r), qE∗) <
hdmin
3 . By the triangle inequality for Hamming distance, this implies
hd
(
E˜C (v; r) , E˜C
(
qV ; r′ + r′′
))
≤ hd
(
E˜C (v; r) , qE∗
)
+ hd
(
qE∗, E˜C
(
qV ; r′ + r′′
))
<
hdmin
3
+ 2
hdmin
3
= hdmin
Since hdmin is the minimum distance of E˜C , we must have v = qV , and therefore
hd(E˜C(qV ; r), qE∗) < hdmin3 . This concludes the induction argument.
The triangle inequality for Hamming distance shows that for any (v∗, r∗) with
v∗ 6= qV we have hd(E˜C(v∗; r∗), qE∗) ≥ 2hdmin3 . Now for any V ∗ 6= V ′ = QV
there is a row ` where the two matrices differ. Let q be the `-th row of Q. Then
hd(E˜C(v∗; r∗), qE∗) ≥ 2hdmin3 tells us that the `-th row of E˜C(V ∗, R∗) and `-th row of
QE∗ differs in at least 2hdmin3 positions.
Given that the minimum distance of the code is linear in n, if the distance between
two strings of length 2n is at least 2hdmin3 , then there is negligible probability that J
will not contain a j such that the two strings differ in position j. Thus, the probability
that P∗ sends a matrix V ∗ 6= V ′ and E˜C (V ∗, R∗) |J = QE∗|J is negligible.
Altogether, the three cases show that the probability that V accepts while VILC re-
jects is negligible.
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Lemma 6.2. Let P∗ILC be defined as in the proof of Lemma 6.1. There exists an expected PPT
Etran such that for all PPT A
Pr

pp← G(1λ); pp = (ppILC, ∗); (u, s)← A(pp);
t˜ranP∗ILC ← E
〈P∗(pp,u;s)←→V(pp,u)〉
tran (pp, u);
(tranP∗ILC ; bILC)← 〈P∗ILC(pp, u; s)
ILC←→ VILC(ppILC, u; ρILC)〉:
b = 1 ∧ tranP∗ILC 6= t˜ranP∗ILC

≈ 0 (6.2)
Proof. On input (pp, u), the transcript extractor Etran first uses its oracle to get a tran-
script of 〈P∗(pp, u; s) ←→ V(pp, u)〉. If V rejects, then Etran aborts. If V accepts, Etran
rewinds the last message of P∗ to get a transcript for a new random challenge J . Etran
continues in this way until it has an accepting transcript for 2n independently chosen
sets J . If there is only one choice of J that results in V accepting, P∗ will likely have
received each allowed challenge around 2n times and Etran will get the exact same
transcript 2n times before it is done rewinding. Still, Etran runs in expected polyno-
mial time: if a fraction p of all allowed sets J give accepting transcripts, the expected
number of rewindings is 2n−1p , given that the first transcript is accepting. However, the
probability that the first run accepts is p, and if it does not accept, Etran does not do any
rewindings. Overall this gives (2n−1)pp = 2n− 1 rewindings in expectation.
We let J1, . . . , J2n denote the set of challenges J in the accepting transcripts ob-
tained by Etran. If
⋃2n
i=1 Ji has less than 2n − hdmin3 elements, Etran terminates. Other-
wise, Etran is defined similarly to P∗ILC: it uses the values of the openings to get at least
2n − hdmin3 columns of each Ei. For each of the row vectors, e`, it computes v` and r`
such that E˜C(v`, r`) agrees with e` in all entries e`|j for which the j’th column have
been revealed, if such v exists. Since Etran will not correct any errors, finding such v`
and r` corresponds to solving a linear set of equations. Notice that since the minimum
distance is more than 2hdmin3 there is at most one such v` for each ` ∈ [t]. If for some
` there is no such v`, then Etran aborts, otherwise Etran uses the resulting vectors v` as
the prover messages to define t˜ranP∗ILC .
If |⋃κi=1 Ji| < 2n − hdmin3 , there are at least hdmin6 indexes in [n] \⋃κi=1 Ji or in {n +
1, . . . , 2n} \ ⋃κi=1 Ji. In either case, a random allowed J has negligible probability of
being contained in
⋃κ
i=1 Ji. Since Etran runs in expected polynomial time, this implies
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by induction that there is only negligible probability that |⋃κi=1 Ji| < min(κ, 2n− hdmin3 )
and therefore |⋃2ni=1 Ji| < 2n− hdmin3 .
Finally, we need to show there is at most negligible probability that for some `
there are no v` and r` such that E˜C(v`, r`) agrees with e` on all the opened j ∈
⋃2n
i=1 Ji
columns and that b = 1. In particular, this shows that the probability that b = 1 and
Etran does not extract the transcript of P∗ILC is negligible.
Since the expected number of rewindings is polynomial, we can assume that in all
the rewindings, P∗ only makes openings to the most frequent openings. Note that if
this is not the case, after sufficiently many rewindings the extractor also observes the
most frequent openings and can thus break the binding property of the commitment
scheme. In Lemma 6.1 we showed that the probability that b = 1 but P∗ sends a
V ∗ 6= V ′ is negligible and by following the same argument, the probability that b = 1
but P∗ sends v∗ 6= v′ is negligible. Therefore, in the following we will assume v∗ = v′.
Now suppose that there is some e` such that the opened values are inconsistent
with E˜C(v`, r`) for any r`. That is, there is some j such that j, n + j ∈
⋃2n
i=1 Ji and
e`|j − e`|n+j 6= EC(v)|j . For uniformly chosen γ` ∈ F, we get that γ`(e`|j − e`|n+j −
EC(v)|j) is uniformly distributed in F. Hence for a random γ ∈ Ft, we have that
γ(E|j −E|n+j −EC(v)|j) is uniformly distributed. When V queries γ, P∗ will respond
with v∗ = v′ and some r∗. V will only accept on a challenge J if for all j ∈ J we have
(e0 + γE)|j = E˜C(v′, r∗)|j . Since j, n+ j ∈
⋃2n
i=1 Ji we have (e0 + γE)|j = E˜C(v′, r∗)|j
and (e0 + γE)|n+j = E˜C(v′, r∗)|n+j . Consider the following
e0|j − e0|n+j + γE|j − γE|n+j =E˜C(v′, r∗)|j − E˜C(v′, r∗)|n+j
=EC(v′)|j
=(EC(v0) + γEC(v))|j
By rearranging the two sides of the first and the last term we have
γE|j − γE|n+j − γEC(v)j = EC(v0)j − (e0)j + (e0)n+j
For random γ the left-hand side is uniform and the right-hand side is fixed, hence
equality only happens with negligible probability. This concludes the proof of the
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lemma and of Theorem 6.3. .
Theorem 6.4 (SHVZK). If (GILC,PILC,VILC) is a public coin proof system for the relation R
over the ILC with perfect SHVZK and (CSetup,CCommit) is computationally (statistically)
hiding then the public coin proof system (G,P,V) of Figure 6.2 is computationally (statisti-
cally) SHVZK.
Proof. To prove SHVZK, we describe the simulator S(pp, u, ρ) that produces a simu-
lated view, which is indistinguishable from the real view of the honest verifier V .
Given the randomness ρ, the simulator learns both the messages and the queries
ρILC = (x1, . . . , xµ−1, Q) produced by the internal VILC and forwarded by the honest
V . S can therefore run SILC(ppILC, u, ρILC) to simulate the view of the internal VILC.
This gives it (t1, . . . , tµ, V ′). By the SHVZK property of (GILC,PILC,VILC) this simulated
transcript is identically distributed to the real view of the internal VILC. The simulator
SILC returns a simulated query response V ′ as part of the simulated transcript.
Then, S reads the rest of ρ to also learn the challenges γ and J that V sends to
the prover. The simulator picks uniformly at random v′ ← Fk. In a real proof v0
is chosen uniformly at random, therefore the simulated v′ is identically distributed
as in a real proof. Since the verifier is honest, the set J is an admissible set and the
exposure resilience of E˜C guarantees that E01|J , . . . , Eµ|J are distributed uniformly at
random, assuming the randomness used in each execution of E˜C is sampled uniformly
and independently at random, as done in a real execution of the proof. Therefore, the
simulator also picks this part of the transcript uniformly at random. Given these, the
simulator computes both e0|J+γE|J andQE|J . The simulator S then invokes the sim-
ulator described in Corollary 6.1. Given an admissible set J and inputs v′, e0|J +γE|J
(resp. V ′, QE|J ), this returns randomness r′ (resp. R′) that is uniformly distributed
conditioned on satisfying E˜C(v′; r′)|j = e0|J + γE|J (resp. E˜C(V ′;R′)|j = QE|J ). This
part of the transcript is identically distributed as in a real proof.
Finally, S defines E01|J¯ , . . . , Eµ|J¯ to be 0 matrices for J¯ = [2n] \ J . It then picks
s1, . . . , sµ at random and makes the commitments c1, . . . , cµ as in the protocol. We
see that all the ci|J commitments are computed as in the real execution from values
that are identically distributed as in a real proof. The ci|J¯ are commitments to dif-
ferent values than in a real proof. However, by the computational (statistical) hiding
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property of the commitment scheme, they have a distribution that is computationally
(statistically) indistinguishable from the correct distribution. Overall, the simulated
view produced by the S is computationally (statistically) indistinguishable from the
real view of the honest verifier.
6.3 Efficiency and Instantiations
Here we report the general efficiency of a compiled proof of knowledge and then dis-
cuss the cases of our ILC proofs for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits and for the
execution of TinyRAM programs from Chapter 4 and 5. We recall that the only require-
ment of our compiler is that the error correcting code has to be linear, with constant
rate, and linear minimum distance. The commitment scheme does not require any ad-
ditional properties other than the standard notion of hiding and binding. Therefore,
any combination of error correcting codes and commitments with these features can
be used to realise our ILC proofs over the standard channel. However, our main goal
in the previous chapter has been to minimise the asymptotical overhead incurred by
the prover. Therefore, we are interested in optimal choices of error correcting codes
and commitment schemes that allow to preserve the efficiency of our proofs also over
the standard channel. For the error correcting codes we opt for the family by Druk and
Ishai [DI14], which we recalled in Theorem 3.1. These are defined over a generic finite
field F and only require a linear number of field additions to compute. For the commit-
ment scheme we consider two possible instantiations which we described in Section
3.5. The first one is based on the hash function of Applebaum et al. [AHI+17b]. The
resulting commitment is computationally binding assuming the bSVP problem and
statistically hiding. The second one is based on the linear-time computable PRG of
Ishai et al. [IKO+08], which is statistically binding and computationally hiding, and
relies on the hardness of decoding sparsely generated linear codes. By using the first
commitment scheme we obtain statistical special honest verifier zero-knowledge argu-
ments of knowledge. With the second scheme we obtain computational special honest
verifier zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge.
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6.3.1 Efficiency of the Compilation
We recall the notation used to indicate the efficiency measures of an ILC proof system:
µ is the number of rounds, t =
∑µ
i=1 ti is the prover’s communication complexity, CILC
is the verifier’s communication complexity, qc the verifier’s query complexity, TPILC is
the running time of the prover, and TVILC the running time of the verifier. Let C be a
[n, k, hdmin]F code. We write TE˜C(k) for the cost of encoding a vector in F
k, TCom(ti) for
the cost of committing to ti field elements, TMmul(qc, t, b) for the cost of multiplying
matrices a matrix in Fqc×t by a matrix in Ft×b, and let CCom(ti) be the combined size
of the commitments to ti field elements. We give the dominant factors of efficiency of
the compiled proof in Table 6.1.
Prover Comp. TPILC + t · TE˜C(k) + 2n ·
∑µ
i=1 TCom(ti) + TMmul(qc + 1, t, k + n)
Verifier Comp. TVILC + (qc + 1) · TE˜C(k) + 2λ ·
∑µ
i=1 TCom(ti) + TMmul(qc + 1, t, 2λ)
Communication CILC + 2n ·
∑µ
i=1CCom(ti) + (qc + 1) · (k + n+ t) + 2λ · t
Round Comp. µ+ 2
TABLE 6.1: Efficiency of a compiled proof of knowledge (G,P,V) for
(pp, u, w) ∈ R.
6.3.2 Proofs and Arguments for the Satisfiability of Arithmetic Circuits
We now move to analyse the efficiency of the compiled proofs of knowledge for the
satisfiability of arithmetic circuit we gave in Figure 4.10. By instantiating the codes
with the ones in Theorem 3.1 we get T
E˜C
(k) = O(k) field additions. Let us now plug
in the efficiency of our ILC proof given in Table 4.5 into the efficiency formulas in
Table 6.1. We use k ≈ √N , n = O(k), t = O(√N), µ = O(log logN), qc = 20 = O(1)
and assume k  λ. The resulting efficiency is given in Table 6.2
Prover Computation TP = O(N) F× + 2n ·
∑µ
i=1 TCom(ti)
Verifier Computation TV = O(N) F+ + 2λ ·
∑µ
i=1 TCom(ti)
Communication t = O(λ√N) log |F|+ 2n ·∑µi=1CCom(ti)
Round Complexity µ = O(log log(N))
TABLE 6.2: Efficiency of our proof of knowledge for the relation RAC
over the standard channel. F×,F+ are the costs of field multiplications
and additions, respectively. log |F| is the size of a field element.
Instantiating with the commitment scheme from Applebaum et al. [AHI+17b] we
get computational knowledge soundness and statistical SHVZK. The commitments
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are compact, i.e. a commitment has size CCom(ti) = poly(λ) regardless of the mes-
sage length, giving us sub-linear communication. The commitments can be computed
with a linear number of bit operations, i.e. TCom(ti) = poly(λ) + O(ti) bit operations.
Although we do not have an accurate estimation on the number of the arithmetic oper-
ations required to evaluate this commitment scheme, we notice that the overall com-
putational cost for prover and verifier remains linear. To give a fair account of the
performances of the proof system we measure the efficiency in a unified model which
can perform both natively Boolean and arithmetic operations, and we consider prover
and verifier implemented as RAM programs, e.g. TinyRAM programs.
In Chapter 5 we considered TinyRAM machines with word size equal to W =
Θ(log(λ)). Since the soundness of the proof system requires a large field, i.e. |F| =
λω(1), we have that field elements require e = log |F|W = ω(1) words for storing. Field
additions then cost O(e) TinyRAM operations and field multiplications cost at most
O(e2) TinyRAM operations. As the hash function operates over bit-strings, if we
stored each bit in a separate word of size W = Θ(log λ) we would incur a logarithmic
overhead. However, the hash function is computable by a linear-size boolean circuit
and we can therefore apply a bit-slicing technique. We view the hash of an n-word
string as W parallel hashes of n-bit strings. Each of the bit-strings is processed with
the same boolean circuit, which means they can be computed in parallel in one go by
a TinyRAM program using a linear number of steps, e.g hashing one field element
requires O(e) TinyRAM steps. Therefore, in this model hashing field elements has a
computational cost comparable to field additions.
Expressing the costs of Table 6.2 in TinyRAM operations, we have that the com-
putational cost of the prover is dominated by O(e2N) TinyRAM steps, which is the
same asymptotic efficiency of a program evaluating the circuit up to a constant over-
head. Regarding verifier computation, the cost of field additions dominates the cost
of checking 2λ committed columns, assuming k  λ, and thus the overall complexity
is dominated byO(eN) TinyRAM steps. Asymptotically this is comparable to the cost
of reading the statement in the memory, therefore the verifier’s cost is optimal up to
a constant factor overhead, unless more compact representations of the statement are
used. Communication complexity amounts to poly(λ)
√
N words.
Instantiating with the commitment from Ishai et al. [IKO+08] we get statistical
178 Chapter 6. Compiling ILC Proofs into Standard Proofs and Arguments
knowledge soundness and computational SHVZK. The commitments have linear size
CCom(ti) = poly(λ)+ti log(|F|) bits, giving us linear communication overall, i.e. O(eN)
words of length Θ(log(λ)). By expressing the performances in TinyRAM, the commit-
ments can be computed in linear time at a cost of TCom(ti) = poly(λ)+eO(ti) TinyRAM
steps, again giving us O(e2N) TinyRAM steps for the prover, which is comparable to
the number of steps for computing O(N) multiplications. The computational cost for
the verifier is dominated again by O(eN) TinyRAM steps, comparable to the cost of
computing O(N) additions on a TinyRAM machine.
We summarise the costs of the instantiated proofs and arguments in Table 6.3, re-
porting the efficiency both in terms of TinyRAM operations and the equivalent amount
of field operations when performed in TinyRAM.
Measure\Inst. Using [AHI+17b] Using [IKO+08]
Prover Comp. O(N) F× ≈ O(e2N) TR O(N) F× ≈ O(e2N) TR
Verifier Comp. O(N) F+ ≈ O(eN) TR O(N) F+ ≈ O(eN) TR
Communication poly(λ)
√
N log |F| ≈ poly(λ)√N |W | O(N) log |F| ≈ O(eN) |W |
Round Comp. O(log logN) O(log logN)
Completeness Perfect Perfect
K. Soundness Computational Statistical
SHVZK Statistical Computational
TABLE 6.3: Efficiency of two instantiations of our SHVZK proofs and
arguments for arithmetic circuit satisfiability both in terms of TinyRAM
operations and field operations. F×,F+ are the costs of field multipli-
cations and additions, respectively. log |F|, |W | are the size of field ele-
ments and words, respectively. TinyRAM operations are denoted as TR
and e = log |F|W .
To summarise, we constructed the first proofs and arguments of knowledge for
the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits with linear complexity for prover and verifier,
which are asymptotically optimal up to constant factor. Our arguments of knowledge
also achieve sublinear communication complexity.
6.3.3 Proofs and Arguments for the Correct Program Execution
We now move on to analyse the efficiency of the compiled version of the proof of
knowledge for the correct program execution of a TinyRAM program we described in
Figure 5.9. As in Chapter 5, we consider programs of length L = poly(λ) terminating
within T = poly(λ) steps and using M = poly(λ) word of memory on a TinyRAM
machine using W = Θ(log(λ)) and K = O(1) registers. The soundness of the proof
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Measure\Inst. Using [AHI+17b] Using [IKO+08]
Prover Comp. O(e2T ) TR O(e2N) TR
Verifier Comp. poly(λ)O(L+ |v|+√T ) TR poly(λ)O(L+ |v|+√T ) TR
Communication poly(λ)O(√T ) |W | O(eT ) |W |
Round Comp. O(log log T ) O(log log T )
Completeness Perfect Perfect
K. Soundness Computational Statistical
SHVZK Statistical Computational
TABLE 6.4: Efficiency of two instantiations of our SHVZK proofs and
arguments for the execution of TinyRAM programs. L is the length of
the program and |v| is the size of the public inputs of the program. TR
stands for TinyRAM operations, |W | is the word size of the TinyRAM
machine and e = log |F|W = ω(1) is the overhead of field operations in
TinyRAM.
system requires the field size to be |F| = λω(1), which results in a superconstant ratio
e = log |F|W = ω(1), which can be made arbitrarily small. Our proofs are designed for
programs executing intensive computation and for which we consider T  L+M .
For the error correcting codes we use again the ones by Druk and Ishai [DI14]
which are computable by a linear number of TinyRAM steps. Instantiating the con-
struction with the commitment scheme from Applebaum et al. [AHI+17b] we get
computational knowledge soundness, statistical SHVZK and sublinear communica-
tion complexity. Instantiating the construction with the commitments from Ishai et
al. [IKO+08] we get statistical knowledge soundness, computational SHVZK and lin-
ear communication. As all the primitives are computable in linear time, our compiled
proofs achieve the same asymptotics as over the ILC channel.
Let us now combine the efficiency of our ILC proofs given in Table 5.9 with the
efficiency formulas in Table 6.1. In this case we use k ≈ √T , n = O(k), t = O(√T ),
µ = O(log log T ), qc = 298 = O(1) and assume k  λ. We summarise the costs of
the instantiated proofs and arguments in Table 6.4, reporting the efficiency in terms of
TinyRAM operations, taking into account the overhead of computing field operations
in TinyRAM.
To summarise, we constructed the first proofs and arguments for the correct exe-
cution of programs achieving arbitrarily small superconstant overhead for the prover,
i.e. O(e2). The verification cost of our proofs is very efficient: aside from the cost of
reading the instance, the verifier only pays a sublinear number of steps in the execu-
tion time of the program. Our arguments of knowledge additionally achieve sublinear
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communication complexity.
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Chapter 7
Foundations of Fully Dynamic
Group Signatures
In this chapter we diverge from the topics of the previous ones and take a look at
group signatures, a compelling application of zero-knowledge proofs. Group signa-
tures are a fundamental cryptographic primitive allowing a member of a group to
anonymously sign messages on behalf of the group: nothing about the identity of the
signer is disclosed apart from her membership in the group. Group membership is ad-
ministered by a designated authority which is referred to as group manager. In case
of a dispute, the group manager or a designated opening authority have the ability to
identify the signer and attribute the signature to her.
Group signatures are typically divided into static, partially dynamic, and fully
dynamic, depending on how flexible the group membership of the users is. In static
group signatures [BMW03], the group members are fixed once and for all during the
setup phase. Partially dynamic group signatures [BSZ05; KY06] allow the enrolment
of members in the group at any time but members cannot leave or be removed from
the group once they have joined. In many settings, however, it is desirable to offer full
flexibility in joining and leaving the group, which is the case covered by fully dynamic
group signatures.
In this chapter we address the fundamental question of defining security for fully
dynamic group signatures. While the security of the static and partially dynamic
group settings has been rigorously formulated [BMW03; BSZ05; KY06; SSE+12] and is
now well understood, the security of their fully dynamic groups counterpart, which
is more relevant to practice, has on the other hand received less attention and is still
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lacking at present. Particularly, the different design paradigms assume different, and
sometimes informal models, which do not necessarily generalise to other design ap-
proaches. This resulted in various models, the majority of which lack rigour. Conse-
quently, it can be difficult to compare the merits of the different constructions in terms
of their security guarantees. Moreover, existing models place a large amount of trust
in the setup and assume that keys are generated honestly, which does not necessarily
reflect real-world scenarios.
Towards a General Model. In the process of formulating a general model we iden-
tify a subtle difference on the security of models following the revocation list based
approach and other approaches, e.g. based on cryptographic accumulators. In these
models the manager periodically publishes some information about members excluded
from the group, i.e. revocation lists. The life of the scheme spans over different inter-
vals, or epochs, at the start of which the manager updates the revocation lists. Sig-
natures are bound to a specific epoch and it is vital for functionality that old valid
signatures are accepted by the verification algorithm. We observe that constructions
that follow this approach allow group members to sign with respect to an epoch un-
less they are explicitly revoked at that time. However, this allows them to sign with
respect to an epoch predating their joining epoch, as they were not revoked at that
time. In a sense this may be considered an attack against traceability, as those mem-
bers were not in the group at that interval. Since accumulator-based constructions are
generally not susceptible to this issue, they can be seen to achieve a slightly stronger
notion of traceability.
One could, on the other hand, dismiss this attack by arguing that, in these models,
it is implicit that epochs are not references to configurations of the group at a specific
time. The underlying issue is a gap between one’s interpretation of group signatures
and what the definition implies.
To address this, our traceability definition models a more general security notion:
users are not authorised to sign unless they are active members of the group. We regard
the time span when a non-revoked user is considered active to be design-specific and
think of it as the group manager’s official policy upon when users are allowed to sign.
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Following this interpretation accumulator-based constructions can be seen to satisfy
our traceability notion with respect to stronger policies.
Chapter Outline. In Section 7.1 we provide a rigorous security model for fully dy-
namic group signatures. We consider both the case of a single group manager and the
case where the role of the group manager who can grant or revoke membership is sep-
arated from the role of the opening authority who can identify a signer. Our security
definitions are general and applicable across different design paradigms. In particu-
lar, our model covers both accumulator-based and revocation list based designs. Our
model offers stringent security definitions, including the case where the authorities’
keys are adversarially generated.
We then show that suitable restrictions of our security definitions yield definitions
related to existing formal security definitions for partially dynamic group signatures
(Section 7.2) and static group signatures (Section 7.3).
In Section 7.4 we present a generic construction of fully dynamic group signatures
from accountable ring signatures and show that this satisfies the strongest variant of
our security definitions, namely the ones with separate authorities and adversarial
key generation.
Finally, in Section 7.5 we clarify the difference between the different flavours of
traceability and the use of activation policies in revocation list based constructions.
Notation. In this chapter we adopt a specific notation to model interactions between
algorithms. We recall that for algorithms A and B, (x; y) ← 〈A(a);B(b)〉 denotes the
the joint execution ofA (with input a) andB (with input b) where at the endA outputs
x and B outputs y. Delving into the details of the interaction, it may take place over
several rounds during which the algorithms send messages to each other and after
which they halt and return their outputs. For an interactive algorithm, a move in the
protocol is generated as (out;M ′) ← A(M), where M is the message just received
from the other participant or M = init if this is the first move in the protocol, and M ′
is the message to send to the other participant. We use the convention that when out is
empty (out = ε), it means that A intends for the interaction to continue, but when out
is not empty A will send the last message M ′ (unless empty) and then terminate the
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interaction with output out. We note that in the setting of group signatures, the group
manager may be involved in multiple concurrent interactions. The group manager’s
state may therefore change between two rounds in any given joint execution. We
write (out;M ′; stA) ← A(M ; stA) when we explicitly want to indicate the state of an
algorithm A may be updated. We use ⊥ as an error symbol. Algorithms do not return
⊥ unless they explicitly want to indicate an error. Conversely, we use the symbol > to
indicate success.
7.1 Definitions for Fully Dynamic Group Signatures
A Fully Dynamic Group Signature (FDGS) scheme involves a set of users who are
potential group members and a group manager GM who is in charge of issuing and
revoking group membership. The group signature scheme enables group members to
sign messages on behalf of the group in an anoymous way, but in case of abuse the
group manager can revoke the anonymity and open the signature to reveal the signer.
We are interested in the fully dynamic setting where users can join and leave the
group at any time at the discretion of the group manager. In static or partially dynamic
group signatures, where members cannot leave, it is possible to fix the group informa-
tion associated with the group at initialization. For a fully dynamic group, however,
there has to be a way to prevent a revoked member from using her old key to sign
messages. This means the group information associated with the group must change
after revocation. We divide the group information into a permanent group public key
gpk and temporary group information infoτ , associated with an index τ referred to as
an epoch. The group information depicts changes to the group, for instance, it could
include the current members of the group (as in accumulator-based constructions) or
those who have been excluded from the group (as in constructions based on revoca-
tion lists). As in existing models, we assume that anyone can verify the authenticity
of the published group information.
Unlike existing security models for group signatures that assume trusted key gen-
eration, we separate key generation from trusted parameter setup. This allows us to
define stringent security that protects against adversarial group managers who might
generate their keys maliciously. Our definitions can easily be adapted to work for the
7.1. Definitions for Fully Dynamic Group Signatures 185
weaker setting where the group manager’s keys are generated honestly as in the case
of existing models.
We give two flavours of our definitions. We start by providing a definition where
the roles of opening signatures and administering group membership are overseen
by the same authority. Subsequently, we specialise the definition to the setting where
each of those roles is overseen by a separate authority.
7.1.1 Syntax
A fully dynamic group signature scheme FDGS involves a group manager GM and
a set of users. Additionally, there might be the presence of a trusted third party that
generates some initial parameters used in the scheme. The scheme consists of the
following algorithms and data structures:
• Interactive polynomial time protocol run by GM and a user: Join
• Probabilistic polynomial time algorithms: GSetup, GKGen, UpdateGroup,
Sign, Open
• Deterministic polynomial time algorithms: IsActive,Verify, Judge
• Data structure: Reg.
We will describe in greater details the data structure, the algorithms and their usage
in a FDGS scheme.
Reg: The registry is a data structure, which is filled as users join the group. The
group manager associates any joining group members with session identifiers
i = 1, 2, 3, . . .. When user i joins, she is able to store a record regi in the registry.
Once a record is stored, it cannot be changed. The group manager has read
access to the registry and may store the information and use it during opening
when tracing the originator of a signature. We model access to the registry with
the following two algorithms/oracles:
• ReadReg(i): On input a session identifier i, it returns the corresponding en-
try in the registry regi. If no record regi is stored, it returns ⊥.
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• WriteReg(i,M): On input a session identifier i and a message M , it sets
regi := M . This oracle can only be used once for every identifier i, further
calls with the same session identifier are ignored.
One way to instantiate the registry is with a PKI, which is done explicitly in
e.g. [BSZ05]. The registry Reg can be hosted by GM but it requires each entry
regi to be signed by the user involved in the i-th instance of the protocol. Whether
one instantiates the registry with a PKI or in a different way it is out of the scope
of this chapter as long as it gives us the desired functionality.
GSetup(1λ)→ param: There may be a trusted third party that runs this algorithm to
generate public parameters param. In case a trusted setup is not required, this
algorithm can be simply regarded as setting param := 1λ.
GKGen(param)→ (outGM; stGM): The group manager uses this algorithm to generate
outGM := (mpk, info0), which consists of the manager’s public key and the initial
group information, and the resulting state stGM of the group manager. The group
public key is gpk := (param,mpk).
Join: To enroll a user as a member, the GM may run the interactive joining protocol
with her. Their respective algorithms are:
• JoinWriteReg(i,·)User (M ; st) → (out;MGM; st): This algorithm specifies the user’s
execution of the interactive joining protocol with the GM. Given an input
message from the GM and the user’s internal state st it returns a message
for the GM and a new state. In its first call, the algorithm is executed on
initial input (init; gpk). In each instance of the protocol, the user is allowed
a single call to the oracle WriteReg(i, ·) for writing into the registration table
an entry regi corresponding to its identifier i. Joining session i terminates
after at most k(λ) rounds by a call returning (gsk;MGM; st), which includes
the user’s secret key gski := gsk, an optional final message for the issuer in-
cluding a termination message done, and the user final state. If it terminates
with gsk = ⊥, the user will consider it as a fail to join, and on failure it will
always be the case that it ends with MGM = (done,⊥). After termination,
the user will ignore all future inputs to JoinUser.
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• JoinReadReg(i)GM (i,MGM; stGM) → (outGM;M ; stGM): This algorithm specifies
the GM’s execution in the interactive joining protocol with a user. The GM
keeps track of distinct instances of the protocol using unique identifiers i,
which we without loss of generality assume are numbered 1, 2, 3, etc. The
algorithm receives as input a session identifier i, a message MGM received
from the user, and the GM’s internal state and it returns a message M for
the user interacting in session i and updates the state stGM. The algorithm
has access to the oracle ReadReg(i) to read the entry regi in the registration
table Reg. Each joining session will terminate after at most a polynomial
number of rounds. We let k(λ) be the maximal number of rounds before
termination. Termination will be indicated in the local output outGM of the
GM and can be successful (>) or fail (⊥), and if it fails the output message
will be Mi = (done,⊥). After termination the GM will ignore future calls
with the same i.
For conciseness we will often refer to the user involved in the i-th session of the
Join protocol with the manager as user i. Please observe though that the user
may not be aware of her own session identifier i, since she may not be aware of
how many other users are joining or have already joined the group.
UpdateGroup(R; stGM)→ (info; stGM): The group manager runs this algorithm to
update the group information, where the set R consists of session identifiers
associated with users to be revoked. The algorithm returns new public group
information info and updates the state of GM. The group information info may
or may not depend on the set of newly joined members of the group, which
the group manager records in its internal state. The group information info is
intended as group information pertaining to the group and we will in general
assume anybody may have access to the sequence info0, info1, . . . the group man-
ager creates during the lifetime of the group signature scheme.
IsActive(i, τ, stGM)→ 1/0: The Join protocol and the UpdateGroup algorithm de-
scribe how an honest GM adds and revokes group members. The exact moment
when a member is activated and able to sign is design specific. In some construc-
tions, group members are implicitly activated after successfully terminating the
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Join protocols and may even be able to sign with respect to previous epochs; in
others they are explicitly activated by GM when a new group information infoτ
is published. Consequently, different design choices lead to different time spans
where members are allowed to sign. In order to take into account these differ-
ences in the security definitions without favouring a particular design paradigm,
we use the IsActive procedure, which should be interpreted as the group man-
ager’s policy for when a member is considered active.
The IsActive algorithm takes as input the state of the group manager, a session
identifier i, and an epoch τ associated with group information infoτ the group
manager has published earlier. We refer to a user as an active member of the
group at epoch τ if and only if the algorithm returns 1. We place the following
constraints on the policies an honest group manager can have for when a user is
active:
• If τ is not associated with any infoτ the group manager has published, the
algorithm returns 0.
• If i is not associated with a joining session where the group manager has
terminated succesfully, the algorithm returns 0.
• If i was revoked when creating infoτ for this epoch or earlier, the algorithm
returns 0.
• If i is associated with a joining session where the group manager ended her
part successfully before infoτ was created, and user i is not revoked at or
before epoch τ , the algorithm returns 1.
Sign(gsk, info,m)→ Σ: Given a user’s group signing key gsk, group information info,
and a message m, the signing algorithm outputs a group signature Σ.
Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ)→ 1/0: The verification algorithm checks whether Σ is a valid
group signature on m with respect to the group information info and outputs a
bit: 1 for accept and 0 for reject.
Open(gpk, stGM, info,m,Σ)→ (i, pi): The opening algorithm receives as input the group
public key gpk, the state of the group manager, some public group information
info, a message, and a signature. It returns a session identifier i together with a
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proof pi attributing Σ to user i. If the algorithm is unable to open the signature to
a particular group member, it returns (⊥, pi) to indicate that it could not attribute
the signature.
Judge(gpk, info, reg,m,Σ, pi)→ 1/0: The judge algorithm checks the validity of a proof
pi attributing the signature Σ on m under group information info to a user with
registry record reg. It outputs 1 for accept and 0 for reject.
Separating the Role of Group Manager and Opening Authority
Following the suggestion of Camenisch and Michels [CM98], Bellare, Shi and Zhang
[BSZ05] separate the group manager role we described above into two parts: a group
manager GM (who they call the Issuer) administrating group membership, and an
opening authority OA (who they call the Opener) capable of tracing the signer of a
message. There are natural settings where such a division of roles may be called for;
an organization may for instance consider group management the task of the human
resources department, and opening signatures the domain of the fraud department.
While the separation of the group manager and opening authority roles complicate
definitions a little, they also have the advantage of permitting more fine-grained se-
curity notion that allow for adversarial behaviour in either the group manager or the
opening authority.
When separating out the role of the opening authority, the syntax of a group signa-
ture scheme changes. Key generation can now be seen as a joint process that involves
both the group manager and the opening authority. Sometimes it may be desirable to
minimise interaction and allow authorities to generate their own keys independently,
but for maximal generality we define key generation as an interactive protocol be-
tween them, where independent key generation is a special case. Another change is
that since the opening algorithm is run by the opening authority it needs access to read
the registry to know who to attribute a given signature to. We describe these changes
below:
GKGen: To generate the group public key the GM and OA may run an interactive
protocol. Their respective algorithms are:
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• GKGenGM(MGM; stGM)→ (outGM;MOA; stGM): This algorithm specifies the
GM’s execution in the interactive key generation protocol with the OA. It
gets as input a message MGM received from the OA and the GM’s inter-
nal state and returns an output outGM, a message MOA for the OA and up-
dates the state to stGM. The state of the group manager is initialised as
stGM := param. If the GM initiates the protocol, the input message is ini-
tialised asMGM := init. In a successful execution of the protocol, the last call
of the algorithm returns a non-empty output value outGM := (mpk, info0)
consisting of the GM public key and the initial group information. After
termination, subsequent calls to the algorithm will be ignored.
• GKGenOA(MOA; stOA) → (outOA;MGM; stOA): This algorithm specifies the
OA’s execution in the interactive key generation protocol with the GM. It
gets as input a message from the GM and the OA’s internal state and it re-
turns an output outGM, a message MGM for the GM and updates the state
stOA. The state of the OA is initialised as stOA := param. If the OA initiates
the protocol the input message is initialised as MOA := init. In a success-
ful execution of the protocol, the last call of the algorithm returns an non-
empty output value outOA := (opk, osk) consisting of the OA’s public and
secret keys. Subsequent calls of the algorithm are ignored.
We denote an entire execution of the key generation protocol as
((mpk, info0; stGM); (opk, osk))← 〈GKGenGM(param);GKGenOA(param)〉
and let gpk := (param,mpk, opk) be the group public key.
OpenReadReg(·)(gpk, osk, info,m,Σ)→ (i, pi): The opening algorithm receives as input
the group public key gpk, the opening key osk, group information info, a mes-
sage, and a signature. It returns a session identifier i together with a proof pi
attributing Σ to user i. If the algorithm is unable to open the signature to a par-
ticular group member, it returns (⊥, pi) to indicate that it could not attribute the
signature.
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Relation Between Definitions with Single and Separate Authorities
Group signatures with and without separate authorities are closely related. Specif-
ically, given a group signature scheme FDGS for separate GM and OA, we can de-
fine a single authority group signature scheme FDGS ′, where the group manager
GM′ first runs the interaction ((mpk, info0; stGM); (opk, osk)) ← 〈GKGenGM(param);
GKGenOA(param)〉 and returns the manager public key mpk′ := (mpk, opk) and sets
the state to be st′GM := (stGM, osk). Whenever a new user joins the group, GM has ac-
cess to an oracle that allows it to read the corresponding record in the registry, and
we imagine GM′ keeps track of these registry entries so it has its own virtual ReadReg
oracle. Whenever GM′ has to run the opening algorithm, it will then just use osk. All
other algorithms inFDGS ′ are defined in the natural way fromFDGS . It is easy to see
that this transformation preserves the efficiency of FDGS and we will in the following
argue that security is preserved as well.
7.1.2 Security Definitions
Definition 7.1. An FDGS with the syntax in Section 7.1.1 is a fully dynamic group signa-
ture if it is correct, anonymous, traceable and non-frameable as defined below.
Correctness
Correctness guarantees that an honest user can enrol in the group and produce sig-
natures that are accepted by the Verify algorithm. We assume in the correctness def-
inition that GM is honest and willing to enrol the user, since otherwise it could just
refuse membership. However, there may be other users that are malicious. We there-
fore model correctness as an adversarial game, where the adversary acts on behalf of
all other users and we require that the honest user can successfully enrol and sign
messages. The correctness definition captures three aspects in this setting:
• An honest user interacting with an honest GM should be able to enroll in at most
k(λ) rounds after which the user terminates successfully with a key gski.
• The group manager should before or in the same round terminate with success
indicator > and activate the user no later than the next update
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• Once activated the user should be able to sign messages.
These three properties should hold as long as the user is not revoked.
In the game ExpCorrFDGS,A (shown in Figure 7.1), we grant the adversary A access
to the following oracles, details of which are given in Figure 7.2. We maintain several
global counters: h is the joining session identifier of the honest user which is initialised
as⊥,N is the number of users that initiated the Join protocol with the GM, and τCurrent
is the current epoch, τJoin is the epoch during which the user created her key, τRevoke
is the time the user was revoked (if ever), and K is the number of calls to the AddHU
oracle, i.e., the number of rounds executed by the honest user in the Join protocol.
AddHU(): This oracle adds a single honest user to the group. Each call of the oracle
executes the next round of interaction in the Join protocol between the honest
user and the honest group manager. It returns the exchanged messages as well
as the outputs of both parties. Note that the adversary learns the group signing
key of the honest user at the successful conclusion of the interaction.
SndToM(i,MGM): This oracle allows the adversary to add a corrupt user to the group.
The adversary can deviate from the Join protocol by sending arbitrary messages
MGM to the GM. Each oracle call executes the next move of an honest GM on
input message MGM in the i-th instance of the Join protocol. It returns the GM
response message and output.
Update(R): This oracle allows the adversary to update the public group information.
Here R is the set of the group members to be removed from the group. Calling
this oracle triggers a new epoch.
Write(i,M): Given a session identifier and a message M , the oracle sets regi := M .
The oracle can only be used once for every identifier i, further calls to it return ⊥
without producing changes to the registry. It cannot be called on the identifier
corresponding to the joining session initiated by AddHU.
State(): This oracle returns the current GM’s state stGM.
In the correctness definition, we restrict the adversary to enrolling a single honest user
into the group via calling the AddHU oracle. This generalises to the case of multiple
honest users via a standard hybrid argument.
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Experiment: ExpCorrFDGS,A(λ)
− h := ⊥;N := 0;K := 0; τCurrent := 0; τJoin :=∞; τRevoke :=∞
− param← GSetup(1λ)
− (mpk, info0; stGM)← GKGen(param)
− gpk := (param,mpk)
− (m, τ)← AAddHU,SndToM,Update,Write,State(gpk, info0)
− If K = k(λ) and τRevoke =∞ and τJoin =∞ return 0
− If h = ⊥ or τ > τCurrent return 1
− If τJoin < τ < τRevoke and IsActive(h, τ, stGM) = 0 return 0
− If IsActive(h, τ, stGM) = 0 return 1
− Σ← Sign(gskh, infoτ ,m)
− Return Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ)
FIGURE 7.1: Correctness game.
AddHU()
 If K = k(λ) return ⊥
 K := K + 1
 If h = ⊥:
◦ N := N + 1; h := N
◦Mh := init; sth := gpk
◦ gskh := ⊥
 (outh;MGM; sth)← JoinWriteReg(h,·)User (Mh; sth)
 If outh 6= ε:
◦ gskh := outh
◦ τJoin = τCurrent
◦K = k(λ) // maximal number of rounds
 (outGM;Mh; stGM)← JoinReadReg(h)GM (h,MGM; stGM)
 Return (outh,MGM), (outGM,Mh)
State()
 Return stGM
SndToM(i,MGM)
 If i /∈ [N + 1] ∨ i = h return ⊥
 If i = N + 1:
◦ N := N + 1
 (outi;Mi; stGM)← JoinReadReg(i)GM (i,MGM; stGM)
 Return (outi,Mi)
Update(R)
 IfR 6⊆ [N ] return ⊥
 (info; stGM)← UpdateGroup(R; stGM)
 τCurrent := τCurrent + 1
 If h ∈ R and τRevoke =∞ set τRevoke = τCurrent
 Return infoτCurrent := info
Write(i,M)
 If i = h or regi 6= ⊥ return ⊥
 Set regi := M
FIGURE 7.2: Oracles used in the correctness game.
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Experiment: ExpCorrFDGS,A(λ)
− h := ⊥;N := 0;K := 0; τCurrent := 0; τJoin :=∞; τRevoke :=∞
− param← GSetup(1λ)
−
(
(mpk, info0; stGM); (opk; stA)
)
← 〈GKGenGM(param);A(param)〉
− gpk := (param,mpk, opk)
− (m, τ)← AAddHU,SndToM,Update,Write,State(gpk, info0; stA)
− If K = k(λ) and τRevoke =∞ and τJoin =∞ return 0
− If h = ⊥ or τ > τCurrent return 1
− If τJoin < τ < τRevoke and IsActive(h, τ, stGM) = 0 return 0
− If IsActive(h, τ, stGM) = 0 return 1
− Σ← Sign(gskh, infoτ ,m)
− Return Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ)
FIGURE 7.3: Correctness game for separate GM and OA.
Definition 7.2 (Correctness). An FDGS scheme is correct if for any PPT adversary A
Pr[ExpCorrFDGS,A(λ) = 1] ≈ 1
If the definition holds also for unbounded adversaries, we say the FDGS scheme is statistically
correct, and if the probability is exactly 1 we say the FDGS scheme is perfectly correct.
Variations of Correctness. In the correctness definition we give the adversary access
to the state of the group manager. This means even if the honest group manager’s
secret data is leaked, an honest user can still enroll and sign messages as long as the
group manager considers her active. A more relaxed but still reasonable definition of
correctness would be to assume the group manager keeps her state secret. In this latter
case, it is then natural to give the adversary access to an opening oracle to model that
the group manager may sometimes trace a member who produced a signature.
In the case where there is a separation between the group manager and an opening
authority, we still need the group manager to be honest for correctness to make sense.
However, we may want correctness to hold even in the presence of a malicious open-
ing authority; since it is the sovereign domain of the group manager to decide who is
an active member and should be able to sign messages. In Fig. 7.3 we therefore de-
fine the correctness game with an adversarial opening authority. It is straightforward
to see that given a group signature scheme FDGS with separate GM and OA satisfy-
ing correctness, the transformation from Section 7.1.1 gives a group signature scheme
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FDGS ′ with a single group manager that is correct too.
Many definitions of correctness found in the literature [BMW03; BSZ05; KY06] en-
compass not just that an honestly generated signature is accepted by the verification
algorithm but also add other requirements such as an honestly generated signature
should be opened to the honest signer who generated it. In our definition of correct-
ness we only require that honestly generated signatures are accepted and refer to other
security definitions to handle additional requirements that we consider less central.
In particular, for the property of honestly generated signatures opening to the correct
signer, it is captured by the traceability and opening soundness properties we later
define, and captured in a much stronger sense than usually done in correctness defi-
nitions since we explicitly consider opening soundness in a highly adversarial setting
instead of just considering an honest interaction. This leaves a small definitional gap
when considering perfect correctness since traceability and opening soundness may
only hold computationally. However, we find the difference to be insignificant and
have therefore deliberately opted for the minimal and simplest definition of correct-
ness that only demands honest generated signatures to be accepted.
Anonymity
Group signatures should be anonymous and not reveal the identity of the group mem-
ber who produced them. Since the group manager has the ability to trace signers we
must assume the group manager to be honest for anonymity to hold but some of the
other users may be malicious.
In the game ExpAnon−bFDGS,A (shown in Figure 7.4), we maintain the following counter
and lists: N is the number of users that initiated the Join protocol with the GM,H is a
list of honest users, and C is a list of challenge signatures obtained from the challenge
oracle. We give the adversary access to the following oracles, details of which are
given in Figure 7.5
AddHU(i) : This oracle allows the adversary to add honest users to the group by go-
ing through the join protocol one round at a time. The oracle models full key
exposure, both communication and the user’s signing key are leaked to the ad-
versary.
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SndToM(i,MGM) : This oracle allows the adversary to add corrupt users to the group.
The adversary can deviate from the Join protocol by sending arbitrary messages
MGM to the GM. Each oracle call executes the next move of an honest GM on
input message MGM in the i-th instance of the Join protocol. It returns the GM
response message and output.
Chalb(info,m, i0, i1) : This a left-right oracle for defining anonymity. It takes as input
some group information info, a message m, and two honest users i0, i1. It returns
a group signature on the message using key gskib for b ← {0, 1} and the given
group information. It is required that both challenge users are able to sign with
respect to info. The adversary can only call this oracle once.
Open(info,m,Σ) : Returns the session identifier i of the signer who produced signature
Σ on m with respect to info, together with a proof pi. The oracle cannot be called
on a signature obtained from the Chalb oracle.
ReadReg(i) : Given a session identifier i, it returns the corresponding entry in the reg-
istry regi.
Update(R) : Allows the adversary to prompt a group information update and incre-
ment the epoch. Here R is a set of the group members to be revoked from the
group.
The adversary can interact with honest users and join corrupt users. At some point,
the adversary picks two honest members of the group at a chosen epoch, gets a signa-
ture from one of them, and tries to learn which of them has signed a chosen message.
The goal of the adversary is to guess which member signed the message. For sim-
plicity, the adversary is only allowed a single challenge query but a standard hybrid
argument (similar to that used in [BSZ05]) shows this is equivalent to seeing many
challenge signatures. Our definition covers full key exposure attacks by allowingA to
learn the secret keys of all users in the group.
Definition 7.3 (Anonymity). An FDGS scheme is anonymous if for all PPT adversaries
A the following advantage is negligible
AdvAnonFDGS,A(λ) :=
∣∣∣Pr[ExpAnon−0FDGS,A(λ) = 1]− Pr[ExpAnon−1FDGS,A(λ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
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Experiment: ExpAnon−bFDGS,A(λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ);N := 0;H := ∅; C := ∅
− (mpk, info0; stGM)← GKGen(param)
− gpk := (param,mpk)
− Return b∗ ← AAddHU,SndToM,Open,Chalb,ReadReg,Update(gpk, info0)
FIGURE 7.4: Anonymity game.
AddHU(i)
 If i /∈ [N + 1] return ⊥
 If i = N + 1
◦ H := H ∪ {i}
◦ N := N + 1
◦Mi := init
◦ sti := gpk
◦ gski := ⊥
 (outi;MGM; sti)← JoinWriteReg(i,·)User (Mi; sti)
 If outi 6= ε:
◦ gski := outi
 (outGM;Mi; stGM)← JoinReadReg(i)GM (i,MGM; stGM)
 Return (outi,MGM), (outGM,Mi)
ReadReg(i)
 Return regi
Update(R)
 IfR 6⊆ [N ] return ⊥
 (info; stGM)← UpdateGroup(R; stGM)
 τCurrent := τCurrent + 1
 Return infoτCurrent := info
SndToM(i,MGM)
 If i /∈ [N + 1] ∨ i ∈ H return ⊥
 If i = N + 1:
◦ N := N + 1
 (outi;Mi; stGM)← JoinReadReg(i)GM (i,MGM; stGM)
 Return (outi,Mi)
Chalb(info,m, i0, i1)
 If {i0, i1} 6⊆ H return ⊥
 Σ0 ← Sign(gski0 , info,m)
 Σ1 ← Sign(gski1 , info,m)
 If Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ0) = 0 return ⊥
 If Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ1) = 0 return ⊥
 C := {(info,m,Σb)}
 Return Σb
Open(info,m,Σ)
 If (info,m,Σ) ∈ C return ⊥
 If Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ) = 0 return ⊥
 Return Open(gpk, stGM, info,m,Σ).
FIGURE 7.5: Oracles used in the anonymity game.
Variations of Anonymity. Our definition of anonymity corresponds to what Bellare
et al. [BMW03] call full anonymity. Their usage of full anonymity emphasizes that ano-
nymity holds even in the presence of an adversary that sees the signing keys of honest
users and has access to an opening oracle. Our definition captures full anonymity,
not only does the adversary see every honest user’s signing key but she also sees the
entire joining transcript. Full anonymity gives strong security guarantees since it en-
sures that even if a user’s secret key is leaked her past or future signatures still do not
reveal her identity.
Group signatures with full anonymity imply the existence of IND-CPA and IND-
CCA secure public-key encryption, as shown in [AW04] and [CG04], respectively. The
anonymity notion therefore has to be relaxed if one wants to build group signatures
based on one-way functions as is done in [CG04]. Such a relaxation can consist in
not giving outi to the adversary in the AddHU oracle but instead give the adversary
access to a signing oracle that will allow it to get signatures from honest users on any
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message of its choosing.
Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [BBS04] define another relaxed form of anonymity
where the adversary does not have access to the Open oracle. This relaxation is anal-
ogous to the distinction between IND-CPA and IND-CCA secure public-key encryp-
tion, and indeed they refer to the notion as CPA-anonymity.
Let us now consider the case where we separate the roles of managing the group,
GM, and the role of opening signatures, OA. For anonymity to hold, we need the open-
ing authority to be honest, however, we may desire security against a malicious group
manager. We give the corresponding anonymity game in Fig. 7.6. Please observe that
the oracles the adversary has access to are different because when the adversary runs
the group manager it can directly manage the joining interaction with honest users,
simulate the enrolment of corrupt users, and compute group information updates by
itself. Therefore we remove the Update,SndToM oracles and replace the AddHU oracle
with an SndToU oracle that lets the adversarially controlled group manager commu-
nicate with an honest user trying to join the group.
Experiment: ExpAnon−bFDGS,A(λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ);N := 0; C := ∅
−
(
(mpk; stA); (opk, osk)
)
← 〈A(param);GKGenOA(param)〉
− gpk := (param,mpk, opk)
− Return b∗ ← ASndToU,Open,Chalb,ReadReg(gpk; stA)
FIGURE 7.6: Anonymity game for separate GM and OA.
SndToU(i,Mi)
 If i /∈ [N + 1] return ⊥
 If i = N + 1:
◦ N := N + 1
◦Mi := init
◦ sti := gpk
 (outi;MGM; sti)← JoinWriteReg(i,·)User (Mi; sti)
 If outi 6= ε ∧ outi 6= ⊥ :
◦ gski := outi
 Return (outi,MGM)
ReadReg(i)
 Return regi
Chalb(info,m, i0, i1)
 If {i0, i1} 6⊆ [N ] return ⊥
 Σ0 ← Sign(gski0 , info,m)
 Σ1 ← Sign(gski1 , info,m)
 If Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ0) = 0 return ⊥
 If Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ1) = 0 return ⊥
 C := {(info,m,Σb)}
 Return Σb
Open(info,m,Σ)
 If (info,m,Σ) ∈ C return ⊥
 If Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ) = 0 return ⊥
 Return OpenReadReg(gpk, osk, info,m,Σ)
FIGURE 7.7: Oracles used in the anonymity game for separate GM and
OA.
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Let FDGS be a group signature scheme with separate GM and OA with full ano-
nymity, and let FDGS ′ be the resulting single authority group signature scheme re-
sulting from the transformation given in Section 7.1.1. Then FDGS ′ is anonymous ac-
cording to the single authority definition because an FDGS adversary can as a special
case run an honest GM algorithm and simulate everything that happens in an attack
against FDGS ′. In particular, by running GM honestly, it can simulate the SndToM
oracle, and use the SndToU oracle to build a simulated AddHU oracle.
Traceability
Traceability protects the group manager by ensuring that all signatures that are valid
for a given epoch can be opened to an active member of the group. In the traceability
game ExpTraceFDGS,A shown in Figure 7.8, we maintain a counter N for the number of
users that initiated the Join protocol with the GM and the adversary A has access to
the following oracles, details of which are given in Figure 7.9.
SndToM(i,MGM) : This oracle allows the adversary to add corrupt users to the group.
She can deviate from the Join protocol by sending arbitrary messages MGM to
GM. Each oracle call executes the next move of an honest GM on input message
MGM in the i-th instance of the Join protocol. It returns the GM output and
response message.
Update(R) : This oracle allows the adversary to trigger a group information update
and increment the epoch. HereR is the set of the group members to be removed
from the group.
WriteReg(i,M) : Given a session identifier and a message M , the oracle sets regi := M .
The oracle can only be used once for every identifier i.
Open(info,m,Σ) : Returns the session identifier i of the signer who produced signature
Σ on m with respect to info, together with a proof pi.
The adversary can add and revoke corrupt users to the group and request the OA
to open any signature. The goal of the adversary in the traceability game is to produce
a valid signature on a message for a given epoch, such that either the signature traces
200 Chapter 7. Foundations of Fully Dynamic Group Signatures
back to a user which was not active at that epoch, or the proof of opening produced
by the honest OA does not verify.
Experiment: ExpTraceFDGS,A(λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ);N := 0; τCurrent := 0
− (mpk, info0; stGM)← GKGen(param)
− gpk := (param,mpk)
−
(
m,Σ, τ
)
← ASndToM,Update,WriteReg,Open,State(gpk, info0)
− If Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− (i, pi)← Open(gpk, stGM, infoτ ,m,Σ)
− If IsActive(i, τ, stGM) = 0 return 1
− If Judge(gpk, infoτ , regi,m,Σ, pi) = 0 return 1
− Return 0.
FIGURE 7.8: Traceability game.
SndToM(i,MGM)
 If i /∈ [N + 1] return ⊥
 If i = N + 1:
◦ N := N + 1
 (outi;Mi; stGM)← JoinReadReg(i)GM (i,MGM; stGM)
 Return (outi,Mi)
WriteReg(i,M)
 If regi 6= ⊥ return ⊥
 regi := M
 Return >
Update(R)
 IfR 6⊆ [N ] return ⊥
 (info; stGM)← UpdateGroup(R; stGM)
 τCurrent := τCurrent + 1
 Return infoτCurrent := info
Open(info,m,Σ)
 If Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ) = 0 return ⊥
 Return Open(gpk, stGM, info,m,Σ)
State()
 Return stGM
FIGURE 7.9: Oracles used in the traceability game.
Definition 7.4 (Traceability). An FDGS scheme is traceable if for all PPT adversaries A,
the following advantage is negligible
AdvTraceFDGS,A(λ) := Pr[Exp
Trace
FDGS,A(λ) = 1].
Variations of Traceability. Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [BMW03] defined trace-
ability purely with respect to identifying a signer but did not require a proof of correct
opening. Bellare, Shi and Zhang [BSZ05] included the use of a proof for correct open-
ing that can be verified by anybody using the Judge algorithm. If we trust the group
manager instead of requiring a proof of correct opening, the defining game in Fig. 7.8
can be simplified by eliminating the proof and the Judge algorithm.
By necessity, the group manager needs to be at least partially trusted since other-
wise it can just enrol some dummy member that can then sign arbitrary messages and
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act as a scapegoat. However, we have defined traceability such that it holds even if
the honest group managers secret state is leaked. A reasonable relaxation of our defi-
nitions would be to trust the group manager to keep its state secret, in which case we
would remove the State oracle.
Let us consider the case where we separate the roles of group manager and open-
ing authority. The opening authority is the primary stakeholder that wants to ensure
signers can be traced. However, we define security strongly by requiring traceabil-
ity even in case its secret opening key is leaked. As in the single authority setting,
we still need to have some trust in the group manager to keep track of who is active
in the group and not to enrol dummy members, however, again we opt for a strong
definition of security where its state may be leaked.
Experiment: ExpTraceFDGS,A(λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ);N := 0; τCurrent := 0
−
(
(mpk, info0; stGM); (opk, osk)
)
← 〈GKGenGM(param);GKGenOA(param)〉
− gpk := (param,mpk, opk)
−
(
m,Σ, τ
)
← ASndToM,Update,WriteReg,State(gpk, info0, osk)
− If Verify(gpk, infoτ ,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− (i, pi)← OpenReadReg(gpk, osk, infoτ ,m,Σ)
− If IsActive(i, τ, stGM) = 0 return 1
− If Judge(gpk, infoτ , regi,m,Σ, pi) = 0 return 1
− Return 0.
FIGURE 7.10: Traceability game for separate group manager and open-
ing authority.
SndToM(i,MGM)
 If i /∈ [N + 1]: Return ⊥
 If i = N + 1:
◦ N := N + 1
 (outi;Mi; stGM)← JoinReadReg(i)GM (i,MGM; stGM)
 Return (outi,Mi)
State
 Return stGM
Update(R)
 IfR 6⊆ [N ] return ⊥
 (info; stGM)← UpdateGroup(R; stGM)
 τCurrent := τCurrent + 1
 Return infoτCurrent := info
WriteReg(i,M)
 If regi 6= ⊥ return ⊥
 Return regi := M
FIGURE 7.11: Oracles used in the traceability game for separate GM and
OA.
The two games for traceability are very similar, and it is easy to see that the trans-
formation in Sec. 7.1.1 of an FDGS for separate GM and OA to a single group manager
scheme FDGS ′ preserves traceability.
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Non-Frameability
Non-frameability is a security notion that says even if the rest of the group as well as
the group manager are fully corrupt, they cannot falsely attribute a signature to an
honest member who did not produce it. In the non-frameability game ExpNon−FrameFDGS,A
shown in Figure 7.12, we grant the adversary access to the oracles described below
and detailed in Figure 7.13, and we keep a global list S of signatures produced by
an honest user. Please note that the adversary controls the group manager and hence
session identifiers no longer carry much meaning, the adversary can pretend the user
has any session identifier. Instead without loss of generality we simply identify the
honest user with a generic record reg and require that only the honest user is able to
write in this record.
SndToHU(Mh) : This oracle allows the adversary to interact with a single honest user
in an instance of the join protocol. Each call executes the next move of the hon-
est user on input a message Mh provided by the adversary (playing the role of
the corrupt group manager) and returns the user response message. The user
may write a message into the register using oracle Write, which can be accessed
only once by the user. Messages received by the Write oracle are revealed to
the adversary. The user output outh, i.e., the signing key, is not disclosed to the
adversary.
SignHU(info,m) : This oracle is used by the adversary against non-frameability to ob-
tain signatures from an honest group member h added to the group via SndToHU
calls. It returns a group signature on the message m using key gskh and group
information info.
The adversary can add a single honest user in the group and request him to sign arbi-
trary messages. The goal of the adversary in the non-frameability game is to produce
a valid signature on a message that was not requested to the signing oracle, together
with an accepting proof attributing the signature to the honest user.
Definition 7.5 (Non-frameability). An FDGS scheme is non-frameable if for all PPT
adversaries A, the following advantage is negligible
AdvNon−FrameFDGS,A (λ) := Pr[Exp
Non−Frame
FDGS,A (λ) = 1].
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Experiment: ExpNon−FrameFDGS,A (λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ); h := ⊥; reg = ⊥;S := ∅; gskh := ⊥
− (mpk; stA)← A(param)
− gpk := (param,mpk)
−
(
m,Σ, pi, info
)
← ASndToHU,SignHU(stA)
− If Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− If (info,m,Σ) ∈ S return 0
− Return Judge(gpk, info, reg,m,Σ, pi)
FIGURE 7.12: Non-Frameability game.
SndToHU(Mh)
 If h = ⊥:
◦ h := >:
◦Mh := init
◦ sth := gpk
 (outh;MGM; sth)← JoinWrite(·)User (Mh; sth)
 If outh 6= ε set gskh := outh
 Return MGM
SignHU(info,m)
 If gskh = ⊥ return ⊥
 Σ← Sign(gskh, info,m)
 S := S ∪ {(info,m,Σ)}
 Return Σ
Write(M)
 Set reg := M
 Send M to A
 Ignore future calls
FIGURE 7.13: Oracles used in the non-frameability game.
In our definition of non-frameability the adversary controls the group manager
during the key generation process. Thus, our definition is stronger than existing def-
initions, which only allow the group manager to be corrupted after the group keys
have been honestly generated.
We allow only a single honest user in the group and ask the adversary to frame
her. It can be shown that this implies the more general case involving several honest
users in the group by a standard hybrid argument since the adversary can simulate
the actions of additional honest users.
Variations of Non-Frameability. While traceability still makes sense without proofs
and the Judge algorithm, non-frameability does not since it is about whether a corrupt
group manager would be able to prove instead of just falsely accusing an honest user
of having signed a message. If we consider the setting with no proofs and no Judge
algorithm, we can therefore completely eliminate the non-frameability notion from
our definitions.
In Fig. 7.14 we give a variation of the non-frameability game suitable for the setting
where the roles of group manager and opening authority are separated. Since both
are under adversarial control, the game is equivalent to the previous non-frameability
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game where the group manager has both roles, so it is easy to see the transformation
from Sec. 7.1.1 of a two authority FDGS into a single authority FDGS ′ preserves non-
frameability.
Experiment: ExpNon−FrameFDGS,A (λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ); h := ⊥;S := ∅; gskh := ⊥
− (mpk, opk; stA)← A(param)
− gpk := (param,mpk, opk)
−
(
m,Σ, pi, info
)
← ASndToHU,SignHU(stA)
− If Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− If (info,m,Σ) ∈ S return 0
− Return Judge(gpk, info, reg,m,Σ, pi)
FIGURE 7.14: Non-Frameability game for separate GM and OA.
7.1.3 Additional Security Definitions
In addition to the core security properties correctness, anonymity, traceability and
non-frameability, a group signature scheme may have additional security guarantees.
In the above definitions the opening provided by either the group manager or the
opening authority can be generally thought as a deterrent against misbehaviours of
users. It is not hard, however, to envision applications in which openings could be
also used to create incentives. In such scenarios it may become crucial to prevent an
attacker exploiting the opening mechanism to her own advantage rather than eluding
it.
Opening Binding
Opening binding1 defined by Sakai et al. [SSE+12] in the context of partially dynamic
group signatures guarantees that even if all authorities and users collude they should
not be able to produce a valid signature that can be selectively attributed to two dif-
ferent members. Consider for instance a contest to find the best stock market analyst.
Group signatures are used to sign stock market predictions by the experts, who should
remain anonymous in order not to influence the markets, and later we use the open-
ing algorithm in order to tally up who is the best expert. There may be a financial
1Sakai et al. [SSE+12] refer to this notion as opening soundness.
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incentive to become the leading expert, so we could imagine a collusion where an “ex-
pert" and a “fool" enrol and then collaborate to attribute all correct predictions to the
“expert" and all wrong predictions to the “amateur".
We define opening binding game in Fig. 7.15, where the goal of the adversary is
to create a signature and two distinct attributions to who signed it. We consider a
strongly adversarial setting, where both the authorities and users may be adversarial
but want the guarantee that each signature must be attributed to a unique record in
the registry.
Definition 7.6 (Opening Binding). An FDGS scheme is opening binding if for all PPT
adversaries A
AdvOpening−BindFDGS,A (λ) := Pr[Exp
Opening−Bind
FDGS,A (λ) = 1] ≈ 0.
Experiment: ExpOpening−BindFDGS,A (λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ)
− (mpk, info, opk,m,Σ, reg, pi, reg′, pi′)← A(param)
//This is for separate GM and OA, use opk = ε if only single GM
− gpk := (param,mpk, opk)
− If Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− If Judge(gpk, info, reg,m,Σ, pi) = 0 return 0
− If Judge(gpk, info, reg′,m,Σ, pi′) = 0 return 0
− If reg 6= reg′ return 1, else return 0
FIGURE 7.15: Opening binding game.
Opening Soundness
Consider again the example of a competition to determine who is a the best stock mar-
ket prediction expert, this time from the perspective of an honest expert. It would be
problematic if it was possible to “steal" the group signatures by the honest user, i.e.,
falsely attribute them to somebody else. The worst-case scenario here is that dishon-
est authorities are collaborating with a malicious user to attribute the honest user’s
signature to the malicious user instead.
We define the opening soundness experiment in Fig. 7.16, where the adversary is
trying to attribute a signature Σ of an honest user to a different registry. The experi-
ment uses an oracle to enrol and honest user and an oracle that provides an honestly
generated signature described in Fig. 7.17.
206 Chapter 7. Foundations of Fully Dynamic Group Signatures
Definition 7.7 (Opening soundness). An FDGS scheme is opening sound if for all PPT
adversaries A
AdvOpening−SoundFDGS,A (λ) := Pr[Exp
Opening−Sound
FDGS,A (λ) = 1] ≈ 0.
Related notions of opening soundness were previously considered by Kiayias and
Yung [KY06], as a requirement for correctness, and Sakai et al. [SSE+12], under the
name of weak opening soundness. Our definition considers highly adversarial settings
and thus captures a much more stringent notion.
Experiment: ExpOpening−SoundFDGS,A (λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ); h = ⊥; reg := ⊥; gskh = ⊥; Σ := ⊥
− (mpk, opk; stA)← A(param)
//This is for separate GM and OA, use opk = ε if only single GM
− gpk := (param,mpk, opk)
− (info∗, reg∗,m∗, pi∗)← ASndToHU,SignHU(stA)
− If Judge(gpk, info∗, reg∗,m∗,Σ, pi∗) = 0 return 0
− If reg 6= reg∗ return 1, else return 0
FIGURE 7.16: Opening soundness game.
SndToHU(Mh)
 If h = ⊥:
◦ h := >:
◦Mh := init
◦ sth := gpk
 (outh;MGM; sth)← JoinWrite(·)User (Mh; sth)
 If outh 6= ε set gskh := outh
 Return (outh,MGM, sth)
SignHU(info,m)
 Σ← Sign(gskh, info,m)
 Return Σ
 Ignore future calls
Write(M)
 Set reg := M
 Send M to A
 Ignore future calls
FIGURE 7.17: Oracles used in the opening soundness game.
7.2 Partially Dynamic Group Signatures
In the previous section, we defined fully dynamic group signatures. Earlier formal
definitions covered static groups, where the membership is fixed at initialisation [BMW03],
and partially dynamic groups where new members may enrol but without revoca-
tion [BSZ05; KY06]. We will now discuss how our definitions for fully dynamic group
signatures can be relaxed to the partially dynamic settings, and we will show that
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aside from minor differences earlier formal definitions of group signatures can be seen
as restrictions of our definitions to special cases.
7.2.1 Restriction to Partially Dynamic Signatures
In prior works, the term dynamic group signature refers to the case where new mem-
bers may enrol. These definitions do not cover revocation though, the group can grow
but it will never shrink. This partially dynamic setting is simply a special case of our
fully dynamic group signatures, where we never revoke members, i.e., in all calls to
Update we have revocation setR = ∅.
For some designs of group signatures, the group information does not change as
new members are enrolled. This is unlike the fully dynamic setting, where by neces-
sity the group information must change to prevent revoked signers from using their
current keys to produce valid signatures. When the group information is immutable,
we can eliminate the Update function entirely from our scheme and remove the cor-
responding oracle in the security definitions. This in turn means we only have one
epoch τ = 0 and also the IsActive policy now simply says that an enrolled user is
active immediately after the group manager considers her joining procedure to have
ended successfully. Since info0 is generated by GM together with the manager pub-
lic key mpk, we can without loss of generality assume info0 = ε. For the special case
of partially dynamic group signatures with immutable group information, the defi-
nitions can therefore be simplified by excluding the epoch τ = 0, the public group
information info0 = ε and the Update procedure.
These notational simplifications lead us to the following syntax for a partially dy-
namic group signature scheme with immutable group information:
Reg: Data structure with records regi for joining session identifiers i = 1, 2, 3, . . . with
algorithms/oracles.
• ReadReg(i): Return regi (or ⊥ if no such record exists).
• WriteReg(i,M): Set regi := M and ignore further calls with the same i.
GSetup(1λ)→ param: PPT algorithm generating trusted parameters (or 1λ if there is
no trusted setup).
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GKGen(param)→ (mpk; stGM): PPT algorithm for group manager key generation.
The group public key is gpk := (param,mpk).
If we separate the roles of group manager GM and opening authority OA, they
instead run the interactive key generation protocol
((mpk; stGM); (opk, osk))← 〈GKGenGM(param);GKGenOA(param)〉
and let gpk := (param,mpk, opk) be the group public key.
Join: Interactive protocol for enrolling user in group. Defined by PPT algorithms
• JoinWriteReg(i,·)User (M ; st)→ (out;MGM; st).
• JoinReadReg(i)GM (i,MGM; stGM)→ (outGM;M ; stGM).
IsActive(i, stGM)→ 1/0 : DPT algorithm defining when user is considered active. In
the partially dynamic case, the policy is that the user joining in session i is active
if and only if the group manager terminated with success symbol >.
Sign(gsk,m)→ Σ: PPT signing algorithm.
Verify(gpk,m,Σ)→ 1/0: DPT verification algorithm.
Open(gpk, stGM,m,Σ)→ (i, pi): PPT opening algorithm.
If we separate the roles of group manager and opening authority, OA instead
uses the opening key osk to run OpenReadReg(·)(gpk, osk,m,Σ)→ (i, pi).
Judge(gpk, reg,m,Σ, pi)→ 1/0: DPT algorithm determining if signature was correctly
attributed to registry record reg.
The corresponding simplified security experiments for partially dynamic group sig-
nature scheme with immutable group information is given in Fig. 7.18. We list the ex-
periments for the single group manager setting, and note in the comments indicated
by // how to adapt them to the separate GM and OA setting. The oracles are defined
exactly as in the case of fully dynamic group signatures and simplified by excluding
the group information info = ε and epochs τ = 0.
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Experiment: ExpCorrPDGS,A(λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ); h := ⊥; N := 0;K := 0
− (mpk; stGM)← GKGen(param); gpk := (param,mpk)
//
(
(mpk; stGM); (opk; stA)
)
← 〈GKGenGM(param);A(param)〉
// gpk := (param,mpk, opk)
−m← AAddHU,SndToM,Write,State(gpk)
− If K = k(λ) and IsActive(h, stGM) = 0 return 0
− If IsActive(h, stGM) = 0 return 1
− Σ← Sign(gskh,m)
− Return Verify(gpk,m,Σ)
Experiment: ExpAnon−bPDGS,A(λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ);N := 0;H := ∅; C := ∅
− (mpk; stGM)← GKGen(param); gpk := (param,mpk)
//
(
(mpk; stA); (opk, osk)
)
← 〈A(param);GKGenOA(param)〉
// gpk := (param,mpk, opk)
− Return b∗ ← AAddHU,SndToM,Open,Chalb,ReadReg(gpk)
// Return b∗ ← ASndToU,Open,Chalb,ReadReg
(
gpk; stA
)
Experiment: ExpTracePDGS,A(λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ);N := 0
− (mpk; stGM)← GKGen(param); gpk := (param,mpk)
//
(
(mpk; stGM); (opk, osk)
)
← 〈GKGenGM(param);GKGenOA(param)〉
// gpk := (param,mpk, opk)
− (m,Σ)← ASndToM,WriteReg,Open,State(gpk)
//
(
m,Σ
)
← ASndToM,WriteReg,State(gpk, osk)
− If Verify(gpk,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− (i, pi)← Open(gpk, stGM,m,Σ)
// (i, pi)← OpenReadReg(gpk, osk,m,Σ)
− If IsActive(i, stGM) = 0 return 1
− If Judge(gpk, regi,m,Σ, pi) = 0 return 1
− Return 0
Experiment: ExpNon−FramePDGS,A (λ)
− param← GSetup(1λ); h := ⊥; reg = ⊥;S := ∅; gskh := ⊥
− (mpk; stA)← A(param); gpk := (param,mpk)
// (mpk, opk; stA)← A(param); gpk := (param,mpk, opk)
−
(
m,Σ, pi
)
← ASndToHU,SignHU
(
stA
)
− If Verify(gpk,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− If (m,Σ) ∈ S return 0
− Return Judge(gpk, reg,m,Σ, pi)
FIGURE 7.18: Security experiments for partially dynamic group signa-
tures.
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7.2.2 Comparison to Bellare, Shi and Zhang [BSZ05]
Bellare, Shi and Zhang [BSZ05] define partially dynamic group signatures with sepa-
rate group manager (called Issuer) and opening authority (called Opener). Their def-
inition is a specific type of partially dynamic group signature with immutable group
information. We will now describe restrictions to our definition of partially dynamic
group signatures that yields a definition similar to their definition.
Bellare, Shi and Zhang consider a group manager state formed as stGM = (msk,
{stiGM}). The state is therefore compartmentalized to consist of a fixed part msk, which
we call the manager’s secret key, and other parts stiGM that are specific to the joining
sessions. It is assumed joining session states are independent of each other, which
makes it easier to reason about concurrent joins. In particular, since the joins are in-
dependent of each other, we can under the same assumption of compartmentalized
group manager state define correctness in terms of a single joining session and ignore
any concurrent joining sessions.
Bellare, Shi and Zhang assume a trusted key generation procedure. If we assume
keys to be honestly generated, we can combine the trusted parameter generation and
the joining protocol into a single algorithm, which first runs the parameter generation
and then honestly execute the interactive key generation protocol. So there is little loss
of generality in assuming a single trusted algorithm that generates all keys.
Taken together, for a partially dynamic group signature scheme with compart-
mentalized group manager state and trusted key generation we can simplify the syn-
tax and security experiments as described below. A group signature scheme with
compartmentalized group manager state satisfying our definition in Fig. 7.18 directly
yields a partially dynamic group signature scheme satisfying the definition in Fig. 7.19
by letting the key generation procedure run the setup algorithm and the interactive
key generation protocol honestly and outputting the resulting keys.
Reg : Data structure with records regi for joining session identifiers i = 1, 2, 3, . . .with
algorithms/oracles.
• ReadReg(i) : Return regi (or ⊥ if no such record exists).
• WriteReg(i,M) : Set regi := M and ignore further calls with the same i.
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GKGen(1λ)→ (gpk,msk, osk): Trusted PPT algorithm for key generation.
Join : Interactive protocol for enrolling user in group. Defined by PPT algorithms.
• JoinWriteReg(i,·)User (M ; st)→ (out;MGM; st).
• JoinReadReg(i)GM (i,MGM,msk; stiGM)→ (outGM;M ; stiGM).
IsActive(i, stGM)→ 1/0 : DPT algorithm defining when user is considered active. In
the partially dynamic case, the policy is that the user joining in session i is active
if and only if the group manager terminated with success symbol >.
Sign(gsk,m)→ Σ: PPT signing algorithm.
Verify(gpk,m,Σ)→ 1/0: DPT verification algorithm.
OpenReadReg(·)(gpk, osk,m,Σ)→ (i, pi) : PPT opening algorithm.
Judge(gpk, reg,m,Σ, pi)→ 1/0: DPT algorithm determining if signature was correctly
attributed to registry record reg.
The matching simplified security experiments are given in Fig. 7.19. The oracles are
defined exactly as in the previous definitions.
Bellare, Shi and Zhang assume a confidential communication channel between the
group manager and joining users, while we assume an open channel. A scheme satis-
fying our security definition will of course also satisfy the weaker security definition
that assumes confidential communication channels. Conversely, the group manager
and user can use public-key cryptography to establish a confidential channel, so this
definitional difference is immaterial. Bellare, Shi and Zhang also consider a slightly
stronger definition of correctness where an honestly generated signature must always
open to identify the signer, which as discussed in Sec. 7.1.2 is covered in a computa-
tional sense by traceability and therefore in our opinion immaterial.
It can now be seen by direct comparison with [BSZ05] that the experiments in
Fig. 7.19 yield a security definition very similar to the one given by Bellare, Shi and
Zhang. One remaining difference is that Bellare, Shi and Zhang explicitly include
a public key infrastructure where each user has an identity j ∈ N and generates a
key pair (upk[j], usk[j]), and they consider the registry to be under the jurisdiction
of the group manager. However, as discussed in Section 7.1.1 we can eliminate this
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Experiment: ExpCorrBSZ,A(λ)
− (gpk,msk, osk)← GKGen(1λ) ; h := ⊥; N := 0;K := 0
−m← AAddHU,Write(gpk,msk, osk)
− If K = k(λ) and IsActive(h, stGM) = 0 return 0
− If IsActive(h, stGM) = 0 return 1
− Σ← Sign(gskh,m)
− Return Verify(gpk,m,Σ)
Experiment: ExpAnon−bBSZ,A (λ)
− (gpk,msk, osk)← GKGen(1λ) ; N := 0;H := ∅; C := ∅
− Return b∗ ← ASndToU,Open,Chalb,ReadReg(gpk,msk)
Experiment: ExpTraceBSZ,A(λ)
− (gpk,msk, osk)← GKGen(1λ) ; N := 0
−
(
m,Σ
)
← ASndToM,WriteReg(gpk,msk, osk)
− If Verify(gpk,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− (i, pi)← OpenReadReg(gpk, osk,m,Σ)
− If IsActive(i, stGM) = 0 return 1
− If Judge(gpk, regi,m,Σ, pi) = 0 return 1
− Return 0
Experiment: ExpNon−FrameBSZ,A (λ)
− (gpk,msk, osk)← GKGen(1λ) ; h := ⊥; reg = ⊥;S := ∅; gskh := ⊥
−
(
m,Σ, pi
)
← ASndToHU,SignHU(gpk,msk, osk)
− If Verify(gpk,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− If (m,Σ) ∈ S return 0
− Return Judge(gpk, reg,m,Σ, pi)
FIGURE 7.19: Security experiments for partially dynamic group signa-
tures akin to Bellare, Shi and Zhang [BSZ05]
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extra step to simplify definitions and just consider the registry record to be under
control of the user. For concreteness, this can be done by letting the user generate
a key pair (upk, usk) for an sEUF-CMA secure digital signature scheme and create a
signature σ on her intended record together with her identity j and public key upk[j].
I.e., in Bellare et al. [BSZ05] let the record created when she is joining in session i be
reg[i] = (j, upk[j], regi, σ). The user can now send this record to the group manager
when she wants to write to the registry. Since the group manager cannot forge the
user’s signature, this is equivalent to letting the user have one-time write access to
the registry, and given the record index i it is easy to map to the user identity j. Our
definition in Fig. 7.19 is mostly similar to the definition of Bellare et al. [BSZ05] modulo
this difference.
7.2.3 Comparison to Kiayias and Yung [KY06]
Kiayias and Yung [KY06] also give a formal definition of partially dynamic group sig-
natures with immutable group information. Their definition is in the single authority
setting and deviates from our definition and Bellare, Shi and Zhang [BSZ05] by trust-
ing the group manager to open honestly and not requiring proofs of correct attribution
to a signer. This simplification is easy to implement given a single authority partially
dynamic group signature; the opening algorithm can simply discard the proof of cor-
rect attribution. Kiayias and Yung assume the key generation process is honest and
they also assume the group manager’s internal state can be compartmentalized as
stGM = (msk, {stiGM}), both of which are special cases of our definition.2 In their mode,
opening takes place against a public record, so we let the opening algorithm have ac-
cess to the registry, while it is of course easy to just incorporate it into the state of the
group manager. We present the syntax and security experiments below.
Reg : Data structure with records regi for joining session identifiers i = 1, 2, 3, . . .with
algorithms/oracles.
• ReadReg(i) : Return regi (or ⊥ if no such record exists).
• WriteReg(i,M) : Set regi := M and ignore further calls with the same i.
2 Kiayias and Yung use very different notation. What they call ‘state’ is what we call ‘registry’. Their
public state contains also the transcripts of the execution of the Join protocol.
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GKGen(1λ)→ (gpk; msk): PPT algorithm for group manager key generation.
Join : Interactive protocol for enrolling user in group. Defined by PPT algorithms.
• JoinWriteReg(i,·)User (M ; st)→ (out;MGM; st).
• JoinReadReg(i)GM (i,MGM,msk; stiGM)→ (outGM;M ; stiGM).
IsActive(i, stGM)→ 1/0 : DPT algorithm defining when user is considered active. In
the partially dynamic case, the policy is that the user joining in session i is active
if and only if the group manager terminated with success symbol >.
Sign(gsk,m)→ Σ: PPT signing algorithm.
Verify(gpk,m,Σ)→ 1/0: DPT verification algorithm.
OpenReadReg(gpk,msk,m,Σ)→ i: DPT opening algorithm.
The matching security experiments are given in Fig. 7.20. The oracles are defined
exactly as in the previous definitions.
The security definition given in Fig. 7.20 is close to the security definition given by
Kiayias and Yung. There are some immaterial differences, such as allowing arbitrary
identifier i versus numbering them consecutively, and their specifying that the registry
must have entries of a specific form corresponding to the joining transcript. There is
one significant difference in the anonymity experiment. Here Kiayias and Yung re-
quire indistinguishability of two signers as long as the keys are consistent with the
protocol, i.e., could plausibly have been generated. We on the other hand, just re-
quire indistinguishability for honestly generated keys. In our opinion, the stronger
anonymity notion of Kiayias and Yung is overkill; it is reasonable to assume honest
signers will follow the protocol and therefore our anonymity experiment suffices to
protect them. Aside from this difference, inspection reveals that there are mainly no-
tational and terminological differences between our security definition in Fig. 7.20 and
Kiayias and Yung [KY06].
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Experiment: ExpCorrKY,A(λ)
− (gpk,msk)← GKGen(1λ) ; h := ⊥; N := 0;K := 0
−m← AAddHU,SndToM,WriteReg,State(gpk)
− If K = k(λ) and IsActive(h, stGM) = 0 return 0
− If IsActive(h, stGM) = 0 return 1
− Σ← Sign(gskh,m)
− Return Verify(gpk,m,Σ)
Experiment: ExpAnon−bKY,A (λ)
− (gpk,msk)← GKGen(1λ); N := 0;H := ∅; C := ∅
− Return b∗ ← AAddHU,SndToM,Open,Chalb,ReadReg(gpk)
Experiment: ExpTraceKY,A(λ)
− (gpk,msk)← GKGen(1λ)
− (m,Σ)← ASndToM,WriteReg,Open(gpk)
− If Verify(gpk,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− i← OpenReadReg(gpk,msk,m,Σ)
− If IsActive(i, stGM) = 0 return 1, else return 0
Experiment: ExpNon−FrameKY,A (λ)
− (gpk,msk)← GKGen(1λ) ; h := ⊥;S := ∅
−
(
m,Σ
)
← ASndToHU,SignHU(gpk,msk)
− If Verify(gpk,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− If (m,Σ) ∈ S return 0
− If OpenReadReg(gpk,msk,m,Σ) = h return 1, else return 0
FIGURE 7.20: Security experiments for partially dynamic group signa-
tures akin to Kiayias and Yung [KY06].
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7.3 Static Group Signatures
Similarly to the previous section we now discuss further relaxations of our definitions
to the static settings and show that definitions of [BMW03] can be seen as special case
of ours.
7.3.1 Restriction to Static Group Signatures
In static group signatures, the set of group members is fixed from the start and never
changes. This means the setup procedure is different, since it includes the key gen-
eration for all the group members, so strictly speaking static group signatures are not
just a definitional restriction of dynamic group signatures but a distinct definition al-
together. However, we can easily convert a dynamic group signature into a static one
by incorporating the join procedure for the users into the key generation process and
then at the end hand them their secret keys.
In our definition of static group signatures, we will replace the group manager key
generation with a trusted combined key generation protocol that also generates keys
for the group members. Since the set of group members is static, there is no manage-
ment operations taking place so the sole purpose of the group manager is to be able
to open group signatures and identify the signer. We therefore only consider the sin-
gle authority setting. Also, since membership does not change, the group information
does not need to change either and we only have a single epoch, so we can without
loss of generality fix info0 = ε and τ = 0 and omit them from the definition. We can
also eliminate reference to the IsActive procedure since all group members are auto-
matically considered active. Finally, since enrolment of users takes place during setup
we can only get non-frameability if the registry is honestly generated. This means that
in all the security experiments, we must assume trusted key generation, and therefore
we can incorporate the trusted parameters generation into the key generation proce-
dure.
With these changes in mind we get the following security experiments for static
group signatures, where N is an arbitrary polynomially bounded function of the se-
curity parameter.
Reg: Data structure with records regi for members numbered i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N .
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• ReadReg(i): Return regi (or ⊥ if no such record exists).
• WriteReg(i,M): Set regi := M and ignore further calls with the same i.
GKGenWriteReg(1λ, N)→ (gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN ; stGM): PPT algorithm for group man-
ager key generation, which depends on the number of desired group members
N . Returns the group public key, secret keys for the users, writes registry entries
reg1, . . . , regN , and sets the state of the group manager (which can be interpreted
as a group manager secret key).
Sign(gsk,m)→ Σ: PPT signing algorithm.
Verify(gpk,m,Σ)→ 1/0: DPT verification algorithm.
Open(gpk, stGM,m,Σ)→ (i, pi): PPT opening algorithm.
Judge(gpk, reg,m,Σ, pi)→ 1/0: DPT algorithm determining if signature was correctly
attributed to registry record reg.
The matching simplified security experiments for static group signature scheme and
oracle Keys are given in Fig. 7.21. The remaining oracles are defined exactly as in
the case of fully dynamic group signatures and simplified by excluding the group
information info = ε and epochs τ = 0.
7.3.2 Comparison to Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [BMW03]
Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [BMW03] gave a formal definition of static group
signatures where group membership is fixed at the beginning of the protocol. Their
definition does not include proof of correct opening, they just require the group man-
ager to identify the signer. This can be seen as a special case of our static group sig-
nature scheme, where we omit the Judge algorithm and simply trust the judgment of
the group manager. We still need the core properties of traceability, i.e., we can open
all valid signatures to one of the members, and still want from non-frameability that a
signature will not be opened to a member who did not sign it. We present the simpli-
fied definition of static group signatures in Fig. 7.22 and the syntax below. Oracle are
defined as for the previous definitions. Bellare et al. [BMW03] combine the traceabil-
ity and non-frameability notions into a combined notion they call full-traceability. It
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Experiment: ExpCorrSGS,A,N (λ)
− (gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN ; stGM)← GKGenWriteReg(1λ, N)
− (h,m)← AReadReg(gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN , stGM)
− If h /∈ [N ] return 1
− Σ← Sign(gskh,m)
− Return Verify(gpk,m,Σ)
Experiment: ExpAnon−bSGS,A,N (λ)
− (gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN ; stGM)← GKGenWriteReg(1λ, N)
− Return b∗ ← AOpen,Chalb,ReadReg(gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN )
Experiment: ExpTraceSGS,A,N (λ)
− (gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN ; stGM)← GKGenWriteReg(1λ, N)
− (m,Σ)← AReadReg(gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN , stGM)
− If Verify(gpk,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− (i, pi)← Open(gpk, stGM,m,Σ)
− If Judge(gpk, regi,m,Σ, pi) = 0 return 1
− Return 0
Experiment: ExpNon−FrameSGS,A,N (λ)
− S = ∅, h = ⊥
− (gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN ; stGM)← GKGenWriteReg(1λ, N)
−
(
m,Σ, pi
)
← AReadReg,Keys,SignHU
(
gpk, stGM
)
− If Verify(gpk,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− If (m,Σ) ∈ S return 0
− Return Judge(gpk, regh,m,Σ, pi)
Oracle: Keys(h)
 If h /∈ [N ] return ⊥
 Return {gski}i 6=h and ignore future calls
FIGURE 7.21: Security experiments for static group signatures.
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is not hard to see though that the definition given in Fig. 7.22 is almost equivalent to
their security definition for static group signatures.
GKGen(1λ, N)→ (gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN ; stGM): PPT algorithm for group manager key
generation, which depends on the number of desired group members N . Re-
turns the group public key, secret keys for the users, and sets the state of the
group manager (which can be interpreted as a group manager secret key).
Sign(gsk,m)→ Σ: PPT signing algorithm
Verify(gpk,m,Σ)→ 1/0: DPT verification algorithm.
Open(gpk, stGM,m,Σ)→ i: DPT opening algorithm.
Experiment: ExpCorrBMW,A,N (λ)
− (gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN ; stGM)← GKGen(1λ, N)
− (h,m)← A(gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN , stGM)
− If h /∈ [N ] return 1
− Σ← Sign(gskh,m)
− Return Verify(gpk,m,Σ)
Experiment: ExpAnon−bBMW,A,N (λ)
− (gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN ; stGM)← GKGen(1λ, N)
− Return b∗ ← AOpen,Chalb(gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN )
Experiment: ExpTraceBMW,A,N (λ)
− (gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN ; stGM)← GKGen(1λ, N)
− (m,Σ)← A(gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN , stGM)
− If Verify(gpk,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− i← Open(gpk, stGM,m,Σ)
− If i /∈ [N ] return 1
− Return 0
Experiment: ExpNon−FrameBMW,A,N (λ)
− S = ∅, h = ⊥
− (gpk, gsk1, . . . , gskN ; stGM)← GKGen(1λ, N)
−
(
m,Σ
)
← AKeys,SignHU
(
gpk, stGM
)
− If Verify(gpk,m,Σ) = 0 return 0
− If (m,Σ) ∈ S return 0
− If Open(gpk, stGM,m,Σ) = h return 1, else return 0
FIGURE 7.22: Security experiments for static group signatures akin to
Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [BMW03].
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If we have a static group signature scheme with proofs of correct opening satisfy-
ing the definition in Fig. 7.21, then it is easy to convert it into a similar group signature
without proofs of correct opening satisfying the definition in Fig. 7.22. The group key
generation algorithm can include registry record regi in the secret signing key gski and
the group manager state stGM may include the entire registry (we could in principle
instead include the registry information in the group public key, but this might lead
to an undesirable increase in the size of gpk). When the Open algorithm is called, it
runs the original opening algorithm to get (i, pi), verifies the proof using the Judge
algorithm, and returns i. It follows from the security definitions in Fig. 7.21 that this
simple modification leads to a static group signature scheme without proof of correct
opening that satisfies the definitions in Fig. 7.22.
7.4 Fully Dynamic Group Signatures from Accountable Ring
Signatures
Bootle et al. [BCC+15] give a generic construction of accountable ring signatures,
where every signature can be traced back to a user in the ring. Differently from group
signatures, accountable ring signatures lack of appointed authorities, and thus sign-
ers choose their designated opener at signing time. In addition, they give an efficient
instantiation in the random oracle model that is based on the DDH assumption. Their
instantiation yields signatures of logarithmic size (in the size of the ring), they cost
quasi-linear time to generate, and linear time to verify.
In this section we show that accountable ring signatures imply fully dynamic group
signatures. We start by recalling the security definitions of accountable ring signatures
and then present a generic construction of fully dynamic group signatures from ac-
countable ring signatures. Combined with [BCC+15], this gives a generic construction
of fully dynamic group signatures from one-way functions, IND-CPA encryption, and
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. We then show that our construction satisfies
the strongest variant of our definitions, i.e. with respect to separate authorities and
adversarial key generation.
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7.4.1 Accountable Ring Signatures
Bootle et al. [BCC+15] define an accountable ring signature scheme over a PPT setup
ARSSetup as a tuple of polynomial time algorithms (ARSOKGen,ARSUKGen,ARSSign,
ARSV fy,ARSOpen,ARSJudge).
ARSSetup(1
λ): Given the security parameter, produces public parameters pp used (some-
times implicitly) by the rest of the scheme. The public parameters define key
spaces PK,DK, V K, SK with efficient algorithms for sampling and deciding
membership.
ARSOKGen(pp): Given the public parameters pp, it produces a public key pk ∈ PK
and secret key dk ∈ DK for an opener. Without loss of generality, we assume dk
defines pk deterministically and write pk = ARSOKGen(pp, dk) when computing
pk from dk.
ARSUKGen(pp): Given the public parameters pp, it produces a verification key vk ∈
V K and a secret signing key sk ∈ SK for a user. We can assume sk deterministi-
cally determines vk and write vk = ARSUKGen(pp, sk) when computing vk from
sk.
ARSSign(pk, sk,R,m): Given an opener’s public key, a message, a ring (i.e. a set of
verification keys) and a secret key, it produces a ring signature σ. The algo-
rithm returns the error symbol ⊥ if pk /∈ PK,R 6⊂ V K, sk /∈ SK or vk =
ARSUKGen(pp, sk) /∈ R.
ARSV fy(pk,R,m, σ): Given an opener’s public key, a message, a ring and a signature,
it returns 1 if accepting the signature and 0 otherwise. We assume the algorithm
always returns 0 if pk /∈ PK or R 6⊂ V K.
ARSOpen(dk,R,m, σ): Given a message, a ring, a ring signature and an opener’s se-
cret key, it returns a verification key vk and a proof ψ that the owner of vk
produced the signature. If dk /∈ DK or σ is not a valid signature using pk =
ARSOKGen(pp, dk), the algorithm returns ⊥.
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ARSJudge(pk,R, vk,m, σ, ψ): Given an opener’s public key, a message, a ring, a sig-
nature, a verification key and a proof, it returns 1 if accepting the proof and 0
otherwise. We assume the algorithm returns 0 if σ is invalid or vk /∈ R.
Accountable ring signatures should be correct, anonymous, traceable, fully un-
forgeable and tracing sound. We recall [BCC+15] definitions of all these properties
below.
Definition 7.8 (Correctness). An accountable ring signature scheme is correct if for any PPT
adversary A
Pr

pp← ARSSetup(1λ); (vk, sk)← ARSUKGen(pp);
(pk,R,m)← A(pp, sk);σ ← ARSSign(pk, sk,R,m) :
If pk ∈ PK,R ⊂ V K, vk ∈ R then ARSV fy(pk,R,m, σ) = 1
 ≈ 1
Anonymity ensures that a signature does not reveal the identity of the ring mem-
ber who produced it without the opener explicitly wanting to open the particular
signature. The definition below implies anonymity against full key exposure attacks
([BKM09]) since in the game the adversary is allowed to choose the secret signing keys
of the users.
Definition 7.9 (Anonymity). An accountable ring signature scheme is anonymous if for any
PPT adversary A
Pr
 pp← ARSSetup(1λ); b← {0, 1}; (pk, dk)← ARSOKGen(pp):
AChalb,Open(pp, pk) = b
 ≈ 1
2
• Chalb: is an oracle that the adversary can only call once. On query (R,m, sk0, sk1) it
runs σ0 ← ARSSign(pk, sk0, R,m); σ1 ← ARSSign(pk, sk1, R,m). If σ0 6= ⊥ and
σ1 6= ⊥ it returns σb, otherwise it returns ⊥.
• Open: is an oracle that on a query (R,m, σ) returns ARSOpen(dk,R,m, σ). If σ was
obtained by calling Chalb on (R,m, ·, ·), the oracle returns ⊥.
Traceability ensures that the specified opener can always identify the ring mem-
ber who produced a signature and that she is able to produce a valid proof for her
decision.
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Definition 7.10 (Traceability). An accountable ring signature scheme is traceable if for any
PPT adversary A
Pr

pp← ARSSetup(1λ); (dk,R,m, σ)← A(pp);
pk ← ARSOKGen(pp, dk); (vk, ψ)← ARSOpen(dk,R,m, σ):
ARSV fy(pk,R,m, σ) = 1 ∧ ARSJudge(pk,R, vk,m, σ, ψ) = 0
 ≈ 0
Full unforgeability ensures that an adversary, who may control the opener, can
neither falsely accuse an honest user of producing a ring signature nor forge ring sig-
natures on behalf of an honest ring. The former should hold even when all other users
in the ring are corrupt.
Definition 7.11 (Full Unforgeability). An accountable ring signature scheme is fully un-
forgeable if for any PPT adversary A
Pr

pp← ARSSetup(1λ); (pk, vk,R,m, σ, ψ)← AUKGen,Sign,RevealU(pp):(
vk ∈ QUKGen \QRevealU ∧ (pk, vk,R,m, σ) /∈ QSign
∧ARSJudge(pk,R, vk,m, σ, ψ) = 1
)
∨
(
R ⊂ QUKGen \QRevealU ∧ (pk, ·, R,m, σ) /∈ QSign
∧ ARSV fy(pk,R,m, σ) = 1
)

≈ 0
• UKGen: runs (vk, sk) ← ARSUKGen(pp) and returns vk. QUKGen is the set of verifi-
cation keys vk that have been generated by this oracle.
• Sign: is an oracle that on query (pk, vk,R,m) checks if vk ∈ R ∩ QUKGen, in which
case returns σ ← ARSSign(pk, sk,R,m). QSign contains the queries and responses
(pk, vk,R,m, σ).
• RevealU: is an oracle that when queried on vk ∈ QUKGen returns the corresponding
signing key sk. QRevealU is the list of verification keys vk for which the corresponding
signing key has been revealed.
Tracing soundness is analogous to our opening binding definition for group signa-
tures and ensures that a signature cannot be traced to two different users in the ring.
That is, only one person can be identified as the signer, even when all users, as well as
the opener, are fully corrupt.
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Definition 7.12 (Tracing Soundness). An accountable ring signature scheme satisfies trac-
ing soundness if for any PPT adversary A
Pr
 pp← ARSSetup(1λ); (pk,R,m, σ, vk1, ψ1, vk2, ψ2)← A(pp):
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ARSJudge(pk,R, vki,m, σ, ψi) = 1 ∧ vk1 6= vk2
 ≈ 0.
7.4.2 Generic Construction from Accountable Ring Signatures
Next, we show a generic construction of a fully dynamic group signature scheme ob-
tained from an accountable ring signature. The main difference between the two prim-
itives is that the latter does not feature designated authorities. In order to minimise
the amount of trust placed in the authority, we set our group signature in the case of
separate group manager and opening authority.
The key generation protocol of our group signature consists of two independent
processes run by the group manager and the opening authority, respectively. The
opening authority computes a pair of keys by executing the opener key generation
algorithm ARSOKGen, and announces her public key. The group manager simply ini-
tialise her internal state and the group information, which are initially set equal to
empty sets.
A user initiates a joining session with the group manager by generating a key pair
(vk, sk), using ARSUKGen, and then she adds the verification key vk into the registry.
The manager reads the registry entry and checks if the same key had already being
registered, in which case the joining fails. We do not spell out the details of the registry,
but we assume users can write once into the registry and that the manager can read
the content of it. We recall that a registry offering these features can be instantiated
with a PKI and thus we abstract it out to simplify the construction.
The group manager stores the outcome of all the joining sessions as well as the
lists Iτ of active users at each epoch. To activate new members, the manager keeps a
list of users that have joined in the current epoch and updates the group information
info, which triggers a new epoch. The information of the group info consists of the
verification keys of all active members. A group signature consists of an accountable
ring signature using the current information info as the ring, and the opening authority
public key as the opener’s key.
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Details of our fully-dynamic group signature from an accountable ring signature
are given in Figure 7.23.
7.4.3 Security in our Separate Authorities Model
Theorem 7.1. The generic group signature scheme construction from accountable ring sig-
natures of Figure 7.23 satisfies our separate authority definitions for a secure, fully-dynamic
group signature scheme, and is additionally opening binding.
Proof. We use a similar proof strategy for all properties: we assume the existence of an
adversary A against the corresponding property of the group signature scheme. We
then show how to build an adversary B that uses A to break the same property of the
accountable ring signature.
For correctness, we start with B in the correctness experiment of Definition 7.8.
The adversary receives pp and the secret key sk of the target user. Given pp, the ad-
versary B provides param to A and let her pick the public key opk for the opening
authority of the group signature, while B plays the role of the honest group manager
in the game of Figure 7.3. The adversary B generates the initial group information
info0 and provides it to A. When simulating AddHU for A, B uses the secret key sk for
the challenge user; note that vk can be efficiently obtained given sk. The oracle calls
to SndToM,Update,Write,State used by A are also simulateable by B, which keeps the
internal state of the group manager. Once A returns a message and epoch pair (m, τ),
B retrieves the group information infoτ , consisting of the public keys of active group
members at epoch τ , and returns (opk,m, infoτ ). We observe thatA only wins the game
of Figure 7.3 when either the registration protocol fails to complete successfully for the
target user, or the target user is flagged as inactive even though she has joined and is
not revoked, or if the produced signature fails to verify. The registration of the target
user fails only in case A has already successfully registered the same verification key
vk in a previous session. Since vk is not exposed to A before AddHU is called, this cor-
responds to guessing the target key vk. Assuming the key space V K is large enough,
this only happens with small probability and we can thus assume the target user to
successfully complete the joining protocol. When B updates the group information,
the target user verification key is included in info until explicitly removed by another
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GSetup(1λ)→ param
 Return pp← ARSSetup(1λ)
GKGen
 GKGenOA(init; param)→ (outOA;MGM)
◦ (opk, osk)← ARSOKGen(param)
◦ Return ((opk, osk); done)
 GKGenGM(init; param)→ (outGM;MOA; stGM)
◦ info0 := ∅;L := ∅; Inew := ∅; I0 := ∅
◦ Return ((param, info0); done; (L, Inew, I0))
gpk := (param, opk)
Join
 JoinWriteReg(i,·)User (M ; st)→ (out;MGM; st)
◦ If M = init:
 (vk, sk)← ARSUKGen(param)
 Call WriteReg on input vk
 Return (ε; init; sk)
◦ If M = (done,⊥):
 gsk := ⊥
◦ If M = (done,>):
 gsk := st
◦ Return (gsk; done; st)
 JoinReadReg(i)GM (i, init; stGM)→ (outGM;M ; stGM)
◦ Parse stGM as (L, Inew, I0, . . . , Iτ )
◦ If ∃ (i, ·) ∈ L return (ε; done; stGM)
◦ vk := ReadReg(i)
◦ If (∃ j < i s.t. (j, vk) ∈ L) ∨ vk /∈ V K:
 L := L ∪ {(i,⊥)}
 Return (⊥; (done,⊥); stGM)
◦ L := L ∪ {(i, vk)}
◦ Inew := Inew ∪ {i}
◦ Return (>; (done,>); (L, Inew, I0, . . . , Iτ ))
UpdateGroup(R; stGM)→ (info; stGM)
 Parse stGM as (L, Inew, I0, . . . , Iτ )
 Iτ+1 := (Iτ \ R) ∪ Inew
 infoτ+1 := {vki : (i, vki) ∈ L ∧ i ∈ Iτ+1 ∧ vki 6= ⊥}
 Return (infoτ+1; (L, ∅, I0, . . . , Iτ+1))
Sign(gsk, info,m)→ Σ
 Return Σ← ARSSign(opk, gsk, info,m)
Verify(gpk, info,m,Σ)→ 1/0
 Return ARSV fy(opk, info,m,Σ)
OpenReadReg(gpk, osk, info,m,Σ)→ (i, pi)
 (vk, pi)← ARSOpen(osk, info,m,Σ).
 If vk 6= ReadReg(j) for all j, return (⊥, pi)
 i := min{j : vk = ReadReg(j)}
 Return (i, pi)
Judge(gpk, info, reg,m,Σ, pi)→ 1/0
 Return ARSJudge(opk, info, reg,m,Σ, pi)
IsActive(i, τ, stGM)→ 1/0
 Parse stGM as (L, Inew, I0, . . . , Iτ ′)
 If τ /∈ N ∨ τ > τ ′ return 0
 If ((i, vk) ∈ L ∧ i ∈ Iτ ∧ vk 6= ⊥) return 1
 Return 0
FIGURE 7.23: Construction of a fully dynamic group signature from an
accountable ring signature [BCC+15] .
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update. The verification key can only be removed either by revoking the target user
or if the adversary adds another group member with the same vk and then requests to
revoke her. However, registering the same verification key in a later session of the join-
ing protocol would cause the new session to fail. The remaining winning condition of
A in the game of Figure 7.3 is captured by the the last line of Definition 7.8.
For anonymity, we follow the same strategy: the adversary B plays the game of
Definition 7.9 and obtains the public parameters pp and a public key pk. Then he
proceeds to simulate the key generation protocol for the group signature (Figure 7.6):
he lets A generate the group manager public key and sets pk as the opening public
key of the opening authority. Note that the key generation protocol in Figure 7.23
consists of each authority independently producing and announcing their own keys.
This implies that pk is sufficient for B to simulate the protocol. Finally, B needs to
simulate A’s oracle calls. For the challenge and opening oracles, this is done by using
his own oracles, whereas for SndToU,ReadReg it can simply answer directly. We note
that B will correctly guess the challenge if and only if A’s guess is also correct.
For traceability, B starts by receiving pp and internally running both sides of the
key generation protocol. He then starts the group signature traceability game of Fig-
ure 7.10 and calls A. As B plays the role of the group manager in A’s game, he can
directly reply to her oracle queries. To complete the proof, we examine when A wins
her game: it must be the case that user i is inactive or that the Judge algorithm fails.
In the accountable ring signature definition the first case folds into the second: i being
inactive implies vki /∈ R which will explicitly cause the judging algorithm to fail. In
either case, A succeeding in the game of Figure 7.10 implies B succeeding according
to Definition 7.10.
For non-frameability, let B play in the full unforgeability game of Definition 7.11.
The adversary B receives pp and initialises A in the game of Figure 7.14, which gen-
erates the group public key gpk. B uses his oracles UKGen and Sign to respond to the
queries of the SndToHU and SignHU, respectively. Adversary B forwards A’s output
together with the opener public key and the honest user verification key. A wining
output by A in her game will cause B to win via the first branch on his own game:
note that B does not make use of his RevealU oracle and thatA does not output a user
identity since she only includes a single honest user in the group.
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Reduction to opening binding is near-trivial from tracing soundness: B simply
passes the setup parameters and converts the output ofA into a ring. We complete the
proof by pointing out that under the accountable ring signatures definitions ARSJudge
implies correct verification.
Instantiating the Register. The joining protocol specified in Figure 7.23 assumes the
existence of an ideal register which could be instantiated in different ways. We do
point out however, that for the traceability proof to go through, it is necessary that the
manager does not accept keys that have already been registered. At the same time, to
avoid the opening authority to misattribute signatures, it is important for the registry
to be robust enough, such that attempts to modify or copy its entries will fail. The
former is captured by our idealization of the registry, which we recall can be realised
with a PKI. The latter is accomplished by considering valid only the first occurrence of
a key in the registry, and ignoring all later occurrences as the group manager should
have rejected the corresponding joining sessions.
7.5 On the Security of Constructions Based on Revocation Lists
A common approach for designing efficient fully dynamic group signatures is by us-
ing revocation lists. Users interacts with the manager to obtain a certificate for their
group membership. The group information, periodically updated by the manager,
consists of a revocation list which stores information about the revoked users. To sign,
users have to show they hold a valid certificate and that they are not part of the set
of revoked users. Examples of efficient schemes following this approach include the
ones of Libert et al. [LPY12b; LPY12a] and Nakanishi et al. [NFH+10].
In these constructions, a user is considered authorised to sign unless the manager
explicitly includes her in the revocation list. However, this means that a user can also
sign with respect to old epochs, including those predating her joining to the group.
As the user was not yet part of the group at that time, it raises the question to whether
this represents an issue for the security of the scheme.
At first glance, this is the dual of a well known issue with many revocation systems.
If a user is revoked and anonymity is maintained, the revoked user is able to produce
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back-dated signatures that still verify. The difference here is that while the revoked
user was authorised to be part of the group for the epoch in question, in the situation
described above, however, the signing user was in fact not part of the group at that
time. If the adversary is able to obstruct or delay the opening of this signature (e.g. via
legal action), its existence would implicitly frame the group’s past membership as the
signature would be attributed to them.
The issue resides mainly on the interpretation one gives to the epochs in the lifes-
pan of the scheme. Namely, whether epochs reference the state of the group at the
time the corresponding group information was created. Our model does not opt for
a specific choice, as different design paradigms may have different takes on this. To
capture different options, our model includes the IsActive algorithm for spelling out
the conditions that makes a user active. This helps to clear potential ambiguities a
construction may have regarding the timespan users are meant to be authorised sign.
Moreover, it also enables to compare the security achieved by different schemes based
on how strong their underlying IsActive policy is.
The IsActive policy has to satisfy some necessary requirements, imposed by our
model, which ensure the definitions capture the intended security notions. One of
these requirements is the following: if user i is associated with a joining session where
the group manager ended her part successfully before infoτ was created, and user i is
not revoked at or before epoch τ , the algorithm returns 1. However, the policy does
not impose a specific outcome in case the joining session terminates after the infoτ was
created, which could then be set equal to either 0 or 1. For example, we can include
the following condition into the policy
• If i is associated with a joining session where the group manager ended her part
after infoτ was created, and user i is not revoked at or before epoch τ , the algo-
rithm returns 0.
Observe that this requirement is achieved by the policy of the construction in Figure
7.23. On the other hand, this policy may be too strict for constructions following the
revocation list approach, as members can typically sign with respect to epochs pre-
dating their enrolment into the group. The violation of the above condition translates
into a trivial attack against traceability: an adversary can simply enrol a user and then
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return a signature produced by the same user with respect to an epoch predating her
joining epoch. If the signature is valid, this represents a breach of traceability because
the user is not regarded as active with respect to that epoch. We notice that in case
such a policy is adopted, construction such as [LPY12b; LPY12a; NFH+10] are all sus-
ceptible to this attack. For such constructions we can then replace the above with the
following condition, which was implicitly assumed in their respective models
• If i is associated with a joining session where the group manager ended her part
successfully after infoτ was created, and user i is not revoked at or before epoch τ ,
the algorithm returns 1.
Note that the IsActive algorithm receives as input the internal state of the group
manager, thus the outcome of the policy can depend on whether the joining session
for user i has currently terminated. This enables to capture the immediate activation
of certificate based constructions, i.e users become active as soon as they successfully
terminate the join protocol, without requiring further action from the group manager.
Given the above trivial attack, it seems that constructions based on revocation lists
can only achieve a slightly weaker notion of traceability than the construction pre-
sented in the previous section. Whether the difference on the two notions is substan-
tial may depend on the intended applications of the primitive. In the case of [LPY12b;
LPY12a; NFH+10], these constructions can be easily adjusted to support stronger poli-
cies. At an high level, these schemes fix the maximal number of users of the system
in the setup of the primitive. Therefore, one could initialise all users that have not yet
joined the protocol as revoked. In this way, the revocation list is used to effectively
store the configuration of the group at each epoch. However, this modification may
affect the efficiency of these constructions, introducing dependencies on the maximal
number of users rather than the number of revoked members.
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Conclusions
In the first part of this work we addressed the question of whether it is possible to con-
struct zero-knowledge proofs and arguments with constant computational overhead
for the prover and gave a positive answer to it. In the process, we introduced an infor-
mation theoretic model, the ILC model, in which we assembled the core components
of our proofs. The level of abstraction encompassed by the model contributed to iso-
late the key features of the arguments presented by Groth in [Gro09], decoupling them
from the underlying commitment scheme used in their construction. This was a piv-
otal process towards the achievement of our efficiency improvements since it opened
up the possibility to instantiate our construction with different primitives and to relax
the requirements imposed on these.
Our zero-knowledge proofs and arguments for the satisfiability of arithmetic cir-
cuits are highly efficient. They achieve constant computational overhead for the prover,
optimal verification time (up to a constant factor), sublinear communication and small
round complexity. Our zero-knowledge proofs and arguments for the correct execu-
tion of TinyRAM programs do not reach our designated goal of constant computa-
tional overhead for the prover. Nonetheless, they achieve good performances and
they improve upon the efficiency of existing arguments, which brings us one step
closer towards the result. In our arguments the overhead incurred by the prover is an
arbitrarily small superconstant function with respect to the time it takes to execute the
program directly, while both the verification and communication costs are sublinear.
These contributions leave space for improvements and indicate future research di-
rections. Firstly, our proofs achieve the desired efficiency only for arithmetic circuits
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over large enough fields. An interesting question is whether our results can be gener-
alised for Boolean circuits or arithmetic circuits over a small field, without introducing
undesirable overheads in computation. As already mentioned above, another inter-
esting question is on the possibility to achieve constant overhead for zero-knowledge
proofs for the execution of programs. The challenge underpinning both these ques-
tions is related to the reduction of the field size, without affecting the soundness of the
proofs.
The other important challenge left open by this work is to achieve good concrete
efficiency. Our proofs are not optimised for this, and the constant inside the asymp-
totic complexity are not yet practical. The main bottleneck here is due to the choice
of the primitives we used to instantiate our constructions, which are optimal from an
asymptotic point of view. Since our approach is general and imposes minimal require-
ments on the primitives, other instantiations could offer different efficiency tradeoffs.
Another interesting question comes from the observation that various recent zero-
knowledge proofs seem to share similarities, despite they use different approaches,
e.g. from the MPC and IOP settings. It is an interesting question to see if these ap-
proaches can be combined within a unified model and to exploit the several improve-
ments stemming from the different directions.
In the second part of this work, we proposed a formal security model for fully dy-
namic group signatures. We think that our definitions provide a good level of abstrac-
tion of the primitive, and that this can be used to capture the security of constructions
which follow very different approaches from each other. Our model covers a wide
spectrum of security definitions and offers several relaxations to help capturing secu-
rity in different settings. Finally, our model offers stringent security properties which
require minimal trust in the designated authorities.
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